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A

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404—362 B.C.

BY

A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A. Oxon.,

AUTHOR OF "THE TUTORIAL HISTORY OF ROME," "EARLY GRECIAN HISTORY," ETC.



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SPARTA AND THEBES:

A HISTORY OF GREECE, 404—362 B.C.

CHAPTER I.

THE YEAR OF ANARCHY.

§ 1. Recapitulatory.—§ 2. Characteristics of the Period.—§ 3. The Terms of Peace and Disarming of Athens.—§ 4. Feeling amongst the citizens: Oligarchs, Aristocrats, and Democrats.—§ 5. Interpretation of the Peace by Lysander: His position, aims, and methods.—§ 6. The Thirty Tyrants: Theramenes and Critias: First Measures of the Thirty.—§ 7. Tyranny of the Thirty.—§ 8. Theramenes at variance with Critias: Further excesses.—§ 9. Dissatisfaction of the Allies of Sparta: Reaction in favour of Athens: Conduct of Lysander.—§ 10. Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus head the Athenian Exiles: They seize Phyle and defeat the Thirty.—§ 11. Alarm of the Thirty: Execution of Theramenes: Occupation of Eleusis.—§ 12. The Exiles seize Peiræus: The Thirty retire to Eleusis: First Board of Ten: They call in the aid of Sparta.—§ 13. Pausanias and Lysander in Attica: Second Board of Ten: Pausanias arranges terms of Peace.—§ 14. The restoration of Democracy and end of the Year of Anarchy.

§ 1. THE fall of Athens in 404 B.C. marks an era. In one sense it is the last notable event in the history of free Greece, and from this point dates the loss of Hellenic liberty and independence. With Athens' fall ends also the Golden Age of Greece, a Golden Age of fifty years only (480—431 B.C.).

There was never such a thing as an Hellenic nation, and it is the special merit of Athens, that within the brief

period of her power, and thanks to her efforts, an Hellenic unity was more nearly effected than at any other date before or after. In the earliest years for which we possess any historical data, Greece appears as an aggregate of rival states, each clinging obstinately to a traditional individuality, and refusing to recognize between itself and others any such bond of union as might have resulted in the building up of an Hellenic nation. Even in the remotest times to which tradition reaches, the epoch of the glories of the Achæan chiefs of Argos and Mycenæ, there is no trace of a national unity; the mighty Agamemnon is not sovereign of a single people, but overlord of a number of petty tribes—Achæans, Danaans, Minyans, and so on—which own no recognizable tie of fellowship. So in historic days: old names have disappeared and new ones have taken their places, but there is still the same unconquerable desire for individuality as before. Even the more comprehensive titles of Dorians and Ionians betray no real growth of the idea of a national unity: they do not so much betoken the friendly coalescence of the several items in the two great groups, as the accentuated divergence of these groups from each other; and the visible result of the acknowledgment of a common Dorism and a common Ionism goes little further than a more or less formal communion in certain unimportant forms of worship.

Then came the Persian Wars. Attacked as an aggregate for the first time within their memory, the various states of Greece suddenly discovered themselves to be an aggregate, to constitute the elements requisite for the making of a nation; and for the moment they promised to combine in something approaching to a national league. The immediate danger passed away, but the menace of it remained; and it was in the fear of that menace that the states of Greece drew together in the most permanent, because most voluntary, union to which they were destined to attain. Heretofore the tendency had been solely centrifugal, the ideal individualism; henceforward for a time there was to be a centripetal movement and an ideal of community, but dimly conceived only, and never put into perfect shape. The state which preached the new ideal and

stood forward as centre of the new movement was Athens, the foundress and leader of the Delian League. Yet even from the first her task was hard, for the very mention of federation again reminded the Greek states of their traditional isolation, and made them suspicious of the new ideal. From the first there was dissent, and as usual the dissenting factions in the heat of their opposition adopted something of the very spirit against which they protested, and united in what was in fact a counter-federation under Sparta. But there was this essential distinction between the two Leagues, that the union inaugurated by Athens was inspired by a common wish for the welfare of its members as members of a nation, whereas the union led by Sparta was based upon no higher motives than jealousy and fear. The Delian League was a positive step towards Hellenic nationalism; the Peloponnesian Confederacy was a retrograde step in the direction of the older and impracticable individualism.

The two parties fought, and the party of retrogression prevailed. Athens fell, and with her fell the only power which was ever able to provoke a generous and voluntary effort towards union. The party of dissent was triumphant, and it seemed that, the life-work of Athens overthrown, Greece was free to revert to the traditional condition of disunion. But the crusade against Athens had been animated by no principle sufficiently lofty, even though mistaken, to guide the policy of the victors. Its true animus had been jealousy of the power of Athens, and the victors discovered too late that in combining against one League they had subjected themselves to another and a very different one under Sparta. Sparta had nothing to offer: she inspired no enthusiasms, satisfied no desires, appealed to no sentiment. Obedience she might and did command for a moment, but nationalism she was neither desirous nor able to inspire. Yet that national union was possible, however difficult of attainment, had been proved by the history of the Athenian League now dispersed: during fifty years it had grown steadily; within this brief period it had advanced its members to a height of prosperity and culture and good government to which they never afterwards attained; and

for nearly thirty years it withstood the incessant attacks of an enemy of at least equal powers. Nay, its members themselves confessed the possibility and the value of such a union, firstly by the stubbornness with which they resisted the attacks of the party of dissent, and secondly by the eagerness with which they sought unavailingly to renew the League only five-and-twenty years later. But there was never to be a Greek nation. Such an end was never attained more nearly than in the days when Athens and the Periclean democracy were the moving spirit of Greece.

§ 2. The Golden Age was ended, and Sparta was apparently the mistress of Greece. Apparently only; for while there remained no single state, or federation of states, sufficiently strong to resist her will, yet the bond which held together the mass of the Greek states as allies of Sparta was neither enduring nor productive. It was based in fact upon two motives only, upon greed and upon fear. The members of the original Peloponnesian Confederacy against Athens had combined under the influence of the greed with which they looked forward to sharing in the plunder of the Athenian Empire; and when that Empire was no more the Confederates, baulked of their hopes by the greater greed of Sparta, had no longer even this base motive for cohesion; the late members of the Athenian League, now forced into an unwilling subjection to Sparta, remained obedient only so long as they were constrained by fear, and this restraint grew less from the very moment when Sparta's triumph revealed to her former allies the selfishness of her greed. The states of Greece were in reality less united, further removed from any recognition of a common nationality, in the moment of Sparta's victory, than even in the days when their entire number was divided into the two hostile camps of the Athenian and the Peloponnesian Confederacies. The history of the next thirty years is the history of the undoing of all that Athens had achieved.

The power which did more than all others to thwart, check, and nullify the efforts of Athens was Sparta. The Spartans were by tradition a conquering people, and to the last they believed that Empire was more strongly founded, more rightly measured, in the numbers of its subjects

than in their cohesion. She wished to set every state in Greece subject to herself, and every one of her subjects at variance with all the rest. She aimed at combining universal autonomy with universal subjection, and she failed because of the inherent contradiction in her aims. Holding in her grasp an Empire far wider than any of which Athens had ever dreamed, Sparta was wholly unable to retain it. From the day whereon Lysander sailed into Peiraeus the power of Sparta waned. Based upon a mistaken and backward policy, it sought to strengthen the conquering state by weakening the rest of Greece; and unfortunately it succeeded in the latter object as signally as it failed in the former.

In fact, from 404 B.C. dates the decline of Greece. It was the doing of Sparta, and a righteous Nemesis ruled that Sparta herself should be the first and most notable example. For a moment the general decay was arrested by the personality of Epameinondas the Theban, but with his death it commenced anew, and thenceforth it never ceased. With Epameinondas disappeared the final hope of a Greece united and free. Greece was never united until no longer free, and the force which then compelled her union was the Macedonian phalanx in the hands of Alexander.

But side by side with the internal decay and disintegration of the Greek states proceeds the extension of their external relations. Their history is no longer their own: it is the history also of Thessaly, of Macedonia and Epeirus and Molossia, of Phoenicia and Egypt, of Persia and of the Orient at large; for these regions came successively and increasingly into contact with the Hellenic states. That final conquest by Alexander which was, in the eyes of a Demosthenes, the extinction of the Greek world, was in reality the restoration of the Greek spirit to a sphere of usefulness and power never known before, for it carried the influence of Greek life and Greek thought to the banks of the Oxus and the Indus, the Euphrates and the Nile. This is what is meant by the dictum that the history of Hellas ends where that of Hellenism begins.

§ 3. With the battle of Aegospotami (405 B.C.) the Pello-

ponnesian War, which had already lasted twenty-six years, virtually came to an end. Athens, it is true, did not capitulate until a few months later, but it was at once apparent that the triumph of Sparta could not be much longer delayed, and on the 16th day of Munychion, that is, in April, 404 B.C., the Athenian Ecclesia accepted the terms of peace as brought back from the Ephorality at Sparta by its envoy Theramenes. By the terms of that peace Athens was to enjoy her original and traditional constitution; she was stripped of all her dependencies, subjects, and allies, beyond the limits of Attica; she surrendered the whole remnant of that magnificent fleet which had for seventy-five years carried her flag over all Grecian waters; she consented to the destruction of the walls and fortifications which encircled her three ports and combined the whole area from the Acropolis to Phalerum into one gigantic fortress—the shield of her power, as her fleet had been its spear; she re-admitted all those whom party feeling had driven into exile; she laid down her claim to independence even within the bounds of Attica, and enrolled herself formally amongst the allies so-called of her conquerors, pledged in future to fight the battles of Sparta defensive or offensive. The terms were hard, yet there had been heard voices in the synod of Sparta's allies—the voices of Corinthians and Thebans—to call for nothing less than the utter destruction of the fallen city. To such extreme suggestions the Ephors had refused to listen: they spoke hypocritically of the impiety of rasing to the ground the city which had once staved off slavery from the Hellenic race. Nay, Lysander, the man to whom Athens surrendered and by whom the terms of the treaty were to be carried out, so far modified their severity as to leave a poor dozen war-ships in her harbours. Yet the terms were still hard, and nothing but famine had wrung them from the vanquished; and harder to bear almost than the terms in themselves, was the sound of the songs and music and revelry which accompanied the overthrow of the battlements and towers of Peiraeus and the Long Walls. Athens herself retained her walls; but Peiraeus, with Munychia and Phalerum, became a separate and unwallied port, and

only ruins and rubbish now occupied the five miles of intervening space. Freedom had dawned upon Greece, said the allies of Sparta.

§ 4. The future of Athens depended upon the manner in which Sparta should interpret the first article of the treaty as given above, an article which was only amplified and particularized by others which followed. What was "the original and traditional constitution" of Athens? for hers was a polity which, founded in prehistoric days, had been already nine times revolutionized by law-givers and despots and demagogues from the legendary Theseus through Draco and Solon to Peisistratus; thence through Cleisthenes and the crisis of the Persian Wars towards that fully-developed democracy sketched by Aristides and completed by Ephialtes and Pericles; and through the revolution of the Four Hundred to that second and less republican democracy which Athens now presented. The common voice of Greece would have said that her traditional constitution was democracy, certainly not oligarchy; for oligarchism at Athens had been overthrown by Solon, the brief renewal of Areopagite ascendancy after the Persian Wars had been abruptly stayed by the statesmanship of Ephialtes, and the attempt to restore it in 411 B.C. had resulted in a speedy and national revulsion. Still, there remained some who hoped to see it established now. These were the men, mostly of the wealthier classes, who had favoured the revolution of the Four Hundred, and had in many cases suffered exile for their political bias; and they came back now as men of extreme oligarchic views, with feelings more than ever averse to the democracy which had expelled them, and with high hopes of support from Sparta. There were others amongst the exiles who owed their banishment only to the demagogism of the leaders of the extreme democrats. These represented the old moderate aristocratic party; they had many supporters amongst the wealthy, and they could plead with some truth that the "traditional constitution" of Athens was the limited democracy of the days when the Areopagus still controlled the machinery of the state. Lastly, there was the mass of the population which had been born under the constitution

of Pericles, and had seen in the misdeeds of the Four Hundred but a sorry specimen of oligarchic rule; the men who for seven-and-twenty years had struggled for their country and its constitution against well-nigh all Greece, the men who had manned the fleets and filled the armies of Athens; that "sea-faring mob" in which democracy found its strongest hold. But though superior in numbers to both of the remaining parties together, in point of wealth and birth and position they could not compare with either oligarchs or aristocrats, and they were the avowed foes of Sparta and all her works.

§ 5. Now the Spartan government, itself the type of rigid oligarchism, was inherently strange to any democratic form of government; and this inherent difference had developed into a positive antagonism during the course of the rivalry between Sparta and Athens and their respective allies. Nevertheless, aversion to democracy and predilection for oligarchism were by no means articles of political faith at Sparta. Had the government been left free to decide the political future of Athens, it would very probably have recognized the now crippled democracy as the "traditional constitution." At the worst, it would have gone no further than to restore the highly respectable ascendancy of the aristocratic Areopagites; for that party had constantly proved itself strenuous in support of Spartan interests, and had been mainly instrumental in effecting the Peace of Nicias. There is no reason to believe that the Spartan government as a body desired to hand over Athens to an oligarchy of the extreme kind, even though we should allow that its counsels would be little influenced by any inconvenient recollection that Sparta had achieved her triumph under the plea of asserting the freedom of all Greeks. But at this moment the Ephorality was not by any means able to do as it pleased: the even course of its usurpations had indeed reduced the kingship and the senate to insignificance, but it had allowed the rise of another power far more formidable than either. Lysander, the son of a slave mother, the ambitious neodamode, the man whose talents had won for Sparta the support of Persia and by spreading his influence throughout the dependencies of Athens had at

length brought the Peloponnesian War to an unlooked-for completion, was now almost the embodiment of the Spartan will. Ambitious, shrewd, indefatigable, a perfect master of all diplomatic arts, as much of a knave as was consistent with Spartan ideas of virtue, and above all phenomenally successful, his example and his genius and his manners alike made him sure of admirers, even without regard to party feeling or personal interest. These latter motives, however, obtained for him supporters far more numerous: his success as admiral of Sparta had won for him extraordinary influence with a government which was only eager to end a burdensome war without regard to the means employed, and from being the servant of his country he had risen to be something very like her master. Lowborn as he was, he yet had partisans even amongst the Spartiates, and with some of these at least the motive for their attachment was secret weariness of the old and narrow Spartan polity and the secret hope that Lysander might open to them a freer and less irksome life.

Lysander had won his influence at home in recognition of his influence abroad: his influence abroad was founded upon his talent for political intrigue. In every Greek state there was a party more or less dissatisfied with the existing form of government: Lysander made himself the patron of such discontent, irrespective of its cause. He went further: his talent for organization enabled him to raise his clients to a degree of strength heretofore unknown. In each community the Lysandrians formed Hetaeries or clubs, of which the influence was the more formidable because of its secret character; and whereas heretofore the malcontents had as a rule been powerless by reason of their lack of unity, Lysander's diplomacy enabled them in many cases to realize their hopes, overthrow the existing government, seize the ascendancy for themselves, and use it solely for the furtherance of their patron's aims. These were the men who at length broke down the power of Athens by stripping her of her dependencies. And Lysander was no less systematic in his treatment of such clients after their success: in each city and town which thus fell under his influence he set up Decarchies, or Councils of Ten, selected

from the most capable and reliable of his clients, strengthening their position, when need was, by the support of a Spartan garrison under the control of a harmost. The presence of a harmost served at once to protect the decarchies and to ensure their loyalty, with the further result that these new dependencies of Sparta were far less allies of herself than of Lysander in person.

At Athens, as elsewhere, Lysander had been at pains to find clients and to form clubs. The fallen party of the Four Hundred offered materials in plenty; and when he appeared in person to accept the surrender of the city, it was to be expected that he would at once establish here also a decarchy of his creatures. Contrary to expectation, he did not immediately do so. He sailed away for some weeks to superintend the reduction of Samos, the last loyal unit of the Athenian Confederacy. In the interim his partisans, sure of his support, had been active in bringing the leaders of the old democratic party into disrepute; and when at length Lysander returned to the city and was appealed to to decide upon the proper interpretation of the expression "traditional constitution," no one was astonished that he at once set up a decarchy in Peiræus and handed over the government of Athens to a similar Board of Thirty, charged ostensibly with the task of revising the constitution with a view to bringing it into harmony with the altered condition of the state.

§ 6. The Board of Thirty—the Thirty Tyrants—was thus established in May, 404 B.C., the decree for its authorization standing in the name of one Dracontides. Of the number were the proposer himself, Theramenes, and Critias. Theramenes had long been a prominent figure in Athens. Included amongst the Four Hundred of 411 B.C., he had at length gone over to the democratic side, and had assisted in expelling his colleagues in time to secure his own safety; he had been foremost in the iniquitous judicial murder of the generals of Arginusæ in 406 B.C.; and had recently served as envoy to Sparta to treat for peace, on which occasion he had used his powers as far as might be to gain friends at Sparta. His training, like that of the traitor Alcibiades, was said to be due to Socrates, his

eloquence was considerable, but his lack of principle and his time-serving had earned for him the *sobriquet* of Cothurnus, "Buskin*," and had made him an object of distrust to all parties alike. Critias, on the other hand, had been for some years an exile, it is not known why. He had made himself a name in Athens rather as a brilliant example of a wealthy and cultured noble—specimens of his poetry and orations were extant as late as the Augustan age—than as a politician; for he was one of the comrades of Alcibiades in his youth, he was a good poet and better orator, and the heir to the wealth and name of an ancient Eupatrid family. His sister was the mother of the philosopher Plato. His years of exile he had spent as an adventurer in Thessaly, where he had adopted the usual method of the would-be despot to obtain power for himself by professing to champion the serfs or *penestæ* against the oligarchs and nobles their masters. Before his plans in Thessaly could bear fruition he was recalled to Athens by the news of her fall.

The Thirty showed no intention to confine themselves to the strict limits of their authority—the codification of the laws. Their first step was to sweep away the whole machinery of the late democratic government. In Peiræus they could reckon upon the support of a decarchy of their own adherents governing that town, together with Munychia and Phalerum, as an independent community: confident therefore in their security they dismissed the existing senate and enrolled another, recruited wholly from returned exiles, men who had belonged to the Four Hundred, and others of well-trying oligarchic bias; they treated the board of police officials known as the Eleven in the same way, making one Satyrus chief of their own nominees; and to ensure their personal security they enrolled a bodyguard of three hundred men. Turning now to what was more strictly their duty, they gave out that they intended to rehabilitate the aristocratic government of the Areopagus as it had existed before the days of Ephialtes and Themistocles, and agreeably with this announcement they proceeded to suppress the dicasteries and such portion of the existing laws as related thereto,

* That is, a shoe which will fit either foot equally well.

and to destroy the records of anti-Areopagite legislation. The suppression of the dicasteries might have been prompted by a real desire to purge the state of one of its worst-abused institutions, but in the case of the Thirty the issue showed them to be guided solely by self-seeking and fear. Equally specious was the declaration that they would put an end to sycophancy by making away with its advocates, for under cover of this plea they arrested and put to death such of the leading men of the democratic party as failed to make good their escape. The victims were dragged before the new senate, the charge was read out by one of the Thirty; and with the whole body of Thirty in the prytaneum and their three hundred guards close at hand, the senators were compelled to register their votes openly for the satisfaction of their masters. Such was the substitute offered for the justice of the dicasteries. The property of the "malignants," whether they remained to be executed or went into exile, was of course confiscated to the state, that is, to the Thirty.

§ 7. We have few details of the proceedings of the Tyrants. We know, and indeed we should have expected, that they soon laid aside the bare pretence of legality. Their first excesses were prompted by fear that a popular reaction might find leaders in the men whom they therefore hastened to put out of the way. Strombichides, a prominent democrat, was got rid of in this manner. The same motive would lead to further judicial murders as a preventive of retaliation. Then would come in the motive of cupidity, and victims would be found amongst wealthy men of no political weight. Despotism is always a costly form of power, for having none to support it on principle it needs to pay for its supporters, and apart from such bribery, the Thirty required funds for the maintenance of their bodyguard, and subsequently also for that of the garrison which they hired from Sparta. On the other hand, the Thirty took no measures to conciliate the many who viewed them with dislike; on the contrary, they had made tacit enemies of the mass of the population by disenfranchising all. They had promised indeed shortly to publish a list of those upon whom the new and more limited franchise was to be conferred, but the promise was not yet

fulfilled. The free citizens of the late democracy, without political power and in daily fear for their lives and fortunes, hurried into voluntary exile, leaving few within the walls but the partisans and hirelings of the Thirty, the wealthy men of oligarchical views, the knights, and the metics. The metics for the most part cared little for politics, so long as the government for the time being should leave them free to make what profits they might from trade. The rich Athenians had positive grievances: alike in times of peace and war they had been heavily taxed, whether with the burden of the state liturgies or with still more burdensome special imposts, yet it was upon them as landholders in Attica or as partners in large mercantile houses that there had fallen the brunt of the losses incurred during the late war; and because of their fewness they had possessed but little influence in the Ecclesia, while constantly exposed to the attack of demagogues and sycophants. Throughout Greece wealth and oligarchism went hand-in-hand, and at Athens the Thirty, so long as they treated their allies well, found their staunchest allies amongst the property-holding classes.

§ 8. Party-feeling was, however, too violent in the Greek mind to allow the Thirty to act with moderation, and moreover they, and their tools in the senate or elsewhere, were from the first fated to disagree, because constituted from the remains of two once dominant parties, that of the Aristocrats and that of the Extremists who had formed the Four Hundred. To Theramenes the error of Critias' policy was patent: if their position was to be worth keeping, the Thirty must contrive to keep Athens from depopulation; for when the democrats had disappeared, the engines of oppression would be turned upon those who remained, and if these were estranged the Thirty must fall. Accordingly he stood forward as the advocate of less violent measures, in opposition to Critias and the extreme oligarchs. He declared that there must at once be published a list of the enfranchised, in order to stay the rapid diminution of the population, and protested strongly against the high-handed murders and robberies of his colleagues. Critias and the extreme party had reason enough to suspect the loyalty of the "Buskin," and indeed it was manifest that the views

of Theramenes must find speedy echo among the mass of the populace. If he should effect a coalition with the remnant of the democracy, the position of the Thirty would be perilous. Accordingly a compromise was made for the present, and there was drawn up a list of 3000 persons to be fully enfranchised*; but even now the concession was but half-hearted, for the list was not published, none save the Thirty knew who were included therein, and the Thirty continued to strike down one or other of the number at their will and to fill up the vacancies with other names. In fact Critias had formed a definite policy and was working, however recklessly, towards its fulfilment: he intended to stamp out democracy entirely. It was for this end that Peiraeus had been placed under a decarchy whose duty it was to discourage all commerce, and by fair means or foul to get rid of the mercantile population. To this end, no less than for private profit, the Thirty oppressed and plundered the democrats within Athens. They went further: they put a veto upon all teaching and teachers, rightly holding the sophists to be the champions of freethinking as the rhetoricians were those of free speech, two liberties which could not be tolerated in an oligarchic state; and they made scapegoats of the metics who formed the commercial connexion between Athens and every other trading community in Greece. The result was that the metics fled the city and its commerce came to a standstill, while the sophists and their fellows went to join the growing numbers of the exiles, and to arouse them to reassert their rights.

§ 9. Before six months had passed, the feeling of Greece at large towards Athens was very markedly changed. The two chief factors in this revulsion were the conduct of Sparta and the lawlessness of the Thirty. The Peloponnesian War had been ostensibly a crusade against Compulsory Federation as exemplified in the Confederacy of Delos: its ostensible object had been to set at liberty all who were constrained to be the unwilling dependencies of Athens, and its results had been the complete dissolution

The principal privilege of the Three Thousand was the right of trial by the senate, which was not worth much, while all others were liable to be disposed of without the form of trial by the vote of the Thirty.

of the Confederacy and the overthrow of Athens. But the allies of Sparta found themselves little rewarded for the toil which they had expended at their leader's behests: the glory of victory went to Sparta alone, in the person of Lysander, and to Sparta went the spoils of the victory also—the warships of Peiraeus, the plunder of the captured towns, the large residue of the funds provided by Cyrus, amounting to no less than 470 talents, and in fact the entire outcome of the twenty-seven years of war. The allies might be content so far as glory went to enjoy the consciousness of their own merits, but they could not as easily forego their just share in the more material gains of the war; and yet their request to be admitted to share at least in the spoils of the Deceleian War and in the Persian treasure were met with rude refusal, and they learnt that they had expended money and men and toil only for the enrichment of Sparta. More than this, the much-talked-of liberation of the Greek communities was palpably a trick, for in all quarters of Greece the communities wrested from the Athenian alliance were now placed in far worse bondage to Sparta, by means of the Lysandrian decarchies and the Spartan harmosts, than any which they had ever felt at the hands of Athens; and whereas their previous allegiance to Athens had in the greater number of cases been determined by the voice of a majority of the population themselves, their subservience to Sparta was secured by the open constraint of military occupation. In fact in place of the twofold division of Greece under the headship of Athens and of Sparta, there was now one well-nigh universal subjection to the single domination of Sparta, a domination which contrasted unfavourably with that of Athens in point of liberality, freedom, and even justice. Everywhere the decarchies and harmosts committed outrages upon life and property and national feeling not less violent than those perpetrated by the Thirty at Athens. The general disgust of Spartan coercion and arrogance found indeed only its most moving example in the pitiful condition of Athens. Not only did the Peloponnesian allies come to regret the part which they had taken in advancing the power of Sparta and in destroying the only

power able to countervail it, but their feelings were stirred with pity and remorse for the evil plight of the city which had been the pioneer of Greek art and civilization and culture. Disappointment, jealousy, and pity rapidly estranged from Sparta even those who had been most violent in their hatred of Athens; and when the Lysandrians caused to be issued an edict that all who sheltered the refugees from Athens should be regarded as enemies of Sparta, Thebes and Megara led the way in refusing to obey such an injunction.

Nor were things working altogether smoothly even at Sparta, where the extraordinary ascendancy of Lysander and his consequent presumption were rapidly making him an object of distrust and dislike to the two kings, whom he was suspected of a wish to depose, to the Ephoralty, upon whose powers he trenched, and to the Spartiates generally, whose pride of birth he offended. His many years of successful service abroad, and his intimate relations with such men as Cyrus and Pharnabazus, by no means tended to leave him a good citizen, but filled him with aspirations and hauteur which suited ill with the traditional humility required by the national discipline. He was disgusted to find himself less powerful in his own country than when in command of fleets and forces on foreign service, and his undisguised efforts to maintain at home what had lately been his position abroad speedily set the constitutional authorities very decidedly against him. For the first time of which we have any record Sparta began to experience the perplexities of political party-feuds.

§ 10. The fugitives from Athens, by this time amounting to several thousands, turned to the best advantage the feeling against Sparta and the general sympathy with their own misfortunes. In particular there assembled a great number of such refugees in Thebes and other Boeotian towns, and at Chalcis in Euboea, at which places they were within sight of their own country. Those who befriended them did not dare indeed to offer them direct aid to their restoration, but they provided them with convenient rallying-points and with funds, and encouraged them as far as they safely could. The leaders

of the exiles were Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus, all men of ardent democratic views and honest resolve. Anytus had yet to make a name, but Archinus was already a man of some prominence and considerable military experience, while Thrasybulus had earned the lasting gratitude and confidence of his party by the zeal wherewith he had resisted oligarchic intrigues at Samos and there maintained the democracy until the fall of the Four Hundred. He was well known, moreover, as a public speaker, and events proved him to be no mean strategist, and withal—a rare thing in Greece—a man in whom the promptings of partisanship did not override those of humanity.

These three men resolved to attempt the restoration of the democracy at Athens. They numbered as yet but seventy followers, and their means were limited to the voluntary loans of Ismenias and other leading Thebans, but they knew that the smallest success on their part would bring to their side the hundreds of other Athenian exiles now scattered throughout Greece, and they could hope for the co-operation of those of the democratic party who still remained within the walls of Athens. Accordingly, late in the year 404 B.C., they left Thebes and seized the dismantled outpost of Phyle, upon the road between that city and Athens on the confines of Boeotia, and from its lofty position on Mt. Parnes commanding the whole of Attica.

By this time the Thirty, yielding to the ceaseless importunities of Theramenes, had published the names of the Three Thousand selected for the franchise, doubtless including in this list only the wealthier men of oligarchic leanings. With this force, with the Knights, and with their bodyguard of three hundred, they at once attacked Thrasybulus at Phyle, favoured by unusually fine weather for the season, which was winter. Their attack was rashly made and easily repulsed; whereupon they commenced to blockade the fortress, but a snowstorm came on and compelled them to return to Athens, leaving their baggage in the hands of their opponents. After this a force of seven hundred men, who garrisoned the Acropolis

under the Spartan Callibius, together with two tribes of Knights, were commissioned to keep the exiles in check, and to prevent their obtaining supplies by foray. But Thrasybulus, whose numbers had by this time risen to seven hundred men, surprised his enemies a little before daybreak, when they were all unprepared and many of them in their beds, and completely defeated them.

§ 11. The Thirty became alarmed. Beyond the walls they could rely only upon Peiraeus, so long as it was occupied by the decarchy, and upon Sparta; but the recent defeat had proved that Spartan troops were not invincible. Within the city there remained indeed few of the democratic party, but Theramenes with his moderate counsels was a standing menace to the cohesion of the oligarchs, and therefore to their safety. Critias therefore resolved to remove him, before he could enter into any dealings with the exiles. Without any warning Theramenes was suddenly denounced in the senate, and that body was called upon forthwith to condemn him to death, as a man who had in the past ruined the Four Hundred, and was in the present suspected of scheming for his own safety by the overthrow of the Thirty. When the senate demurred, partly from natural compunction and partly persuaded by the vehement rhetoric of Theramenes' reply to his accusers, and when it was objected that, as one of the Thirty, he was entitled to a formal trial, Critias replied by striking out his name from the list of the Thirty, and thereby making his immediate execution a matter for the decision of himself and his remaining colleagues. In vain Theramenes sought refuge at the altar of the Prytaneum. He was dragged away by Satyrus and the Eleven, and at once despatched by the customary draught of hemlock.

Such an act was well calculated to repress the growth of defection amongst the adherents of the Thirty, but that body was now in a condition of panic terror. They commenced a fresh series of murders and confiscations, so contriving their iniquities as to involve in them the whole body of their partisans, and thereby to make it a matter of interest with the latter to resist to the utmost any revolution which would bring them within reach of the

vengeance of the democrats. On one occasion they sent orders to Socrates and four other prominent citizens to set out for Salamis and bring back by force a certain democrat named Leon who had gone thither for safety. Socrates bluntly refused, and defied the vengeance of the tyrants. The others were more compliant and accomplished their mission. So little, however, did the Thirty trust their position that they now cast about for some place which might serve as a refuge if things came to the worst. They selected Eleusis and Salamis, two positions admirably situated for hampering Athens and Peiraeus, and easily accessible to aid from Sparta. By a stratagem they got possession of the whole population of Eleusis, and had them to the number of three hundred put to death on the next day by vote of the Three Thousand. Whether they were equally successful in their attempt upon Salamis is not known. Lastly, they utilized the Spartan garrison in another stratagem, whereby they disarmed the whole population of Athens other than the Three Thousand, thus making impossible any attempted armed rising in favour of Thrasybulus.

§ 12. Meantime the exiles had found themselves strong enough to quit Phyle and march past the city to Peiraeus, which they seem to have occupied without a struggle. Thereupon the Thirty advanced along the great road from Athens, drove back the small and poorly-armed company of Thrasybulus, and at length brought him to a stand upon the slope of the hill of Munychia. Here they ventured to attack him despite the strength of his position, and suffered a complete defeat. Critias himself fell in the fight, and the whole of the Peiraeic peninsula was now in the hands of Thrasybulus.

Within Athens the immediate result was the downfall of the party of extreme oligarchy. The Three Thousand formally deposed the Thirty, and elected in their place a Board of Ten, who were instructed to arrange for a compromise with the exiles if possible. But the new board, which included at least two members of the old Thirty, were no more anxious to fulfil their purpose than their predecessors had been: they had ardent supporters amongst

the Knights and the wealthy generally, all of whom dreaded punishment for the enormities in which they had been participants; and backed up by these they made fresh appeals for Spartan aid, and for funds with which to equip a larger force. They made no attempt to negotiate with the exiles in Peiraeus.

Upon their deposition, the remnant of the Thirty, together with their most obstinate adherents and their bodyguard, and presumably with Callibius and his seven hundred men, had withdrawn to their lately-acquired retreat at Eleusis, whence they sent urgent messages to their patron Lysander, bidding him interfere ere it was too late to save Athens from falling into the hands of a party hostile to his own views. It would seem that Lysander found the ill-feeling which he had provoked in Sparta too strong to allow of his enlisting the government in the cause of the Thirty, or possibly it was from the wish to act with all possible despatch, that he at once left the city without an armed force and joined his protégés at Eleusis. There he commenced levying mercenaries from all quarters, himself providing pay to the amount of a hundred talents. Three of the five Ephors had already resolved to give him no further support, and the speedy arrival of envoys from the Ten gave to Lysander's more energetic enemies an excuse for actually frustrating his designs. Headed by Pausanias, the colleague of Agis in the kingship, they obtained the despatch of a considerable force to the scene of action. The altered feelings of the Peloponnesian allies were shown in an alarming manner when the Corinthians and Boeotians flatly refused to furnish contingents to an expedition of which the ostensible purpose was the reassertion of the position of the oligarchs at Athens: the exiles, they declared, had in no way infringed the peace, and they refused to assist Sparta in reducing so important a county as Attica to the condition of a mere outpost upon their own frontiers.

§ 13. Pausanias entered Attica probably about midsummer (403 B.C.), and was at once joined by Lysander with his mercenaries. Albeit resolved to overthrow the Lysandrian ascendancy in this quarter, Pausanias was too

shrewd to come to open quarrel with his rival. He pretended to be eager to restore the oligarchs, and at once bade Thrasybulus disband his forces and withdraw; but this was only a ruse, and when the exiles refused compliance Pausanias attacked them in a fashion intended rather to mislead the Ephors and Lysander than to discourage the exiles. Ultimately, after allowing himself to be once defeated in the attempt to occupy Peiraeus, and after having vindicated his own merits as a general by rather severely handling his adversaries in a second battle, he induced Thrasybulus to ask for and conclude an armistice.

Meantime the Ten within the city, having failed to perform the task entrusted to them, had been very speedily deposed and their place taken by a second Board of Ten, chief of whom was Rhinon. Such an event, following close upon the overthrow of the Thirty, clearly showed the growth of the reaction against oligarchy. Rhinon and his colleagues at once set themselves to effect an accommodation with Thrasybulus and the exiles, and the negotiations were already in a fair way to be concluded when Pausanias and Lysander again appeared before the walls. Thus Pausanias was probably from the first in communication with both parties, and having done sufficient to maintain his own credit he had no difficulty in bringing about the armistice which he desired. A few days later the exiles and the new Board of Ten came to terms, and early in August, 403 B.C., Thrasybulus entered Athens with all his followers, the democracy was formally restored, and Rhinon and his colleagues in the traditional democratic manner submitted for audit to the democratic magistrates the account of the conduct of the office conferred upon them in the late crisis.

By the terms of the peace, the Thirty and their instruments were formally deposed and all their enactments abrogated, the democracy being restored in its entirety and new magistrates at once elected. There was decreed a general amnesty: only the Thirty, the Peiraeic decarchs, the Eleven, and the Board of Ten which had succeeded the Thirty, were excepted, and even these were to be entitled

to the privileges of the amnesty if they would and could pass the usual audit for the offices which they had held; while for the rest, heavy penalties were laid upon any one who should venture to bring an action for any offence committed during the Year of Anarchy, as the period of revolution was termed. Such as feared to remain in Athens were allowed to make new homes for themselves at Eleusis, with the proviso that that town, though in political matters independent, should retain its old sacred rights, and should be accessible to all who chose to visit it for religious purposes. A definite space was arranged within which those who intended to migrate should do so. The peace being sworn, Pausanias withdrew the Spartan garrison and retired, leaving Athens in the hands of the democracy and the Lysandrians hopelessly defeated.

§ 14. The Thirty, and such others as were declared excepted from the amnesty, withdrew in a body to Eleusis, where they were joined by many of the Knights and others who had shared their misdeeds; but when the number of emigrants threatened to assume serious proportions, Archinus suddenly procured the passing of a law to cancel the remaining days assigned for such emigration, and so stayed the exodus. The property of the excepted oligarchs was either confiscated to the treasury or restored, where possible, to its rightful owners; but no proceedings were allowed against others of their party, and Archinus did his country another service by securing the immediate execution of one who ventured to set the example of disregarding the amnesty. A proposal to limit the franchise by the exclusion of the trading classes was at once rejected, and the only limitation allowed was that which demanded pure Athenian parentage on both sides as a qualification for the citizenship. The funds borrowed by the oligarchs from Sparta were repaid at once by the democracy, and the leaders of the exiles were rewarded with a donation of a thousand drachms. To remove any inconsistencies between the old laws of Draco, Solon, and Cleisthenes and subsequent legislation, and to codify the whole, there was appointed a board of Five Hundred Nomothetae, the results of whose labours formed the constitutional law of Athens from this time

forward. Two years later (401 B.C.), upon learning that the oligarchs at Eleusis were raising mercenaries with hostile intent, the Athenians attacked and expelled them, restoring Eleusis to its old position in relation to Athens. Never was there in Greece a revolution so important effected in so gentle a fashion, in the face of innumerable incentives to bitter vengeance and retaliation; whereof credit is due to the entire democratic population in scarcely less degree than to its leaders Thrasybulus and Archinus.

The Archon Eponymus of the Year of Restoration was Eucleides. His date is memorable for another reason: in this year the old Ionic alphabet of sixteen or eighteen letters was replaced even in legal documents by the newer alphabet of twenty-four, the Greek alphabet as we know it*. It was first employed to record the law of the new Constitution as revised by the Nomothetae.

* Heretofore legal documents had been written in the Old Ionic alphabet of eighteen letters, although the New Ionic Alphabet of twenty-four letters had long been in use for general purposes. The latter was now adopted for all purposes, *i. e.*, the old alphabet was extended by the addition of the letters H, Ω, X, Ψ, etc.

CHAPTER II.

THE TEN THOUSAND.

§ 1. Birth and position of Cyrus the Younger: His proceedings in Western Asia.—§ 2. He quarrels with Artaxerxes and Tissaphernes: Condition of the Persian Empire.—§ 3. Character and aims of Cyrus.—§ 4. He raises an army: His lieutenants, Clearchus and others.—§ 5. The march to Cunaxa.—§ 6. Measures of Artaxerxes: Battle of Cunaxa and death of Cyrus.—§ 7. Treachery of Tissaphernes and massacre of the Greek generals.—§ 8. Xenophon assumes the command: He conducts the army to Trapezus.—§ 9. Remarks upon the March of the Ten Thousand: They proceed to Byzantium and Thrace.

§ 1. DARIUS NOTHUS, King of Persia, died just about the time when the Spartans, thanks mainly to his assistance, had finally humbled Athens and broken up her Confederacy. He left two sons: the elder, Artaxerxes surnamed Mnemon, was born before Darius had succeeded to the throne; the younger, Cyrus, was born when the father was already king. About eighty years before, upon the death of Darius Hystaspes (486 B.C.), the succession had been disputed by two princes born under the same conditions, and the precedence had been given to Xerxes, the younger of the two, as having been born in the purple. This precedent, backed up, moreover, by every means in the power of his mother Parysatis, led Cyrus to believe himself fully as much entitled to the throne as his elder brother; and when interest and intrigue alike failed to prevent the accession of Artaxerxes, Cyrus came to regard himself as one that had been robbed of his birthright.

It seems indeed that Darius Notus had been unable to make any decision between the two rival brothers. Certainly he had treated Cyrus with so large a share of

confidence and honour as to justify the hopes of that able and ambitious prince, for he had appointed him, while yet but eighteen years of age, to the satrapy of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia, with general military surveillance of the adjoining satrapy of Lycia and Caria, and of the whole of Western Asia. The command of Western Asia had always a special value in view of the position of the Persian power in that quarter with regard to the Greeks: with the military command of this region went the task of resisting the encroachments of the Greeks of the Asiatic coast, and the duty of recovering, if possible, that ancient supremacy of Persia in Ionia which had been first attained by Harpagus, the general of Cyrus the Elder, reasserted after the Ionic revolt, and lost again during the long maritime struggle with Athens and the Delian Confederacy. When, in 412 B.C., Darius made alliance with Sparta, it was mainly with a view to the recovery of this lost ascendancy, and the terms of the alliance guaranteed to the King the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks in the event of the victory of the Spartans over Athens. Cyrus had exerted himself to the utmost to secure that victory; Sparta's triumph was due to Lysander, and Lysander's ability owed its opportunities to the lavish generosity of Cyrus. Accordingly, by the summer of 404 B.C., the Asiatic Greeks found themselves once more at the mercy of Persia, and an acknowledged portion of the dominions of some half-dozen satraps and dependent princes. By far the larger number were included in the satrapy of Lydia and Caria under Tissaphernes, while the Aeolic Greeks to the north-west belonged to that of Cyrus, and the more straggling and remote colonies of the Cilician coast and the southern shores of the Euxine were nominally under the rule of the half-dependent prince, or Syennesis, of Cilicia and the princes of Bithynia and Pontic Armenia.

§ 2. Both Cyrus and Artaxerxes were present at the death-bed of Darius. Cyrus' chagrin at finding himself passed over in the matter of the succession was turned into active hatred of his brother when the latter placed him under arrest on the charge of conspiring against him. His informant was Tissaphernes, always jealous of the stripling

to whom Darius had made him subordinate in Western Asia. Whether the charge was true or not, we cannot say: it was as likely as not. However, the intercession of Parysatis induced Artaxerxes not merely to spare his brother's life, but to reinstate him at once in his late position.

Returning to his palace at Sardis, Cyrus considered himself ill requited for all he had done towards recovering for Persia her ascendancy over the Asiatic Greeks, for the cities and territories recovered by his aid and his funds had been made over in the main to Tissaphernes, and after the recent affair at court Cyrus cherished against his traducer an Oriental passion for revenge. He set himself industriously to seduce the Greek cities from Tissaphernes, with so much success that, with the single exception of Miletus, all Ionia and Aeolia placed themselves under his authority. At Miletus Tissaphernes forestalled such a course by the execution or expulsion of the malcontents. Such as escaped made their way to Cyrus and were well received by him. He openly espoused their cause, and on this plea he proceeded to levy troops of all arms, as though for service against Tissaphernes, while, to keep in with Artaxerxes, he was careful to remit with regularity to the Persian exchequer the annual tribute due from the Greek cities. The Great King cared not how his satraps quarrelled, so long as his revenues were not interfered with.

Indeed the immense area included in the inheritance of Artaxerxes was far too large and unwieldy to be regulated in accordance with modern ideas of unity. The twenty or more satrapies were each a kingdom, and their satraps more like independent sovereigns than mere viceroys. It was a rare thing for them to be one and all in quietude: more usually some of the number were in open revolt, while for neighbouring satraps to levy war upon one another was a matter of too frequent occurrence to excite comment. Throughout the Empire there was no pretence of consolidation or unification, no pains were taken to obliterate national differences of whatever sort, and the only bond of unity was in the submission of all alike to Persian satraps and taxation, which stirred up constantly the spirit of rebellion by the insolence and cruelties of the one, and by

the heavy burden of the other. Yet so divergent were the various peoples of the Empire, and so little inclined to any joint action, that not even the all-pervading discontent could arouse them even to a momentary unanimity, and the ill-advised rebellion of one people could always be crushed by the equally ill-advised aid of others. When Asiatics fight with Asiatics, numbers will generally decide the contest, and numbers were always at the disposal of the Great King. As for military discipline and strategy, there was none of it. Themselves brave to admiration, the native Persians wasted their valour for lack of guidance, while the millions of their subjects were for the most part only cowards. The Empire was one which held together only because no one dared to sunder it. Once attacked by a general of ability at the head of troops bred to war and discipline, it must fall if only the first attack were crowned with success.

§ 3. All this Cyrus knew, and he resolved to utilize his knowledge. Unlike the mass of his countrymen, he was a general of ability. Not only did he see all the weak points in his brother's position, but he set himself carefully to destroy the few real barriers which protected it. He possessed a fascination of manner which made for him friends upon all hands, and he practised a virtue long forgotten by the descendants of the Persians of the days of Cyrus the Great—the virtue of truthfulness and honesty. Cyrus' word was above doubt: what he promised he performed, but not less did he exact full performance of all that he demanded. No one lived to repent having aided him, and no one lived to boast of having defied him. Moreover, his demands were not dictated by mere whim or appetite, as in the case of his fellow-satraps: he proved himself a worthy governor, making his province a pattern for security of life and property and for consequent well-being. Possessing none of the avarice of his compeers, his lavish generosity purchased him friends and servants wherever he sought them. When therefore he professed himself about to make war upon Tissaphernes, he found it easy to raise forces in any number, and funds wherewith to pay them.

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In another point Cyrus was entirely unlike his countrymen: he was able to deal with Greeks as no other Persian could, bringing them to regard him rather as one of themselves than one of the hated race which had for a hundred years been the hereditary foe of Greece. The service which he had rendered to Sparta went far to win him friends amongst many of the Greek states; still further went his generosity, his honour, and his marked deference and predilection for anything Greek. Something of this was certainly due to genuine admiration, but more of it to a carefully-laid policy. Cyrus was bent upon no such petty scheme as the discomfiture of Tissaphernes: his aim was to drive Artaxerxes from the throne and seize it for himself, and he had not failed to see that his object could be accomplished only by aid of a genuine soldiery—such a soldiery as he could find only in the descendants of those whose handfuls worsted the Persian thousands at Marathon, at Salamis and Plataea and Mycale, at Eurymedon and Cyprian Salamis.

§ 4. Circumstances were highly favourable to Cyrus' object. The close of the Peloponnesian War had just turned adrift large numbers of men trained in the best schools of Grecian warfare, while the length of that war had produced in many the habit of regarding military life as a profession and a distaste for the monotonous drudgery of peace. On the other hand, Cyrus had already made himself a name for generosity and honourable dealing, and service with him seemed to open the way to the Eldorado which all Greeks saw in Persia. And while these were the feelings of the mass of the Greeks, Cyrus had many friends and abettors amongst their leading men. On the Hellespont, in Thessaly, in Boeotia, not less than in Laconia, he had agents to sound his praises and to set forth in glowing colours the advantages of service under his banner. Lastly, his court offered a harbour of refuge to all those whom the recent war in Greece had driven into exile, whether to escape from the sword of the conquerors or from the more protracted and less excusable outrages of the Lysandrian oligarchies and harmosts. In the early spring of 401 B.C., when Cyrus mustered his

forces at Sardis, he found himself at the head of more than 11,000 choice Greek troops, and at least 100,000 Asiatics.

Cyrus in person was naturally commander-in-chief of the entire army, but the Greek force was kept entirely distinct from the Asiatic, and while Clearchus was nominally marshal of their whole number, in point of fact the various contingents owned no allegiance save to the particular leaders who brought them into Cyrus' service. Chief of these leaders were Menon the Thessalian, Proxenus the Boeotian, and Xenias the Arcadian. Others were Socrates the Achaean, Sophaenetes the Arcadian, and Pasion of Megara; while amongst the rank and file was the man who was destined to be most distinguished of all, Xenophon of Athens.

Clearchus had been Spartan harmost of Byzantium towards the close of the late war, and had there conducted himself so violently as to compel the Ephorality to dismiss him. Thereupon he attempted to retain his position by force, and being discomfited, found shelter with Cyrus, who recognized his undoubted abilities, and who moreover was particularly desirous of securing the services of Spartans in his projected undertaking. He furnished Clearchus with funds to equip and maintain a considerable force of mercenary Greeks in the Thracian Chersonese, where he had found plenty to do in protecting the Grecian settlements there from the encroachments of the neighbouring Thracian tribes. He was thus one of the first instances of a class of men which became common enough in the course of the next century, Greeks of position who abandoned their own homes to act as mercenary captains under any government which would pay for their services. Menon belonged to the Aleuadae of Thessaly, a great oligarchical family which had maintained friendly relations with Persia since the time of their expeditions to Greece. He had applied to Cyrus for aid in one of the chronic struggles which kept the Thessalian nobles at variance with the populace, and in return for Cyrus' support he now brought into the field a force of 1500 troops. He showed in a notable degree the usual traits of a Greek oligarch, and his hot blood, jealousy,

and treachery, earned for him a terrible requital. Proxenus, who furnished 2000 troops, had once been a pupil of the rhetorician Gorgias, and was now an intimate friend of Cyrus. He is most famous as the man who induced Xenophon to throw in his fortunes with that prince. Xenias had accompanied Cyrus to Susa on the occasion of Darius' death, and had since then been in command of the various bodies of Greek mercenaries engaged under Cyrus' orders in Ionia and about Miletus, as had also Pasion and Socrates.

§ 5. Cyrus was fully alive to the fact that the Greeks at large cherished a wholesome awe of the far-off power of the Persian Empire, and that it would be impossible to induce his Greek mercenaries voluntarily to undertake the march of 1500 miles through Asia to Susa. Accordingly he set himself to draw them after him by one excuse or another until it would be as dangerous for them to retreat as to advance. It was announced therefore that the army would be employed to chastise the mountaineers of Pisidia for their incessant depredations upon the lowlands of the neighbouring satrapies, and with this impression the army broke up from Sardis and moved in a south-easterly direction across the Maeander (*Menderes*) to Colossae and Celaenae. From this point the march lay for some distance northward to Ceramon-Agora; thence again eastward through Caystru-Pedium and Tyriaeum to Iconium (*Konieh*); and so along the northern foot of Mt. Taurus across Lycania to the formidable pass known as the Cilician Gates, through which the one practicable road from Central Anatolia crosses to Tarsus and the Gulf of Issus (*Scanderoon*). The pass is one which might at any time be held by a mere handful of men, and under Persian rule it was further defended by a wall and fortress at its narrowest part. It lay upon the frontiers of the dependent kingdom of Cilicia, whose prince or Syennesis was entrusted with its defence; but that chieftain, whose queen Epyaxa had already joined Cyrus with a large and sorely-needed supply of money, was minded to keep upon good terms with both Cyrus and Artaxerxes, in order to profit by the success of either. Accordingly he allowed Menon with a troop of

horse to enter Cilicia by a circuitous route, and thereupon abandoned the defence of the Gates upon the plea that his flank was turned. The Cyreian army marched through without molestation, and descended to rest in comfortable quarters at Tarsus.

By this time the Pisidians had been left far to the westward, and the troops saw very clearly that Cyrus had some other object than a raid upon those freebooters. The suspicion that they were being led against Artaxerxes gained ground amongst the Greeks and led to a serious mutiny, which was only quelled by the astuteness of Clearchus. Clearchus alone was in the secret of the real object of the march: backed by the assertion of Cyrus that he only wished to make a demonstration as far as the frontiers of Syria and Phoenicia, because he suspected the satrap Abrocomas of hostile designs, Clearchus induced the Greeks to march onward to Issus, and thence across another formidable pass known as the Syrian Gates, behind Myriandrus. Here also the natural defensibility of the pass had been further strengthened by fortifications, and here also the position was abandoned without a struggle. Cyrus had foreseen a difficulty in forcing the position, and had accordingly called upon the Spartans to requite his recent services to Lysander by providing him with a fleet which would have enabled him if necessary to land troops in the rear of the Syrian Gates and so turn the position. This fleet, commanded by the navarch Samius, had sailed as far as Issus, and had done Cyrus a collateral service in overawing the Syennesis of Cilicia. It brought 700 hoplites, under the command of the Lacedaemonian Cheirisophus. It was now no longer required, and accordingly sailed homewards, but the action of the Ephorality in thus abetting Artaxerxes' enemy was destined to bring Sparta into more active collision with the Persians. Cyrus advanced at once as far as Thapsacus (*Surijeh*) on the Euphrates, the satrap Abrocomas offering no resistance whatever.

At this point there was a fresh mutiny of the Greek troops, whose numbers had risen by help of various accessions taken up along their route to at least 14,000 men of all arms. But they had gradually come to a tacit

conviction that the real goal of their march was Susa, and they were the less disconcerted by reason of the few difficulties which had thus far attended their advance. They were now within striking distance of the Persian capitals with all their fabulous wealth; no enemy had appeared to oppose them; it seemed as if none dared offer any resistance, if the impregnable passes of Cilicia and Syria were thus left open to them. Cyrus moreover increased by one-half their pay, and promised them undreamt-of rewards if they would but take him to Babylon, and easy escort home thence to their own land; while to attempt any retreat on their own account would certainly be a task of peril, and would leave them as poor as when they started. They acquiesced therefore in the task before them, crossed the Euphrates without opposition, and struck boldly across the Syrian desert along the northern bank of the river. And still they met with no enemy. At a point scarcely seventy miles from Babylon they reached a huge ditch and rampart running from the river across the plain, with but a narrow roadway of a few yards in width to permit the passage of an army. Yet even this was left undefended: the whole army passed safely through, and advanced to within fifty miles of Babylon.

§ 6. Meantime the Great King had had warning sufficient of the impending attack, for Tissaphernes had guessed Cyrus' object many months before and had at once informed his sovereign. Had the Syennesis or even Abrocomas been loyal, it must have been an easy matter to check Cyrus, if not to destroy his army, before it reached the Euphrates, while the fords of that broad river might have been easily defended for any length of time. But as usual the Persian monarch could rely neither upon the loyalty nor the generalship of his satraps: he could not even trust himself to bar the passage of the ditch which he had been at such pains to construct. It was only now, when his enemy was within reach of Babylon itself, that he mustered for battle with a force estimated at 900,000 men. It would have amounted to 300,000 more had not Abrocomas still played false and purposely delayed to bring up his division.

It was about the first week of September when the two armies at length came into collision at a point not far distant from the village of Cunaxa. Artaxerxes divided his forces into three columns of 300,000 each: commanding together with Gobryas in the centre, he entrusted his right to Arbaces, his left to Tissaphernes. His advance was from south to north, and the Euphrates covered the flank of Tissaphernes' division. Against this enormous host Cyrus could array only some 115,000 men. He would have placed the Greeks in the centre, and opened the battle by at once charging the Persian centre under Artaxerxes, but Clearchus, fearing to be hemmed in on all sides by the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, insisted that his place must be on the right wing, where the Euphrates would cover his flank. Cyrus was forced to acquiesce: he stationed his 100,000 native troops on the left under Ariaeus, and in person took his place at the head of his handful of 600 horse in the centre. So much was his force inferior in numbers that his extreme left only reached as far as the centre of Artaxerxes' line, while the Persian right under Arbaces had no enemy before it.

The issue was just what might have been foreseen. The Greeks charging upon the right, cut their way with ease through the Persian left, but the smallness of their numbers made no material change in the position of the main body of Persians under Tissaphernes. That satrap suffered them to pass by, while he himself with his division of horse advanced along the river. Simultaneously Arbaces advanced on the Persian right, and in conjunction with the centre closed in upon the Cyreian left under Ariaeus. Cyrus himself, at the very outset of the battle, charged with his six hundred horse full upon the Persian centre. In the *mêlée* he caught sight of his brother's figure, and carried away by resentment, he recklessly rode at him; but his men were swallowed up in the thousands of his enemies, and were almost all cut down, while he himself died amongst the first. The troops under Ariaeus now found themselves beset on all sides and speedily gave way, while the whole Persian force at once fell to pillaging the Cyreian camps.

Shortly afterwards the Greeks, having pushed the pursuit of the routed left wing until they were weary, halted, re-formed their ranks, and retraced their steps towards their camp, still ignorant of how the battle had gone elsewhere. As they returned they were met by the entire force of Artaxerxes also returning. The two armies might have passed each other flank to flank, but to avoid the danger of an attack upon his right flank Clearchus wheeled his men to face the east, while simultaneously the Persians wheeled to the west. They were now a second time face to face: again the Greeks charged without delay, and again the Persians fled before them. When this second encounter was ended the Greeks bivouacked in the adjacent village, expecting every moment to hear of the safety and success of Cyrus.

§ 7. When, on the next morning, Ariaeus sent word of what had happened, the consternation of the Greeks was indescribable. Nevertheless they put a bold face upon matters: Clearchus invited Ariaeus to step into Cyrus' place, promising to place him upon the throne of Persia, and when Artaxerxes sent to demand the unconditional surrender of the entire force his envoys were dismissed with contempt. Ariaeus declined to take up Cyrus' designs: he was bent only on retreating in safety, and the Greeks had no choice but to follow suit. Shortly afterwards, however, came other envoys from the Great King offering to conduct the whole force safely back to the coast, if they would consent to withdraw in quietude. The offer was eagerly accepted: the whole Cyreian army was abundantly provided with supplies and comfortably quartered in the heart of Babylonia until Tissaphernes was ready to conduct them upon their homeward march. Under his guidance they marched eastward to Sittace, where they crossed the Tigris, and thence in a direction due north as far as the Zabatus (Greater Zab).

Already there had arisen amongst the Greeks suspicions as to the good faith of Ariaeus, and they placed little more confidence in him than in Tissaphernes. Clearchus believed him to be prompting Tissaphernes to treachery, until at length, to put an end to the growing ill-feeling between all

parties, he took advantage of the halt on the Zab to obtain an interview with Tissaphernes. That satrap so deftly humoured the perplexed Greek, that the latter laid aside all his mistrust, and on the following day rode into the Persian camp accompanied by Proxenus, Menon, Socrates, and Agias, with some twenty of the leading Greek captains, and a guard of only two hundred regular troops. Tissaphernes at once ordered the arrest of all the generals and the massacre of the captains and troops, and only one escaped to inform the Greeks of what had occurred. The prisoners were all sent in chains to the Great King's court, where with the exception of Menon all were executed at once. Menon, who pretended to have been the instrument of Tissaphernes' treachery, only preserved his life for a twelvemonth of tortures. Queen Parysatis did her best to save them, by reason of her affection for Cyrus, but her influence was counterbalanced by that of Artaxerxes' wife Stateira.

§ 8. The case of the Greeks, thus deprived of their leaders, was now far worse than before. They were further than ever from home, they had neither guides nor provisions, and while all the forces of Artaxerxes were in arms against them, Ariaeus had now openly gone over to the Great King. It was at this juncture that Xenophon came to the front.

Xenophon was one of the Athenian Knights, and as such had probably taken an active share in the troubles of the Year of Anarchy, of course on the side of the Thirty Tyrants. Upon the restoration of the Democracy he doubtless found life at Athens anything but pleasant, albeit the amnesty was faithfully observed there. Accordingly, when his friend Proxenus sent word to him that Cyrus was in need of volunteers, Xenophon discussed the matter with the philosopher Socrates, to whom he was closely attached, and decided to take service as a private soldier in Asia. In this humble capacity he had shared in all the events of the march from Sardis to the Zabatus, and he shared also for a moment in the despair which seized upon his comrades upon the news of Tissaphernes' treachery. But it was only for a moment. In the course of the ensuing night he dreamed a dream, which seemed

to urge him to action with every promise of success. Always a man of almost superstitious piety, he accepted the omen as a command; he roused his comrades, encouraged them to hope for better things, advised them to do whatever could be done for an immediate and rapid march across the unknown heart of Armenia to the Euxine, and was rewarded by being placed at once in a position of paramount authority in the army. Perhaps on no other occasion did the value of an Athenian education show itself so decisively. Xenophon had profited to the fullest by such an education as Athens could alone give in that age: the keynote of his training had been the art of persuasion, with all the rhetorician's armoury of sound logic and specious fallacy, exhortation and denunciation, in a word the "sophistical art" of "making the worse case appear to be the better." When to influences so potent with a Greek audience there was added the bond of fellowship through the past months of marching and fighting, a courage and military ability which had few rivals in the army, and an honesty of purpose which spoke the truth fearlessly and won support by its very boldness, it was not to be wondered that he obtained and kept so great an ascendancy over the hearts of his followers.

It is not necessary here to detail the manifold events of the celebrated Retreat of the Ten Thousand. Steadily turning a deaf ear to all further overtures from the Great King's emissaries, the army moved across the Zabatus, along the course of the Tigris, through the hill country of the wild Carduchi; thence across Central Armenia somewhat to the west of Lake Van, through the lands of the yet wilder Taochi and Chalybes now deep in snow and wrapt in winter; and so again to the Euphrates near its source, and over the mountains of the Colchi, until from the summit of Mt. Thecles they once more sighted the sea so dear to all Greeks; and descended thence, still numbering 10,000 men after so many dangers, to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus (*Trebizond*), a flourishing colony of Sinopian Greeks, on the shores of the Euxine. For well-nigh the whole of their march they had done ceaseless battle with the tribes that beset them; they had

often despaired, often murmured even against Xenophon; but strenuously supported by Cheirisophus and the others of his staff, Xenophon had brought them victoriously through every danger, and if they came back to Grecian civilization with empty purses, they came with such a reputation for heroism and endurance and military efficiency as had been claimed by no collective body of Greeks before them or of their own day.

§ 9. It would seem that the Great King was only anxious to get the Greeks safely out of the vicinity of Babylon, and that so long as they could be prevented from any further aggressions he was indifferent to their escape. It was to disarm their hostility that he had, for some weeks after Cunaxa, furnished them with comfortable quarters near the scene of the battle. Subsequently he became alarmed lest they should wish to establish a permanent settlement there; for such an event would have placed at the very gates of Babylon an enemy which no Persian troops could withstand, and would have been a constant inducement to the over-taxed natives to revolt. To prevent this, Tissaphernes was instructed to get the Greeks out of the country by any means he could devise: hence his seemingly friendly offers of guidance. But when the Ten Thousand were once beyond the Tigris and in retreat the Persians recovered their courage, and set themselves, but in a thoroughly Oriental and half-hearted way, to annihilate the fugitives. Hence the treacherous seizure of Clearchus, and when even this failed to break the courage of the Greeks, hence the intermittent persecutions of Persian cavalry for the earlier part of their retreat. But the satraps proved themselves no more able in the pursuit than they had shown themselves in obstructing Cyrus' advance: one opportunity after another was let slip, and in the end almost the whole force made good its escape. The story of the Anabasis and Katabasis was destined to bring ruin upon that empire of whose weakness it was so signal a proof. From this day forth the Greeks learnt to despise heartily the boasted resources of the Great King's power, and when seventy years later Alexander the Great overthrew the Achaemenian Empire and made it his own,

that conquest was but the corollary of the march of the Cyreian Greeks.

The Ten Thousand reached Trapezus early in 400 B.C., and there rested for a time. Xenophon, who was well known for his philo-Spartan views, hoped to obtain from Anaxibius, harmost of Byzantium, sufficient vessels to transport the whole force thither by sea, believing that they would find a hearty welcome and the prospect of remunerative service there. In this he was disappointed: Anaxibius had no wish to assist a force so formidable, and the jealousy with which he regarded the Ten Thousand was shared by all the Greek states of the Pontic coast. Xenophon was compelled to lead his weary followers by land to Cerasus and Cotyora, and thence by sea to Sinope and Heraclea, in the face of new perplexities arising from intrigues fostered amongst them by Anaxibius, from the jealous fear of the various states along the route, from the penury of the troops themselves, and from the disappointment with which they viewed the results of their long toils. On several occasions Xenophon's own life was endangered, and more than once it was only by consummate tact that he prevented the outbreak of violence and the perpetration of some outrage, which would have aroused against his men the active hostility of all Greece. At length Anaxibius changed his tactics: he caused the whole force to be transported to Byzantium under false promises to find them profitable service elsewhere, but the discovery of his bad faith was within an ace of causing the ruin of Byzantium, which the Ten Thousand threatened to sack. For several months more the army lay in Thrace, at one time cheated into assisting Seuthes, prince of the Odrysae, only to meet with further trickery and impoverishment, more often lying idle and mutinous; while Xenophon repeatedly endeavoured to get away and return to Athens, and was as often compelled to change his mind. At length the remnant of the army found service under Thibron the Spartan commander in Asia, and Xenophon at length resigned his command. He returned to Athens for a few months, not so very much richer than when he left it. Within a year, however, he once more rejoined the men

whom he had brought through so many perils, and revenged himself richly upon Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus for the treachery of the former satrap. The Retreat of the Ten Thousand had considerable influence on the future history of Greece, for it showed how easily the Persian Empire might be overturned if a resolute leader would undertake the task. The idea was entertained by Agesilaus of Sparta, later by Jason the tyrant of Pherae, and still later by Philip of Macedon, but it was reserved for the latter's son Alexander to achieve the exploit of carrying the arms of the West to the capitals of the Great King.

CHAPTER III.

THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA.

§ 1. Decline of the influence of Lysander: Misconduct of the Lysandrian decarchies and harmosts, and of Lysander at Sestus: He leaves Sparta.—§ 2. Social and political changes in Sparta: Sparta unfitted for her new position.—§ 3. Strained relations between Sparta and her allies.—§ 4. War between Sparta and Elis: Its causes, course, and results.—§ 5. Sparta in collision with Persia: Position of the Greeks in Asia.—§ 6. Campaigns of Thibron and Dercylidas in Asia.—§ 7. Disputed succession to the Spartan kingship: Lysander supports Agesilaus: His intrigues.—§ 8. The Conspiracy of Cinadon.—§ 9. Agesilaus sails to Ionia: His rebuff at Aulis.—§ 10. Pharnabazus overthrows Tissaphernes: His anti-Spartan policy: Conon in Cyprus.—§ 11. Lysander returns to Asia: Failure of his designs: Campaigns of Agesilaus in Asia.

§ 1. It has been said that Lysander had lent his support to the Thirty Tyrants, had joined them when they were compelled to retire from Athens to Eleusis, and had been prevented from restoring them only by the personal rivalry of King Pausanias. Returning to Sparta, he doubtless found himself little at ease amidst so many opponents and beneath the stern discipline of the Lysurgian rules. He applied therefore for another commission. Probably the government were very well pleased to be rid of him: he was again despatched with a fleet to the eastern shores of the Aegean, where he busied himself in revisiting the numerous decarchies and strengthening them against the violent antipathy which they had everywhere aroused. Indeed every day brought to light fresh instances of the enormities of their proceedings. While the story of the miseries of Athens was the chief example of Lysandrian misrule, numbers of smaller towns could instance cases of

oppression not less cruel and licentious than that of the Thirty. In many cases the harmosts, the direct instruments of the Spartan government, were themselves guilty of acts of violence and outrage. In such cases the Ephorality appear to have done little to check or punish the offenders. But the case was different with the decarchies who owed their creation and authority entirely to Lysander, and in no wise to the government. Therefore, now that Lysander was neither a useful servant nor a welcome citizen, the Ephors lent a not unwilling ear to the reports of the misdoings of his clients, encouraged by the avowed and successful anti-Lysandrianism of Pausanias.

Too confident of his own security and of an ascendancy unquestioned at any rate amongst the islands and coast towns of the Aegean, Lysander utilized his new commission in a manner which speedily gave excuse for interference on the part of his enemies at home. Sailing to Sestus, one of the most important strategical positions of maritime Hellas, he attempted to secure it entirely to his own interests and at the same time to furnish a notable example of his ability and willingness to reward his adherents, by expelling the entire body of its population and dividing their houses and lands amongst members of his own crews. The Ephors were not yet bold enough to act directly against Lysander, but they struck a very evident blow at his authority by ordering the immediate restoration of the expelled Sestians and by making a scapegoat of Thorax, the harmost of Sestus, who had assisted in their spoliation. Every one knew why Thorax was put to death, though the government pretended to veil its conduct by judicially convicting him under the old Lysurgian law which forbade any Spartan to possess gold or silver money. A few weeks later Lysander himself returned to Sparta, hastening his journey in order personally to combat the growing jealousy against him. It seems that in his actions in and near the Hellespont he had shown as little regard for the rights of the Persians as for those of the Sestians, and Pharnabazus, who had for several years been an active and valuable ally of Sparta, very reasonably sent despatches to the Ephors, demanding redress for the injuries done to his Phrygian

satrapy by Lysander, and the prevention of such aggressions for the future. Aware of this, Lysander obtained a personal interview with the satrap, who easily flattered him into the belief that such complaints should cease at once. He further gave to Lysander a letter to be delivered to the Ephors. Armed with this document, which Pharnabazus had led him to believe to be a complete exoneration of his conduct, Lysander presented himself confidently before the Ephors, and demanded that the letter should be forthwith read. It was read, and turned out to be yet more bitter and hostile to Lysander than were the previous complaints of the satrap, who took this means of condemning Lysander as it were out of his own mouth. The latter remained but a little while in Sparta, where he was now less popular than ever: pleading the need of fulfilling a vow to Jupiter Ammon in Libya, he with some difficulty obtained leave of absence, probably in the year 402 B.C. It is not very probable that he actually visited Libya: we shall hear of him shortly in relation with the less distant oracle of Delphi. The Ephors proceeded to break down his influence by the removal of the decarchies, that is, by tacitly making it known that Sparta would raise no objection if they were suppressed like the Thirty at Athens, by the several communities. The harmosts however were left at their posts, each with his garrison. It was about the time of this change in the condition of the states of the Aegean that the Athenians finally expelled the Thirty from Eleusis.

§ 2. The jealousy which divided the Spartan state in reference to Lysander was but one of many forces now operating to her detriment. Standing now as unquestioned head of Hellas, to be competent for the duties of her new position she should have been a united state acting with one well-defined and firmly-executed policy. But she was not united. Socially, the rigours of the old Doric discipline had rapidly fallen into neglect for all practical purposes, albeit still useful at times, to assist in getting rid of a Thorax for instance; for the long and far-reaching activity of the late war, the new and close relations into which well-nigh all able-bodied Spartans were brought with the various civilization and life of the states of Greece and Asia Minor,

above all, the spirit of impatience born of the long and autocratic authority of navarchs and harmosts, had changed the Spartan spirit. Not only had the hitherto despised culture of the more liberal Greeks made itself at home in the state of Lycurgus, but in its train had come new ideas of personal liberty and indulgence which ill bore with the stern *régime* of Spartan training and the meagre diet of the *syssitia*. With the appetite for indulgence came that for the means to satisfy it, and the old prohibition against amassing wealth, a prohibition which had always acted as an incentive to corruption, was now openly disregarded. Therewith came the heretofore unknown antagonism of rich and poor: the wealthy Spartans formed an oligarchy yet closer than that framed by Lycurgus, while the poorer sort, excluded by their more wealthy fellows from those offices which were the road to riches, grew ever poorer and more dissatisfied. They became unable even to defray the small expenses of the public mess, and sank into the condition of Inferiors, that is, men whose lack of means precluded them from most political advantages—a condition certain to breed discontent, and lending a new element to swell the dissatisfaction which was always fomenting amongst the helots and perioecs. Politically, things were no better. The popular assembly, the *Apella*, had throughout history been of but nominal authority: now the senate, the *Gerusia*, was reduced to a similar insignificance, and the entire control of the state had passed into the hands of the Ephors, whose annual election was of course decided by the handful of wealthy oligarchs, and whose views were not less as a matter of course adapted to those of the same oligarchs. And not only had the Ephors usurped the place of the senate: they had so far encroached upon the kingship as to reduce that office to a merely nominal independence. From the time of Agis no Spartan king took the field except accompanied by a staff of Councillors, nominees of the Ephors, who watched and controlled his every act; while in the navarchy the Ephors had established an office which Aristotle styles “so to say, another kingship”—an office which had, in Lysander’s hands, been far superior to that of the kings of his day. And lastly there was now, as

always, the inherent jealousy of one royal house towards the other—a jealousy which has been the primary means to the limitation of the powers of the royal office, and which effectually crippled any attempts of the Agiads and Euryontids to resist the encroachments of the Ephoralty. Thus divided socially and politically, Sparta was in no position to take up a consistent policy in relation to foreign states. Neither was it in the nature of Dorians—men trained to live as a camp of invaders in the enemy's land, and preserving still in theory the old-fashioned Constitution which had come into being hundreds of years before as expressly fitted for the needs of that remote age—to lay aside the formulae now no longer needed, and to take up broader views more in accord with their changed circumstances. Inertness was a proverbial feature of the Dorians, and a real feature so far as went any capacity for political betterment. But there is no inertia in the forces which are always active to the internal ruin of communities. Such forces thrive by neglect, and the state of which the constitution does not advance with the times is not stationary but decadent; and the more it seems at a standstill the more rapidly is it falling to ruin.

§ 3. "Liberty for Hellas" had been the battle-cry of Sparta during the late war—a useful cry to inflame the perseverance of her own allies and to spread defection amidst those of Athens. But now that the war was ended such a cry was no longer needful: Sparta took all the spoils of war, the late allies of Athens became Sparta's subjects, and worn out by seven-and-twenty years of a struggle for which they had found most of the materials, Sparta's allies were in no condition to dispute her injustice. They learnt too late that they had been made the tools of her ambition, and we have seen how speedily they showed their discontent when Corinth and Thebes refused to assist Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus. All Greece saw now what was the policy of Sparta: it was no generous liberation of small and great alike, no yet more liberal, pan-Hellenic confederation upon terms of equality, but the barefaced avowal of Sparta's dominion over all alike at all costs and by all expedients, whether the aid of Persia or

decarchies or harmosties or mere brute force. That the decarchies disappeared with the fall of Lysander, and that Pausanias restored the democracy in Athens, was a small set-off to the heavy account against the dominant state, and probably misled no one: such acts were the outcome of a jealousy of Lysander felt not by Greece at large but by the oligarchs of Sparta, and were due to no promptings of justice or honour. Had there been no other cause of complaint it must have been intolerable to Greeks to feel themselves dependent upon any one power, most of all when that one power was the few thousands of uncultured, illiberal, arrogant, and faithless Spartiates, whose only claim to supremacy was that of the strongest. The dissatisfaction of the constituents of the new Spartan hegemony was practically universal.

§ 4. The Spartan government was quite aware of these facts: it was resolved to make an example of one of the most hostile states, and the victim selected was Elis, upon which war was declared in 401 B.C. Several excuses were easily found: in the year 420 B.C. the Eleians had excluded the Spartans from participation in the Olympic festival, in retaliation for the non-payment of a fine laid upon Sparta for a breach of the "Sacred Peace," and they had chastised one Lichas who had ventured to disregard that prohibition. Subsequently they had refused to allow Agis to offer sacrifice at Olympia. But it was of graver moment that the whole policy and organization of the state of Elis had in the course of the last twenty years undergone a complete change, and one very markedly hostile to Sparta: the old philo-Spartan oligarchy had been replaced by a strong and well-organized democracy; the town of Elis had been fortified, a fleet had been built, and the neighbouring towns and villages to the east and south had been reduced to a condition of forced dependence; and over and above such less direct defiance of Spartan wishes, the Eleians had been active in fomenting hostility to Sparta amongst the Peloponnesian states, and even in supporting against her the failing power of Athens. Sparta could not afford to tolerate the consolidation of a state so extensive, so wealthy, and so hostile, at her very gates, and feeling herself strong

enough for action she peremptorily demanded the liberation of the dependent townships. The Elean democracy, led by one Thrasydaeus, a friend and supporter of the Athenian Thrasybulus, replied by citing the subjugation of Hellas beneath Spartan harmosties and decarchies, and made energetic efforts to secure allies in the inevitable struggle. However, though Thebes and Corinth declined, as before, to send contingents to the Spartan army, Elis was left to fight her battles alone, saving for some small help sent to her by the Aetolians.

Agis crossed Achaea (401 B.C.) and invaded Elis from the north-east, but his campaign came to nothing, for the occurrence of an earthquake was taken by his troops, most of whom were but unwilling followers, as a sign of the wrath of heaven against the sacrilege of those who dared to violate the sacred territory of the Olympians. The army was withdrawn until the following spring (400 B.C.), when Agis again led it into Elis, on this occasion by way of Triphylia and the south. The Eleans were quite unable to face him in the field, and their small towns were easily captured. Within Elis itself the oligarchs, whom the recent turn of politics had placed in a position of inferiority, made a desperate attempt to cut down their opponents and deliver up the town to Agis; but the design miscarried, and Thrasydaeus revenged it by expelling the oligarchs in a body, though he could not prevent the Spartan army, now swelled by numbers of freebooters from Arcadia and elsewhere, from making spoil of the whole country around. When Agis at last withdrew, he established the expelled oligarchs in Epitalium on the Alpheus, as a standing menace to the Eleans. So much had the latter suffered, and so well were they aware of their inability to resist Sparta, that they opened negotiations for peace. The terms granted were hard: the whole of Triphylia was declared independent; the lands bordering on Arcadia, the Acrorea, were also taken from Elis; and in the remaining narrow territory every separate township was to be free and autonomous. Further, Elis was deprived of its walls, and the newly-founded navy was destroyed, together with its port of Cyllene. The Pisatans of course put in a claim that the

presidency of the Olympic Festival should be handed over to themselves, but to this request the Spartans declined to accede. The peace was probably concluded early in 399 B.C. After so notable an example of the terrors of her vengeance Sparta could feel more secure, at least as far as Peloponnesus was concerned. About the same time she expelled the remnant of the Messenian nation from the two settlements wherewith Athens had provided it in Cephallenia and Naupactus, and permanently occupied the Trachinian Heraclea by a garrison under the harmost Herippidas, whose violent energy made that position a standing peril to the doubtful loyalty of Thebes.

§ 5. Meantime affairs in Asiatic Greece had taken a new turn. It has been said that Sparta surrendered the Greek communities there to Darius in return for his assistance against Athens. Artaxerxes, in the persons of his satraps, readily took up the claims of Darius, and while Pharnabazus was making the most of the opportunity in Phrygia and along the Hellespont, Tissaphernes and Cyrus respectively struggled to get possession of the coast-towns of Ionia by force or by diplomacy. Lysander, as has been seen, came into collision with Pharnabazus with results disastrous to himself, for it would seem that he was seeking to secure certain of the Hellespontine Greeks to his own side by lending them an unauthorized support against Persian aggressions. Further to the south, many of the Greek states had voluntarily placed themselves under the rule of Cyrus, while Miletus had been forcibly retained by Tissaphernes, and probably some few communities remained still independent of either satrap. But upon the removal of Lysander Pharnabazus was left free to deal as he chose with the towns of Aeolis, and the death of Cyrus was followed by the reappearance of Tissaphernes in Caria and Lydia, with powers greater than before. Moreover, the keen and dangerous support lent to Cyrus by so many Greeks had embittered the animosity of Artaxerxes against that nation generally, no less than the support of the Lacedaemonian fleet which met Cyrus at Issus had inflamed him against the Spartans in particular. Without any formal declaration of war, Sparta had brought herself

into direct collision with Persia. And indeed the Ephoralty, possibly from the first bent upon conceding to Persia no more than they were compelled to do, now saw clearly the bad policy of allowing the Asiatic Greeks to pass under Persian rule: to permit this was to undo at a blow all that had been achieved by Greeks since the day of Salamis, for it would establish the Persians in the wealthiest cities of Greece, put them in command of all the countless harbours of the Ionian coast, and so give them access to the whole of the Aegean, to the islands therein, and to the Hellespont; while by allowing this to happen Sparta would but add to the many causes of complaint already in hand against her. Hence it came that in 400 B.C. the Ephors despatched an armed force to Asia in response to the appeal of the Greek communities there, and proclaimed herself set to "liberate" the same Greeks whom she had but a few years before voluntarily thrust into the hands of the Great King.

§ 6. The commander of this force was Thibron (or Thimbron). Albeit furnished with ample numbers (2000 neadamodes or newly-enfranchised helots, 4000 Peloponnesian heavy armed troops, and 300 Athenian horsemen, the latter mainly adherents of the Thirty), and joined moreover upon his appearance in Asia by the 6000 survivors of the Cyreian army, he achieved little, taking only a few minor towns besides Magnesia. Much of his time was wasted in the futile siege of Larissa, and when at length he raised the siege and moved southwards towards Caria by express order of the Ephors, the commander destined to supersede him was already in Asia. This was Dercylidas, a man who had already distinguished himself as harmost of Abydos, and one whose natural ability was sharpened by personal antipathy to Pharnabazus, who had once been the cause of his disgrace. It was against that satrap accordingly that he turned his attention, gladly arranging a truce with Tissaphernes in order to gratify his grudge against the other by plundering a satrapy which was at once richer and less strongly guarded than that of Tissaphernes. He occupied a large number of towns in Aeolis, winning over many by his tact or cunning, and

even wintered luxuriously in the heart of Bithynia, near the satrap's residence at Dascyleum. In the following year (398 B.C.) he crossed into the Thracian Chersonese and made good the security of that fertile Greek territory against the inroads of Thracian tribes by building a wall across the neck of the peninsula. After again wintering in Phrygia he conducted yet a third campaign with equal success and profit in both satrapies, and was only superseded at last by no less a person than Agesilaus, the new king of Sparta.

§ 7. Agis I., having satisfactorily concluded the Elean War and avenged himself for the insults offered to him at Olympia, sickened and died at Sparta in 399 B.C., having reigned since 427 B.C. Himself the son of King Archidamus, he left a son Leotychides, something over fifteen years of age, and a half-brother Agesilaus, born of a second and somewhat unroyal marriage of Archidamus. Rumour averred that Leotychides was no son of Agis, but the bastard offspring of his queen Timaea and the Athenian Alcibiades. Even Agis himself had expressed doubts of his legitimacy, but upon his deathbed he had been brought—so it was said—to declare Leotychides his lawful heir. As such he would probably have succeeded to the kingship without question, had it not been for the intrigues of Lysander. After quitting Sparta upon the plea of a journey to Libya, Lysander appears to have changed his mind and visited Delphi and Dodona. Disappointed and humiliated by his recent recall from the Hellespont, and knowing himself to be no favourite with the Spartiates, his ambition now led him into intrigues which fell little short of high treason: he resolved to win the kingship for himself, but in conformity with all precedents for revolutionary agitation in Sparta, he aspired to effect his object not by force but by fraudulently working upon the religious fears of its people. Just as the whole Lycurgeoan constitution was believed to be founded upon the *rhetrae* of Delphi, so any modifications thereof must have the same or similar authority. Accordingly Lysander intrigued with the priests of both Delphi and Dodona, offering large bribes if they would use the pretended voice of Apollo or Zeus to induce the Spartans

to do away with hereditary monarchy and make the kingship an elective office. For once the priests were incorruptible, and this design failed. A second and rather less direct intrigue, after for a moment promising complete success, broke down at the moment of trial. Thus twice foiled, but still undetected, Lysander thought it wise to desist from his original plan: if he could not be king in actuality, he would seek to be so in effect. Agis could not live long, and in the rumoured illegitimacy of Leotychides there was opportunity for fresh intrigue. Lysander made himself the partisan of Agesilaus, firing the ambition of that remoter claimant, with whom he believed his influence to be so great as to ensure his own ascendancy if Agesilaus could be installed in the kingship.

Accordingly, immediately upon Agis' death, the succession was made a matter of dispute. Against Leotychides was alleged his doubtful parentage; against Agesilaus, the low station of his mother and his own physical deformity, for he was of puny stature, and withal lame in one foot. It seemed that the cause of Agesilaus, that is, of Lysander, was lost when the partisans of Leotychides produced what purported to be an ancient oracular utterance warning Sparta to "beware of a lame reign"; but Lysander's wit was equal to the occasion: he explained that the accession of one who was no true son of the house of the Eurypon-tids—as was not Leotychides—was far more truly lame royalty than that of a man whose birth was indisputable even though his frame was malformed. The youth of Leotychides was probably greatly against him, for the position of Sparta and the attitude of other Greeks towards the dominant state rendered highly undesirable the succession of a minor of whose views and ability nothing was as yet known. There was need of a king who was at once able and submissive to the control of the Ephoralty. Agesilaus was elected king, and Lysander's designs seemed once more to prosper.

§ 8. The success of Agesilaus was a triumph for the liberal party in Sparta—the party which was prepared to bring the constitution into harmony with its altered surroundings; it was a notable defeat of the party of rigid

conservatism represented by the wealthy oligarchic Spartiates, and for the more creditable patriotism of Pausanias. The decision was not arrived at without intense excitement, and it was scarcely made when the state was threatened with a novel and extreme peril. It has been shown how events had enriched some of the upper ranks in the state while proportionately depressing others, and how these latter were naturally uneasy under their disabilities. For the helots and perioecs to be constantly in bitterest conspiracy against the Spartiates was a legacy bequeathed from the far-distant times when the Spartiates first reduced them to slavery and inferiority—a condition of things so normal as to be accepted as part and parcel of the Spartan theory of government; but it was something new for the ruling class to be itself divided, and for the discontented amongst it to make common cause with the despised underlings. This was what happened now. Helot risings had heretofore failed by reason of the solid front shown by the Spartiates in a body: if the latter were divided, and in part in collusion with the helots, there was hope of a different result. The Inferiors (*Hypomeiones*) saw this, and their insight and discontent found a leader in one Cinadon, by birth a Spartiate, but by the working of constitutional economics degraded to a condition of political incapacity.

If Lysander could, by his individual influence, shake the pillars of the constitution, surely it was possible for the united efforts of the lower classes to overthrow the handful of oligarchs who were themselves at variance. Cinadon pointed to the thousands who assembled in the streets and squares of Sparta, and showed that not more than one in a hundred was contented with his lot. Could not the ninety-nine dissatisfied deal with the one exception? The jealousy of the Ephoralty kept the helots without arms, but they had the tools of their crafts, and out of these they could forge weapons for war. The conspiracy was already widely organized, the conspirators were only waiting the signal for rising, when the whole plot was betrayed to the Ephors. The government was panic-struck, and not unnaturally, for the treason of the Spartiates threatened to

paralyze every effort at repression, and there were scarce five thousand who could be counted upon to support the government. Not daring to take open measures, the Ephors met plot with plot: they caused Cinadon to be arrested while engaged in a pretended secret service mission to Aulon, which they had entrusted to him. By torture they wrung from him the names of his fellow-conspirators, and arrested these also. All were loaded with manacles, publicly scourged through the streets of Sparta, and executed. The proceeding was typical of Spartan methods of government, but it was successful: the plot collapsed, the thousands of malcontents still endured their serfdom or disabilities in silence, nothing was done to obviate the occurrence of similar attempts, and the government laughed at the grim reminder that it had as many enemies as slaves. It is a matter of wonder that so widespread and so justifiable a conspiracy was repressed by this one act of terrorism, barbarous as it was, on the part of a handful of nobles.

§ 9. The anxiety consequent upon the discovery of Cinadon's conspiracy had scarcely worn off when a Syracusan merchant, calling at a Laconian port on the way from Phoenicia, brought word that at every harbour of that region there was being pushed forward, by order of the Great King, the equipment of a formidable fleet of war vessels, and that the chief command was given to Conon the Athenian, who since his escape from Aegospotami had lived in Cyprus, in the service of Evagoras of Salamis. That this fleet was destined to act against Greece was patent, for Sparta had by this date been for several years at open war, in the persons of her generals Thibron and Dercylidas, with the satraps of Lower Asia. Heretofore, however, the war had been confined solely to operations by land, and when the Ephors heard of the mighty preparations going on in the Persian dockyards, they awoke to the fact that in the naval power of Athens they had destroyed their chief safeguard against the national enemy, while they had taken no measures to replace her navy by one of their own. It seemed that Greece was threatened with another attack like that of Xerxes, nor did the new-made leaders of Greece

know how to prepare themselves against it. Their perplexity was Lysander's opportunity. He had succeeded in placing upon the throne the claimant whom he regarded as his *protégé*: he now suggested that Agesilaus should be despatched at once into Asia with additional forces to take over the command from Dercylidas. In any matters concerning Persia and Ionian Greece, Lysander was an authority whose experience could not be denied. He pointed out that the appearance of a veritable King of Sparta in Asia, especially if accompanied by even a moderate fleet, must go far to overawe the Great King's new-found courage; and this line of argument was strengthened by Agesilaus' declaration that he desired to take with him no more of the Spartiates than were considered needful as a staff, content to raise an army from helots, perioecs, and allies; for this offered to the government a ready means of ridding themselves of the more dangerous portion of the malcontents of Laconia, as well as of making further use of Lysander, whose presence in Sparta was not at all to their liking. Lysander himself believed that, once out of Sparta, he would be able to do as he pleased under cover of the docility of Agesilaus, and he looked forward to renewing his old relations with the oligarchs in Ionia. It was therefore to the satisfaction of all parties that, early in 396 B.C., Agesilaus sailed for Asia with a force of 2000 neodamodes and 6000 troops of the Peloponnesian allies. His staff consisted of thirty full Spartiates, one of whom was Lysander. To lend all pomp and circumstance to this unusual expedition, Agesilaus desired to sacrifice, as Agamemnon had done, at Boeotian Aulis before crossing the Aegean; but he was too thorough a Spartan to think of asking permission of the Thebans, so that he had only himself to blame when the latter gave yet another proof of their attitude towards Sparta by interrupting the sacrifice and expelling the royal devotee with ignominy from their borders. Agesilaus delayed his departure no longer, but he cherished unforgiving recollections of the insult which he had thus brought upon himself, and his hatred of Thebes had an important bearing on the history of his country.

§ 10. Successful as had been Dercylidas' conduct of the war in Asia, it was yet indirectly due to him that Artaxerxes had formed the design of aggressive warfare upon Hellas by sea; for the conduct of Tissaphernes in bribing Dercylidas to confine his hostilities to the satrapy of Pharnabazus, accentuating the long-standing enmity between the two satraps, had led Pharnabazus to seek revenge by denouncing his rival as no good subject of Artaxerxes. He accused him of culpable remissness, not to say collusion with the enemy, and insisted that the way to rid Persia of Spartan interference was not by using Persian gold to buy truce after truce, and so keeping the enemy in affluence in Asia. The gold so wasted would be better employed in stirring up enemies against Sparta at home and in building a fleet to take the sea against her, for she was surrounded by malcontents in Greece, and she had no navy worthy of the name. These arguments, supported as they were by the intriguing hatred of Parysatis, who had never forgotten or forgiven the fact that Tissaphernes had been more or less directly concerned in the overthrow of Cyrus, sufficed to persuade Artaxerxes. He caused Tissaphernes to be treacherously executed by Tithraustes, who was installed in his place as satrap of Lydia—a proceeding the more to Artaxerxes' pleasure, in that Tissaphernes had by this time shown himself quite unable to withstand the attack of Agesilaus, and had suffered a disgraceful defeat before the very walls of Sardis.

Apart from jealousy of Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus had very good grounds for his action. After having loyally befriended Sparta for many critical years he found himself made the favourite victim of the inroads of her generals. The design of ridding himself of his rival was his own: the design of adopting a new policy in the conduct of the war was due to the advice of the Athenian Conon. Conon, the only one of the ten generals of Athens whom the defeat at Aegospotami had not disgraced, escaped thence to the court of Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus. There he found a cordial welcome, and surroundings coloured by the strongest of philo-Athenian views on the part of

Evagoras. The two set themselves doggedly to work for the restoration of Athens: the chagrin of Pharnabazus and the irritation with which Artaxerxes viewed the successes of Dercylidas in Asia furnished them with the needed opportunity. It was Conon who pointed out the weakness of Sparta by sea and her insecurity at home: he offered his own services as commander of any Persian fleet raised against her; and it was in answer to these representations that Artaxerxes had ordered the construction of a fleet of three hundred sail in Phoenicia.

§ 11. Lysander was not disappointed in the expectation that his return to Asia would place him once more in a position agreeable to his ambition: from all sides flocked to him his old partisans, the more eagerly as they saw in his presence a possible means to the recovery of that ascendancy from which the fall of the decarchies had lately ousted them, and amongst the crowds who paid court to him the unfamiliar and insignificant figure of Agesilaus was altogether disregarded. But once again Lysander had reckoned without his host: Agesilaus when king was a very different person from Agesilaus as a private citizen. He did not need to be aroused to a sense of his own rights by the jealousies wherewith the remainder of his staff viewed the returning arrogance and pompous airs of Lysander. Without breaking at all with the man who had desired to be his master, he took the course of quietly ignoring every petition or suggestion made to himself through the person of Lysander. The latter was speedily forced to confess himself unable to fulfil all the promises and wishes which he had expressed on behalf of his clients, and was fain at last to beg for a commission elsewhere. Content to have thus humiliated him, Agesilaus commissioned him to watch the Spartan interests on the Hellespont, where he was successful in seducing from his allegiance one Spithridates, a dependent official under Pharnabazus, and so securing for Agesilaus the aid and advice of one intimately acquainted with the condition of Phrygia.

Upon the arrival of Agesilaus Tissaphernes had, as usual, arranged a truce under pretence of sending to Susa to

arrange a peace, but really in order to collect additional forces. Agesilaus was too scrupulous to break the truce on his own part, and too clever to allow himself to suffer by it; he gave out that he would, upon its expiry, at once attack Tissaphernes, thereby causing a general muster of the Persian troops in Lower Asia for the defence of Lydia and Caria; whereupon he marched direct into the satrapy of Pharnabazus and collected spoil at his pleasure, though on one occasion his horsemen met with a reverse at Dascyleum near the Propontis. He spent the winter in Ephesus, busily engaged in training his troops and raising new levies, especially cavalry, in which he was weak; then announcing again that he should attack Sardis, he on this occasion kept his word, which Tissaphernes so little expected to be the truth that he had again massed all his troops in Caria. Agesilaus marched almost to the walls of Sardis, defeated a large Persian force on the Hermus, and quietly sat down to pillage the country. It was in direct consequence of this last stroke that Tissaphernes was disgraced and executed. On the other hand, so well pleased were the Ephors with their king's successes, and with the manner in which he had dealt with Lysander, that they now appointed him to command by sea as well as by land. Tithraustes, the successor of Tissaphernes, in order to gain a brief respite for the arrangement of his plans, bribed Agesilaus with the sum of thirty talents to quit Lydia for Phrygia, and after some months of successful plundering there the army wintered at Dascyleum, where Agesilaus found comfortable quarters for himself and his staff in Pharnabazus' palace. At the same time he easily levied new troops, especially cavalry, amongst the wealthy Ionian cities, and entrusted the equipment of the fleet to his brother-in-law Peisander. In the spring of 394 B.C. he had a conference with Pharnabazus. The satrap made not unreasonable complaints that the only return for all he had done for Sparta was thus to have his territories constantly ravaged. He pretended to lend a ready ear to Agesilaus' suggestion that he should revolt from Artaxerxes and join the Spartan side. Whereupon Agesilaus withdrew to the coast preparatory to a grand attack upon the Persian

power further to the south and east. Before he could put his army in motion he received orders from the Ephorality to return to Greece with all possible speed. Sparta was once more engaged in a struggle which needed all her strength, and once again the Asiatic Greeks were left to their own resources.

CHAPTER IV.

THE LIBERATION OF GREECE.

§ 1. Mission of Timocrates to the Greek states: The indictment against Sparta: Thebes heads the disaffected states.—§ 2. Thebes attacks the Phocians: Feeling at Sparta.—§ 3. Outbreak of war: Battle of Haliartus, death of Lysander, and retreat of Pausanias: Pausanias is exiled.—§ 4. Coalition of the states: Agesilaus is recalled from Asia: Battle of Nemea.—§ 5. Conon in Lycia: Revolt of Rhodes: Battle of Cnidus and defection of the maritime states.—§ 6. Agesilaus enters Boeotia: Battle of Coronea.—§ 7. Conon returns to Athens: The Long Walls rebuilt.—§ 8. Progress of the Corinthian War: Military reforms of Iphicrates.

§ 1. CONON'S insistence that the surest way to rid Asia of the Spartans was to engage them in a war nearer home, a conviction based upon reliable knowledge of the state of feeling in Greece, lost nothing in its transmission by the mouth of Pharnabazus to the court at Susa; and Tithraustes at once took up the line of action which Tissaphernes had been too apathetic to attempt. His emissary, a Rhodian named Timocrates, crossed the Aegean in the autumn of 395 B.C., bearing with him fifty talents of gold as an earnest of the aid to be expected from Persia in case the recipients should fall in with his views, and should foment such a war in European Greece as should occupy the entire strength of Sparta. At Argos and Corinth, and especially at Thebes, Timocrates found his mission an easy one, while at Athens he needed not even to show his gold. Each and all of these states had remained quiet during the past seven years, more from weakness and from lack of any common bond, than from love of Sparta. All had the same general grievances: Sparta had made

herself a despot-city at their expense or by their means; she gave them no return for their sacrifices in her behalf; instead of liberating Hellas she had subjected to a worse tyranny than ever did Athens a far larger portion of it; Spartan harmosties were not less instruments of oppression than Lysandrian decarchies; the recent attack upon Elis proved that the Spartan despotism was no merely transitory development, but the realization of a studied policy which was to be continued in the future; what Elis had suffered any other free state in Greece might expect to suffer; and so far from having any high desire to occupy that well-deserved position from which they had thrust Athens, the Spartans had voluntarily surrendered the Greeks of Asia, and practically also those of the Aegean, to Persian rule, and had utilized Persian aid in enslaving alike Athens and those whom Athens had once so heroically saved from Persian domination. Each state had also its own especial grievances: Argos still regretted her lost hegemony; the mercantile soul of Corinth regretted the still unpaid share in the spoils of Athens; Thebes moreover knew that for her recent treatment of Agesilaus she must expect to be called to a bitter account; while Athens longed only to turn the tables upon her conqueror and to avenge the terrors of the Year of Anarchy. Moreover, it seemed to be an excellent opportunity for action, for it was known that Sparta was scarcely yet recovered from the shock caused by the discovery of Cinadon's treason, and that her councils were divided by the rival interests of Lysander and his opponents. The mission of Timocrates, again, was a practical test of the feeling of the leading states outside Laconia: it gave that assurance of sympathy and support which was alone needful to kindle into one flame the smouldering discontent of all. Further, it brought the glad news that the hand of Persia was now turned against Sparta, and that Conon was at that very moment putting to sea with a fleet such as no efforts of Sparta could hope to raise. With these varied motives and inducements, all subordinated to the one universal hatred of Sparta, the four great states surrounding the Isthmus came to a tacit understanding, wherein the leading spirit was Thebes.

§ 2. Thus resolved to have war, it was no hard matter for Thebes to bring it about. The Locrians of Opus* and the Phocians were at variance about a strip of debatable border land, and the leaders of the anti-Spartan party in Thebes, if they did not actually incite the disputants to war, sided heartily with the Locrians. Whereupon the Phocians at once appealed to Sparta.

Now that Elis had been chastised, Thebes was the one power in Greece of which the Spartan government most desired to make an example. It was Thebes that had set the example of insubordination in refusing to aid Pausanias in his march upon Athens; she had taken a similarly offensive attitude in respect of both the Elean and Persian wars; she had sheltered Thrasybulus and his fellow-exiles in defiance of the Spartan threats against all who should do so; nay, she had offered personal insult to the Spartan king Agesilaus in his attempted sacrifice at Aulis. Her attitude was a standing menace to the security of Spartan influence beyond the Isthmus, while an attack upon her would, in the event of its success—an event which no one at Sparta doubted—secure that ascendancy in Central Greece. Moreover, her position as head of the Boeotian League was opposed to the Spartan theory of universal autonomy under the headship of Sparta alone. To all these considerations was now added the direct appeal of the Phocians for aid against the combined forces of Thebes and Locris. The Ephorality readily accepted this excuse for a war which they saw was necessary, if they were to maintain their hold upon the extra-Peloponnesian Greeks.

§ 3. The attack was to be made from two sides. Lysander, too valuable to be neglected when there was need of energetic and capable officers, was commissioned to proceed to Heraclea in Trachis, raise an army from the Malians, Oetaeans, and Aenianes in that neighbourhood, and advance upon Boeotia from the north, so as to effect a junction on a set day with Pausanias and the main army approaching from the south. The plan miscarried. Possibly the old enmity between Pausanias and Lysander led the former to act with the less energy: at any rate he

* According to Pausanias, they were the Ozolian Locrians of Amphissa.

spent some considerable time in getting together his forces, and Lysander—himself not improbably moved by jealousy and ambitious to win laurels for himself without awaiting his colleague's arrival—presented himself at the rendezvous in the neighbourhood of Haliartus before Pausanias had come up. Orchomenus, the town of the Boeotian Confederacy second in importance to Thebes, had already declared for Lysander, and possibly there was in each town of the Confederacy a party favourable to similar secession. At all events Lysander, his forces swelled by the contingents of Phocis, deemed himself strong enough to demand the surrender of Haliartus. A company of Thebans, recently thrown into the town, prevented this. Thereupon Lysander at once proceeded to reconnoitre the walls with a view to an assault. While so engaged he was surprised by the simultaneous attack of another Theban division coming up to the aid of Haliartus, and of that which already garrisoned the place. Here he met his death, falling in a petty skirmish before the gates of an insignificant country town. His troops held their own with difficulty until evening, and thereupon dispersed. On the following day the arrival of Pausanias for a moment damped the exultation of the Thebans, but close in his steps followed Thrasybulus with the hoplites and cavalry of Athens in numbers sufficient to put Pausanias' force at a disadvantage. Indeed he was in a highly difficult position: his troops, composed mainly of Peloponnesian allies, were in a dangerously disloyal mood; Lysander was dead, and his army had vanished; his death had as far emboldened the Thebans and their friends as it had discouraged his own side; and lastly his numbers, even if all were confident and loyal, were seemingly not superior to those now arrayed against them from Thebes, Locris, and Athens. If he fought he might win, but he would thereby gain nothing but the ground upon which he fought; and on the other hand he might very possibly lose, and so make his position still worse. He decided not to risk a battle, but to ask for the customary truce for the purpose of burying those who had fallen on the previous day. Such a request was the recognized acknowledgment of defeat. The

exultation of the Thebans was unbounded: "It was from this moment," says Xenophon, "that the growth of their great pride took its commencement." They showed their assurance by the unheard-of proceeding whereby they made conditional the granting of the desired truce, and the condition was nothing less than that Pausanias should forthwith quit Boeotia. The undisguised relief with which his troops heard the condition went far to justify their commander in having declined to fight. He buried the slain and withdrew with what speed he might, while the Thebans hung upon his rear and insulted his troops with impunity. Upon his return to Sparta, Pausanias was indicted upon the double charge of having by his negligence contributed to the death of Lysander, and of having disgracefully asked for a truce instead of risking a battle. The partisans of the dead Lysander would be loud in their denunciations, and would recall Pausanias' conduct in permitting the restoration of Thrasybulus at Athens, a matter for which the king had already been tried and acquitted. On this occasion he found it wise to forestall condemnation by flight. He took asylum at Tegea, and lived there for the remainder of his life. His career, with its vicissitudes of royalty, banishment, recall, and final exile, is a notable example of the fallen dignity of the royal office at Sparta, and of the hazard involved in unsuccessful generalship even in the case of an oligarch amongst oligarchs. He was succeeded by his son, Agesipolis, during whose minority Aristodemus acted as regent.

§ 4. Wide and notable were the results of the death of Lysander and the triumph of Thebes and Athens. The hitherto covert sympathy between the disaffected states gave place to an intimate and overt alliance of the states about the Isthmus—Corinth, Argos, Athens, and Thebes—the further populations about the head of the Maliac Gulf and Thessaly, and the Acarnanians, Ambraciots, and other peoples of Western Hellas. The Phocians were left isolated under the inadequate protection of the Spartan garrison in Heraclea; and this fortress too fell into the hands of the Thebans, thanks to the boldness and energy

of Ismenias, within a few days. So alarmed were the Ephors that they despatched to Agesilaus in Asia that peremptory summons to return which put a stop to his schemes of anti-Persian conquest. Leaving 6000 men to garrison the Greek towns of the coast he reluctantly crossed the Hellespont, and made the best of his way homewards through Thrace and Macedonia. His brother Peisander remained with the fleet to combat the designs of Conon, whose vessels were now commissioned and active in the neighbourhood of Rhodes.

The representatives of the new alliance met without delay at Corinth to discuss a plan of action against Sparta. If any further proof were needed of the extent of the alteration in Sparta's position, it may be found in the words of Timolaus of Corinth, who urged the allies to waste no time, but instantly to attack Laconia itself, and "destroy the wasps in their nest." Such bold action was forestalled by the energy of the regent Aristodemus, who suddenly presented himself, with such allies as he could muster from Arcadia and Achaea, before the walls of Corinth. At Nemea the hostile armies* fought a pitched battle: the Spartan contingent defeated the Athenians with loss, while their allies were beaten all along the line by the Thebans, Argives, and Corinthians; but Aristodemus, keeping his victorious companies well in hand, was able to neutralize the success of the various divisions of the opposite side by attacking and defeating each as it returned exhausted and disordered from the pursuit of the enemy. The allies sought shelter within the walls of Corinth, but the conduct of certain "Laconizing" Corinthians in endeavouring to close the gates against them, and so leave them to the mercy of the Spartans, was an omen of the internal feuds soon to cripple the movements of the allies. Such as it was, the victory was with Aristodemus, yet so unreliable was the temper of his allies that he did not venture to

* The forces were as follows. Aristodemus had 6000 hoplites from Sparta, 3000 from Elis, 3000 from Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halie, 600 Lacedaemonian horsemen, 300 Cretan bowmen, 400 slingers. On the side of the allies were 6000 hoplites from Athens, 7000 from Argos, 5000 from Boeotia, 3000 from Corinth, 3000 from Euboea, besides 1550 horsemen from Boeotia, Athens, Euboea, and the Opuntian Locrians, and also light-armed Arcadians, Locrians, and Malians. The fight is known also as the Battle of Corinth.

follow up his success, but retreated to Sparta until Agesilaus should return. Dercylidas, carrying to Agesilaus the news of the victory, found him already upon the Strymon, and was by him sent eastward to maintain the Spartan interests on the Hellespont—interests now gravely menaced by the approach of Conon (394 B.C.).

§ 5. Although Artaxerxes, and more particularly Pharnabazus, were heartily in accord with Conon, the usual lethargy of Orientalism delayed his taking the sea until far on in the year 395 B.C. At length, with only forty sail, he moved towards Lycia, where he fell in with a Spartan fleet under Phrax, three times as numerous, and was blockaded for many weeks in Caunus. Reinforced at last by a further flotilla of forty ships, he could not prevent his enemy from avoiding a battle. Phrax withdrew to Rhodes, where he was expecting the arrival of a large fleet of transports bringing up corn from Egypt; but the Rhodians were no fonder of Spartan rule than were their fellow-Ionians: they expelled Phrax, and welcomed Conon, and when the expected transports arrived shortly after, the whole number fell into Conon's hands. Phrax was soon afterwards superseded by Peisander.

In the spring of 394 B.C. Conon was strengthened by the junction of a large Phoenician fleet under Pharnabazus, and at once moved upon the Greek ports of the Asiatic coast. At Cnidus he fell in with Peisander, whose design was to prevent his communicating with the Greek communities. Peisander was a brave officer, but no strategist: his whole fleet was destroyed and himself slain. Almost as one man the Asiatic and Aegean Greeks threw open their gates with enthusiasm to the combined fleets of Conon and Pharnabazus. Only Abydos and Sestus on the Hellespont, through the exertions of Dercylidas, were induced to remain loyal to Sparta. This was the answer of the maritime Greeks to the government which had thrust upon them the harmosties and decarchies, and even surrendered them to Persia. The Spartan supremacy of the seas fell even more quickly than it had risen, again transferred to Athens in the person of Conon, eleven years after his escape from the disaster at Aegospotami.

§ 6. Agesilaus was encamped at Chaeronea in Boeotia, when there reached him the news of the defeat at Cnidus and the death of his brother-in-law. He had fought his way successfully across Thessaly, and was now hourly expecting to meet the allied army advancing from Corinth to cover Thebes. The struggle would, he well knew, try to the utmost his own valour and that of his men, and he dared not damp their courage, already depressed by superstitious fears consequent upon a solar eclipse (August 14), by divulging the evil news. With pitiful tact he garlanded his head and proclaimed to the army that Peisander indeed was slain, but that he had died in winning a notable victory. On the next morning he advanced to Coronea, and there met the enemy.

After crushing all opposition in Thessaly and passing Thermopylae, Agesilaus had moved down the valley of the Cephissus as far as Chaeronea, a few miles west of Orchomenus. Owing to its jealousy of Thebes, that town supported him, as it had lately supported Lysander, and as many as a third of his whole number were Orchomenian and Phocian allies. Inasmuch as the Isthmus was entirely occupied by the forces of the Confederates, Agesilaus must either fight his way through their opposition or transport his army into Peloponnesus by sea from Creusis or some other port on the Corinthian Gulf. Which course he was to adopt must be decided by the result of the impending battle. He moved south from the Cephissus across the plain of Chaeronea, marching direct for Creusis. As he approached the slopes of Mt. Helicon by Coronea, the Confederate army moved down to bar his passage.

The whole of the Cyreian Greeks, together with a considerable force of allies from the Ionian cities, accompanied Agesilaus: amongst them was Xenophon, to whom we owe the account of the battle. The Spartans, as usual, took post upon the right wing, the Phocian and Orchomenian auxiliaries upon the left, while the Asiatic and Cyreian Greeks occupied the centre. Opposed to the latter were the Corinthians, Athenians, and others of the lesser Confederate contingents; while respectively on the right and left the Thebans and Argives faced their several peculiar

foes, the Orchomenians and the Spartans. The engagement fell into a triple battle: on the right the Theban hoplites drove the Phocians and Orchomenians from the field and pursued them as far as the baggage of Agesilaus' army; on the other hand, the Cyreians and Asiatic Greeks, captained by Herippidas the ex-harmost of Heraclea, not without difficulty drove back the Confederate centre, while the right wing of the Lacedaemonians, led by Agesilaus in person, found their Argive adversaries only anxious to escape their charge. The centre and left of the Confederates retreated to Mt. Tilphossium, one of the lower spurs of Helicon, and there formed their ranks afresh; the victorious Lacedaemonians halting for the same purpose at the foot of the hills, wheeled about to complete their victory by the annihilation of the Thebans, now far in the rear and entirely separated from their allies. But the Thebans were equal to the emergency, and gave a foretaste of what they were later on destined to achieve at Leuctra and Mantinea. Forming in deep order, they fearlessly charged full upon the centre of the whole force of Agesilaus, bent upon cutting their way through. Xenophon, himself in the thick of the fight, has recorded the desperate bravery of either side: it was the most notable fight of his day, he said. The Thebans gained their point: not the numbers or the valour even of Agesilaus' own companies or of the redoubtable Cyreians could prevent the compact body of Thebans, less than half as numerous, from triumphantly rejoining their allies upon Tilphossium. Agesilaus himself was covered with wounds, and could not call himself a victor until, on the following day, the allies owned themselves the weaker by asking for the customary truce of burial. Agesilaus gladly granted it, then hastened his march to Creusis, whence he took ship for the Achaean coast. After the display at Coronea he could not venture to force the Isthmus. Even as it was, the polemarch Gylis, entrusted with the command during the healing of Agesilaus' wounds and commissioned to raid Locris, was repulsed and slain. Agesilaus had gained laurels indeed, but they were barren ones. Like Aristodemus after the battle of Corinth, he was glad to retreat unmolested to

Sparta, nursing a yet more bitter hatred of the Thebans who had so much jeopardized his fortune and his life. At Sparta he was welcomed with the utmost enthusiasm, a feeling which was not less lessened when it was found that he had preserved his old simplicity of manners. The results of his three years of campaigning were represented solely by the tithe of the spoils of Asia which he dedicated at Delphi—a tithe amounting to £700,000.

§ 7. The readiness wherewith the maritime Greeks had welcomed the advent of Conon and Pharnabazus, was justified by the moderation of those commanders. That "liberation" which had upon the lips of Spartans been but a lie was now realized conscientiously by the Athenian and his Persian ally. With the sole exceptions of Sestus and Abydus, the two towns which still remained under Spartan influence, every Greek community of the Eastern Aegean and the coast of Ionia was left absolutely unmolested; for Conon had thoroughly learnt the lesson of past years, and he promised to afford in Greece itself a higher gratification to Pharnabazus' thirst for vengeance than could be obtained at the cost of the Asiatic Greeks. Accordingly, in the spring of 393 B.C. the Peloponnesus witnessed a sight unknown since the day of Salamis—a Persian fleet in command of the surrounding seas, and no longer to be discomfited by the hostility of Athens but working for the benefit of that city. The Spartan army lay almost inactive at Sicyon, while Conon and the satrap cruised southwards as far as Messenia, ravaged the coastlands of Laconia, and occupied Cythera. The whole of the eastern sea was in their power, and even in the Gulf of Corinth the Confederates were taking heart to face the Lacedaemonian cruisers. When Conon at length anchored in the Saronic Gulf there was no preventing his making what arrangements he pleased with the Confederate council. His object was simple: he would restore to Athens those walls which had been the basis of her late sovereignty. To do so, he assured Pharnabazus, was to inflict upon Sparta a humiliation and a lasting injury transcending any other. The satrap was delighted: he placed at Conon's disposal the crews of his Phoenician and Cilician vessels and the funds

needful both to pay these and to hire from Thebes and elsewhere a host of masons and carpenters. Eleven years after their overthrow the Long Walls rose once more from their ruins, and the restoration effected by Thrasybulus was confirmed and completed by that of Conon, so that the latter was often styled the second founder of the Athenian sovereignty. Thus did Persia retaliate upon Sparta for promises broken, and make amends to Athens for past hostilities. But the Persian's motive was no far-seeing policy and no love for Athens herself: it was the mere thirst for revenge at any price, a thirst driven to extremes by the obstinacy with which Dercylidas maintained Sparta's one foothold upon Asia in Abydus. Had Dercylidas been less defiant and less successful, Athens might still have continued without her walls, waiting yet longer for the event which was to give to her a second lease of power previously to her own political extinction and that of Greece at large.

§ 8. The other chief event of this year was the construction of a line of fortifications across the southern extremity of the Isthmus. So energetic were the allies, so disheartened and weak were the Spartans, that this object was accomplished without interruption. Unable to keep the seas on either shore, and equally unable to force the land-route along the Isthmus, the Spartans could but look on sullenly at the restoration of their rival in Attica. They did indeed make a number of fruitless but harassing attacks upon the allies, but here again their energy, such as it was, worked to their disadvantage, for the immediate outcome was the organization by the Athenian Iphicrates of his famous peltasts or light infantry. The heavy-armed Greek hoplite, with his cumbersome body-armour—breastplate, greaves, and helmet—his heavy oblong shield, short sword, and stout pike, formidable enough in hand-to-hand conflict or when charging with all the weight of the phalanx, was quite useless for the more active duties of skirmishing and scouting: the weight of his armour, the want of missile weapons, and the peculiar tactics in which he was drilled, making him incompetent to do the duty of, or to cope with, assailants formidable only from their agility and from the skill wherewith they could use missile weapons at a distance beyond the

reach of the hoplite's sword or pike. Iphicrates recognized this fact, and set himself to meet the redoubtable heavy regulars of the Peloponnesus with flying companies of *guerrilleros*. He chose for this service mercenaries of every nationality, whose bodily vigour commended them for the purpose: in place of the heavy shield of metal he furnished them with the light round *pelta* of wood, lengthened the sword and pike, did away with the greaves and helmet, and substituted for the cuirass only a quilted corselet of linen. Fighting always in open order, and avoiding anything in the way of hand-to-hand fighting, these troops could outweary any hoplites, and while themselves keeping beyond range of the hoplites' weapons, could keep their enemy well within range of their own arms. Iphicrates with his peltasts became the terror of the Peloponnesian allies, though he did not yet venture to pit them against the Spartans themselves.

CHAPTER V.

THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.

§ 1. Party feuds in Corinth : Battle of the Long Walls.—§ 2. Agesilaus at the Isthmus : Iphicrates annihilates a Spartan division.—§ 3. Dissensions amongst the allies : The Spartans make overtures to Persia : Agesilaus in Acarnania.—§ 4. Tiribazus in Western Asia : He supports Antalcidas.—§ 5. Defeat and death of Thibron, and of Thrasybulus : War in the Hellespont.—§ 6. Teleutias at Peiræus : The Athenians wish for peace : Artaxerxes dictates terms to the Greeks.—§ 7. The terms of the Peace of Antalcidas.—§ 8. Evagoras of Cyprus.

§ 1. THE aspect of affairs had not changed when the year 392 B.C. saw the Spartans again encamped before the Isthmus, and again ravaging the lands of the wealthy Corinthians. This was the third year that the Corinthians had thus suffered, and while the fact had no effect upon the purses or politics of the poorer class, who represented the anti-Spartan and democratic party, it was a cause of very sensible loss to the wealthy land-owners who represented the oligarchic party. Heretofore the oligarchs had themselves belonged in the main to the anti-Spartan side, but finding that the burden of the war fell almost entirely upon themselves they became desirous of an accommodation, and passed over gradually to the views of a minority of their own number who had all along favoured the Spartan side. It was these men who had endeavoured to close the town gates upon their own countrymen after the battle of Nemea, and though foiled at the moment, their party had by this time grown so much more formidable that the governing party had recourse to open violence, and thus removed more than a hundred of the malcontent nobles. Further to secure themselves they drew yet more close the bonds of their

alliance with Argos ; they caused the very boundary-marks of the two states to be removed, called in an Argive garrison, and in fact made Corinth a dependency of Argolis. The natural result was that the entire aristocracy of Corinth, that of birth as well as that of wealth, became actively hostile to the government which had thus betrayed the independence of their city, placing them beneath the control of the Argives and causing their lands to be more than ever the object of Spartan animosity. They entered into negotiations with Agesilaus, and contrived to admit the Spartan army by night within the two long walls connecting Corinth, on the side towards Sicyon, with her port of Lechaëum on the Corinthian Gulf. Within these walls on the next day was fought a bloody battle, in which the Spartans made good their venture against the combined efforts of Corinthians, Argives, and Athenians ; but for some unknown reason they omitted to maintain their advantage, and suffered the Athenians to repair both walls, thereby again excluding them from the Isthmus. The treasonable oligarchs, with their leaders Alcimenes and Pasimelus, fled to Sparta.

§ 2. In the following spring (391 B.C.) Agesilaus determined upon a more vigorous assault upon the Confederate position. While a fleet under his brother Teleutias moved upon Lechaëum from the seaward side, he advanced upon it by land from Sicyon. Lechaëum was captured, and the Long Walls again demolished. Through the gap thus made Agesilaus moved along the Isthmus and overran the small peninsula which juts out westward into the Corinthian Gulf behind Megaris, a secluded and comparatively secure district whereby the Corinthians and Argives kept open their communications with Thebes and Athens, and into which they had conveyed for security the major part of their stock and other valuables. The whole of this spoil now fell into Agesilaus' hands, together with Peiræum, the fortress commanding the district, and a large number of captives of either sex. He was in the act of adjudging the latter to slavery, and rejoicing to see envoys from the hated Thebans anxiously seeking his attention to their proposals for peace—for now that Peiræum had fallen, together with Sidus, Crommyon, and Lechaëum, Thebes was completely

severed from her allies in Corinth and Argos—when there reached him a piece of news which appeared to the Greeks a judgment upon his pride, and caused his instant and humiliated retreat. This intelligence was that the peltasts of Iphicrates had cut to pieces an entire Spartan *mora* of six hundred men under the very walls of Corinth. This was the first occasion upon which the peltasts had tried their strength against the Spartans in the open, and it brought a bitter retaliation upon the contempt with which the Spartans had hitherto regarded them. It was not less grievous a blow to the military prestige of Sparta than had been formerly the surrender of Sphacteria; and over and above the disgrace there was the loss, to Sparta with her dwindling population irreparable, of some six hundred of her best warriors. Agesilaus hurried to the scene of the fight to recover the dead by battle if possible. It was too late: they had already been buried under truce, and the defeat of the Spartans stood confessed to all Greece. Worse still, the Arcadians welcomed the news with delight. To measure the extent of the disaster one has but to be told that Agesilaus, himself a Spartan king and the successful leader of the Spartans in Asia and at Coronea, though at the head of a full army of Spartans and allies, made his way homewards at once and, as far as might be, in secret.

§ 3. This was the last notable event of the so-called Corinthian War. Both sides were heartily weary of the struggle, for neither gained any definite advantage, and as usual the Confederates had long since begun to feel mutual jealousies. Corinth was divided by the feuds of democrats and oligarchs; Corinth and Argos were envious that they should suffer all the brunt of war while their allies in Boeotia and Attica went scatheless; and finally, Corinth and Argos and Boeotia were alike jealous of the restored position of Athens. Unable, however, to bring their own quarrels to an end, all parties turned their eyes to Persia—Sparta, because now that Pharnabazus had had his revenge and she had relinquished all her hold upon Asia, there was no further reason for the Great King's hostility; the Confederates, to counteract the diplomacy of Sparta. As early as 392 B.C. Antalcidas had gone up to Susa as envoy of the

Ephors, and thither also in the following year went Conon from Athens, and representatives from Thebes and Corinth and Argos also.

Negotiations with Persia were always a matter of time, and while the various envoys were intriguing one against another at Susa, Agesilaus led an expedition into Acarnania, to punish that country for its adhesion to the Confederates: he did not venture near Corinth again, where the late victory of Iphicrates had been speedily followed by the recovery of all the places recently captured by the efforts of Agesilaus and Teleutias. The Achaeans had made good a footing in Acarnania during the disturbances of the last few years, and their conquest was now threatened by a combined attack of the Acarnanians. It was to prevent this that Agesilaus intervened, in the hope also of reviving, by a successful campaign here, the laurels which had faded so rapidly in Boeotia and at the Isthmus. He gained little however except booty, and was doubtless glad to make good his retreat from a wild and almost unknown country. The simultaneous invasion of Argolis by Agesipolis led to no better results. These expeditions occurred either in 391 or 390 B.C. In the ensuing year the Acarnanians, dreading a repetition of the attack, consented to the demands of Sparta, surrendered to the Achaeans the conquests claimed by the latter people, and enrolled themselves amongst the allies of Sparta.

§ 4. The mission of Antalcidas to the Persian court coincided with the arrival of Tiribazus to replace Tithraustes as satrap of Lydia. Tiribazus, having had no personal experience of the injuries inflicted upon Persia in late years by the Spartan generals from Thibron to Agesilaus, might be expected to lend an unprejudiced ear to the diplomatic suggestions of the envoy, or if prejudiced at all, it was to be supposed that the usual jealousy of one satrap towards another would cause him to take a course opposite to that of his neighbour Pharnabazus, and side heartily with Sparta. Antalcidas was an able diplomatist, skilful at making the most of his opportunities. He persuaded Tiribazus that since the evacuation of Asia by Agesilaus, and the expulsion of the fleets from the Aegean by the

battle of Cnidus, the Great King had nothing more to fear from her: on the contrary, if he would but accept her as his ally, she would be able and willing to protect his interests against the assaults of any Greeks whatever. She would at once and for ever surrender to Persia all the Greek communities of Asia, and asked in return only that Artaxerxes should guarantee, under her superintendence, the absolute autonomy of every other Greek community. To Tiribazus, who desired only to get quiet possession of the maritime towns of his satrapy, these professions and conditions were highly attractive, and he gave to Antalcidas his hearty support, despite the remonstrances of the envoys despatched from Thebes, Athens, Argos, and Corinth to counterwork the influence of the Spartan envoy. All those states refused emphatically to hear of the surrender of their Asiatic kinsmen to Persia, but they had also each their several special objections to the proposals of Antalcidas. They saw clearly that those proposals aimed at destroying, by Persian aid, the recent alliance of Corinth and Argos, not less than the ancient confederacy of Boeotian towns under the leadership of Thebes, for each could be interpreted as an infringement of the proviso as to absolute autonomy. As for Athens, she dreamed still of reviving the Confederacy of Delos, or at any rate of retaining the three islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which had for nearly a century been colonized by Athenian settlers; and the same proviso would set aside her claims in this direction. But Tiribazus cared no more for particular grievances than for general theories as to the freedom of the Asiatic Greeks: not only did he supply Antalcidas secretly with funds until such time as the Great King should formally accept the proffered alliance of Sparta, but he undertook to present Antalcidas in person to Artaxerxes at Susa, and he so far disregarded the rights of embassy as to place Conon under arrest on the alleged charge of acting contrary to the interests of the Great King. It is uncertain what was Conon's subsequent fate. Either he died in prison, or he contrived to escape once more to his old friend Evagoras in Cyprus: in any case he was lost to Athens and died very shortly afterwards.

§ 5. Tiribazus was less successful at Susa than he had

anticipated; he was detained there for many months, while his place was taken at Sardis by Struthas, a man of considerable abilities and decidedly anti-Spartan views, and so energetic that (391 B.C.) the Ephors found it advisable to send out Thibron a second time to protect their interests beyond the Aegean. Thibron was not more successful now than formerly; he allowed himself to be surprised in the vicinity of Ephesus with an army of 8000 men, and perished in the rout of his troops. He was succeeded by one Diphridas, who effected little or nothing. Indeed, what energy the Ephoralty possessed was directed now to recovering some portion of their power on the seas, which seem at the time (390 B.C.) to have been deserted by the fleets of Persia and Athens. They had an opening at Rhodes, where the oligarchs were at variance with the democracy established in the island immediately before the battle of Cnidus. Teleutias, acting as navarch, effected a landing upon the island and set on foot a dilatory civil war, but his only real success was the capture of a small Athenian fleet bound for Cyprus. It was shortly before this date that Evagoras of Salamis became involved in a ten years' war with his Persian suzerain, and much as their ships and funds were needed for their own interests, the Athenians, mindful of the aid lent by Evagoras to Conon, faithfully sought to repay that debt of gratitude. However, to deal with Teleutias, and to support the Rhodian democracy, they commissioned a further fleet of forty sail under Thrasybulus. That general saw fit to sail first to the Hellespont, where he made alliance with the Thracian princes in the neighbourhood of the straits and with Chalcedon, drew more closely the bonds between Athens and Byzantium by setting up a democracy there, and re-established the old impost of a tithe upon all corn-ships passing the straits. He then attacked and defeated the Spartan harmost commanding in Lesbos, and sailed in leisurely fashion southwards towards Rhodes, raising money at every possible point. He was so engaged at Aspendus in Pamphylia when the inhabitants, exasperated by the violence of some of his men, attacked and murdered him in his tent. So died the liberator of Athens.

Alarmed at the re-establishment of Athenian influence on the Hellespont, especially as imperilling the position of Dercylidas who still occupied Abydus, the Ephors despatched Anaxibius to supersede that officer there. Energetic and unscrupulous, Anaxibius soon destroyed much of Thrasybulus' work, whereupon the Athenians despatched the redoubtable Iphicrates to the scene of action with twelve hundred of his peltasts. It seems that he had been only lately recalled from Corinth, where his services were no longer needed, and where he had made himself unpopular by interference with political matters beyond his sphere. Within a few days he surprised Anaxibius when marching from Antandrus, which he had just occupied with a garrison, to Abydus, and killed him with most of his troops.

§ 6. With such petty warfare the struggle dragged on. Even in the waters of the Saronic Gulf the Athenians found themselves hampered and annoyed by the presence of a Spartan harmost in Aegina, who encouraged constant piracy at the expense of Athenian cruisers and merchantmen. This was checked for a moment when Chabrias, the successor of Iphicrates at Corinth, and one of the few able commanders of the period, while fitting out a fresh fleet at Peiræus for the relief of Evagoras, suddenly landed in Aegina and slew the harmost, Gorgopas. But to Gorgopas succeeded Teleutias, who signalized his arrival by an instant descent upon Peiræus, surprising the port in the early hours of the morning, disabling the warships there anchored, plundering or towing off the merchantmen, and even carrying away many of their crews. The dash and energy of Teleutias at their very gates, coupled with the fact that another and stronger Spartan fleet was now in the Hellespont, while their own energies were divided between the need of defending themselves and the desire to aid their ally Evagoras, made the Athenians anxious to conclude a peace. Their wishes were echoed by the Greeks at large, and found fulfilment in the following year.

When Tiribazus first presented himself at Susa on behalf of Antalcidas (391 B.C.) he met with little encouragement. Artaxerxes had not yet forgiven the Spartans for the exploits of Dercylidas and Agesilaus, or for the bad faith

shown by them in return for Darius' aid against Athens; and as Persia was now mistress of the seas, and had compelled the withdrawal of Agesilaus from Asia, there seemed no reason why he should listen to any terms suggested by Antalcidas. But when the Spartans under Thibron again appeared in Asia to resist Struthas, and when the conjoint revolt of Evagoras and Egypt was found to be supported in part by Athenian aid, the Great King's views changed. He wished to be free to deal with Cyprus and Egypt: he wished therefore to have no further trouble on land in the direction of Lower Asia, or on sea from the rivalry of Athens; and both of these objects seemed attainable by help of Sparta. Tiribazus recovered his influence, returned to Sardis, and sent immediate word to Sparta of the change in the King's attitude. In consequence, Antalcidas reappeared in the Aegean as navarch in 387 B.C., and made a second journey to Susa. All went well with him: to Sardis towards the end of the year Tiribazus summoned the representatives of all those Greeks who cared to be included in the pacification. All came, and listened patiently to the dictates of Artaxerxes:—

All the towns of Asia shall belong to Persia, together with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus: to Athens shall belong Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros: all other Greek towns shall be free and autonomous. Thus it seems just to the Great King, and upon such as object to these conditions he will make war in conjunction with such as accept them.

§ 7. After hearing the rescript, the envoys departed to report the conditions to their respective cities, and shortly afterwards at a congress assembled at Sparta, the states of free Greece swore adhesion to this, the infamous Peace of Antalcidas. Its conditions were of grave moment to the parties concerned.

Firstly, the Greeks of Asia were abandoned to Persia, and thus by one stroke of the pen Sparta for a second time surrendered to the national enemy those kinsmen for whom the Greek nation had been doing battle ever since the burning of Sardis. Nor was there any constraint to force Sparta to make this surrender: it was her own proposal, advanced with the sole object of purchasing the

amity, and therefore the money, of Persia for the furtherance of her own ends. Her narrow view was not to be concerned with trans-Aegean Greeks; still less was her conscience to be pricked by the recollection of Plataea or even of Agesilaus' bold designs: her one object was to be first in continental Greece, regardless of the fate of any that lay further afield. Upon the Asiatic Greeks accordingly the hand of Persia closed at once: many of their towns were destroyed, the remainder were garrisoned by Persians or mercenaries, their ports sheltered Persian and Phoenician war fleets menacing the liberties of the adjacent islands, their wealth and their sons and their daughters were drained away to gratify the pleasures of Oriental luxury.

Secondly, the conditions compelled the immediate disarmament of all Greece, under pain of the combined attack of Sparta and Persia. It compelled the dissolution of all confederacies whatever, seeing that even voluntary alliances might, if Sparta so pleased, be interpreted as infringements of the clause as to autonomy: thus Argos was compelled to rescind her close alliance with Corinth, and the Isthmus was thereby thrown open to the Spartans; thus too Thebes was compelled, under threat of instant attack by Agesilaus, to forego her claim to sign the peace in the conjoint name of the Boeotian Confederacy. Athens alone, with the exception of Sparta, gained anything, in that she was permitted to retain her three island-colonies: but this concession was only a bribe to purchase her assent to the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and to induce her to leave her faithful ally Evagoras to his fate. As for the rest, all Greece was left in a condition of disintegration transcending anything as yet known within her borders: state was divided against state, town against town, and if such an arrangement rendered impossible any united efforts against Persia in the future, it also left Sparta free from the fear of another Confederate war.

Thirdly, the whole drift of the peace was to confirm the hegemony of Sparta in Greece, but at the same time to make Sparta but the servant of Persia in the overlordship of Greece. The object of Persia was to prevent the formation of dangerous confederacies in Greece; the duty

of Sparta was to maintain the interests of Persia in Greece with the help of Persian threats and Persian money. The Great King did not concern himself to define too nicely what was meant by absolute autonomy: the interpretation of the phrase was left to the discretion of the Ephorality, and we shall see how it was used to reinforce the despotic system inaugurated by Lysander at the close of the Peloponnesian War. But however powerful Sparta became, it must always be recollected that her authority was based upon her own truckling to Persia. Just as Achilles would be a king, if it was only over the dead, so Sparta would at all costs be chief in Greece, though to attain her end she sold to the barbarian the liberties of herself and of her subjects. Artaxerxes had achieved a century later what Darius and Xerxes had in vain striven to accomplish: but as it was Greek cohesion which had defeated Xerxes, so it was Greek disruption which gave the victory to Artaxerxes.

§ 8. The immediate result of the peace was that the Great King was left free to act with his whole resources against Evagoras. That prince, descended from Teucer of Grecian Salamis, and heir to the principality and city by him founded in legendary times at Salamis upon the eastern coast of Cyprus, had made good his position about the year 411 B.C., deposing the usurper Abdemon, by whom he had been previously driven into exile. A man of energy, honour, and refinement, he used every means in his power to raise the tone of the Cyprian civilization by Hellenic influences in the face of the rival Oriental influences represented by the large Phoenician population; for of the ten petty states of Cyprus, three at least were entirely Phoenician, viz. Amathus, Citium, and Paphos, while in the others there was a constant struggle of Greeks and Phoenicians for supremacy. The overlord of the whole since the suppression of the Ionic revolt in 500 B.C. was the Great King, and to him Evagoras paid all deference, while at the same time gradually consolidating a considerable power for himself. The welcome which he offered to Conon, as to other Athenian refugees, led him to take a prominent part in the movement which resulted in the battle of Cnidus and the restoration of the power of

Athens; but such energy and success, while it won for him the warm gratitude of Athens, speedily aroused the jealousy of the neighbouring satraps, and especially of Tiribazus. It is impossible to say what was the direct cause of the outbreak of war between him and Persia, but in the year following the battle of Cnidus he was at open hostility with his suzerain, and so vigorous and popular was he that he speedily reduced the major part of Cyprus, including Amathus and Citium, to his rule. He found allies in Cilicia, where he had passed some time in exile, and in Egypt, now in revolt under Acoris, and proceeded to secure his insular position by attacking the hostile ports of Phoenicia. The famous fortress-harbour of Tyre he stormed and sacked, and the arrival of the Athenian Chabrias with a small squadron enabled him to gain several further victories. It was the rebellious attitude of Evagoras and Egypt which made Artaxerxes ready to come to terms with Sparta, and it was the aid contributed to Evagoras by Athens made him dictate a peace in favour of Sparta; and it was to purchase the cessation of such aid that he caused Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros to be surrendered to Athens. Immediately after the acceptance of the peace of Antalcidas, he raised an immense fleet and army, the flower of which came from the Asiatic Greek communities now ceded to Persia. Against this force, commanded by Tiribazus and Orontes, Evagoras was almost powerless. He was severely defeated in a stubborn sea-fight off Salamis, but still maintained himself for many months within that town; until at length the mutual jealousies of his assailants enabled him to arrange an honourable peace. He lived for some time longer as tributary prince of Salamis, and finally perished by the hand of the servant of one Nicocreon, in revenge for his success in defeating a conspiracy organized by the latter. His death surrendered Cyprus wholly to Oriental influence. Ionia was already lost: Cyprus was the next portion of Hellas to fall away, and the means to dis-Hellenize Cyprus was largely found amongst the Greeks betrayed by Sparta to Persia. Agesilaus, who had hoped to turn all Greece from internal discord to one grand crusade against the national enemy across the seas, had been com-

pelled to relinquish that design in order to save the very liberties—so it had seemed—of his country at home. Now he had to look on in chagrin and sorrow while Antalcidas carried out a policy in which he had no heart. He cherished to yet greater vigour his old-standing hatred of the state whose insolence had driven him from Aulis, and whose energy had caused the breakdown of his schemes of Asiatic conquest and his own personal disablement at Coronea, seeing in that state the immediate cause also of the present truckling of Sparta to Persia. The energies which he was now forbidden to employ across the Aegean he reserved for vengeful indulgence against Thebes and the Thebans. When that state had hesitated to sign the late peace only on her own behalf, claiming her right to do so on behalf also of the towns of the Boeotian Confederacy, Agesilaus had rejoiced at the seeming opportunity for vengeance, and had hurried to call out the army for instant attack upon the objects of his hate. Their timely submission had compelled him for the present to forego his revenge, but this disappointment also he set down to the account for which he should one day demand a reckoning.

CHAPTER VI.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS.

(413—367 B.C.)

§ 1. Enthusiasm at Syracuse after the failure of the Athenian Expedition: Active operations against Athens: Hermocrates in the Aegean: His banishment.—§ 2. Diocles: Egesta appeals to the Carthaginians: Hannibal.—§ 3. Sack of Selinus and Himera: Attempts of Hermocrates to re-enter Syracuse.—§ 4. First appearance of Dionysius: Siege of Agrigentum.—§ 5. Its desertion and sack: Disgrace of Daphnaeus: Dionysius elected a general: His intrigues: He becomes sole general.—§ 6. He obtains a bodyguard, and becomes Tyrant: Fails to relieve Gela.—§ 7. Suppresses a rising in Syracuse, and makes peace with Carthage.—§ 8. Fortifies Ortygia and disarms the populace: Popularity of his resolve to make war on Carthage.—§ 9. The war with Carthage: Excellence of the opportunity: Siege of Motye.—§ 10. Himilco relieves Egesta: Sacks Messina: Naval victory of Mago: Siege of Syracuse.—§ 11. Relations of Dionysius with Sparta: The Plague: Flight of Himilco.—§ 12. Increase of Dionysius' power: Wars in Italy.—§ 13. Condition of Magna Graecia: The native tribes: Sack of Rhegium: Plunder of the Temple of Agylla: Actions of Dionysius in the Adriatic, and elsewhere.—§ 14. His Theory at Olympia: Oration of Lysias: Fresh war with Carthage.—§ 15. Assists the Spartans against Thebes, etc.: His Tragic victory, and death: His character.

§ 1. THE triumph of Syracuse over the Athenians at the close of 413 B.C. left her full of hatred for the power which had brought upon her so much suffering. Few things are more surprising in ancient history than the elasticity with which a Greek state recovered from blows apparently crushing. Syracuse—and indeed Athens also—proved no exception to the rule. In spite of the waste, both of citizens and of treasure, entailed by two years of war, despite the desire for peace which that war must not unnaturally have aroused, the Syracusans, having once tasted

revenge, determined to follow up their success to the end. To have destroyed the flower of the Athenians' forces, together with two of their most esteemed generals, was not sufficient—the very vestiges of the empire of Athens were to be swept away. Party spirit was forgotten in the enthusiasm of the moment, or rather all parties were merged in the wave of liberal democracy which, commencing before the year 415 B.C., had been the chief instrument in the defence of the city, and now gained additional impetus from its proven stability. At the head of the aggressive movement was Hermocrates—his reputation augmented by the zeal with which he had supported Gylippus; while the latter doubtless lost no opportunity of urging the city which owed its safety to himself and to Sparta, in its turn to assist Sparta in her crusade against Athens. Scarcely waiting to re-organize their relations with their Sicilian allies and the few still hostile towns such as Catana, the Syracusans despatched, in the spring of 412 B.C., a squadron of twenty triremes, under Hermocrates, to join the great fleet which the Peloponnesians had in that year sent out under Astyochus. Selinus sent two other vessels, and Thurii, which had lately passed over to the anti-Athenian side, furnished a squadron of ten under Dorieus.

The proceedings of Hermocrates and the Sicilian contingents in the Aegean have been already related. For four years the combined Peloponnesian fleets carried on a desultory maritime war about the Hellespont and the coast of Asia Minor, but the proverbial tardiness of Sparta, coupled with the double-dealing of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, neutralized their greatest efforts. The former had incurred the personal enmity of the Spartan king Agis and the distrust of the Peloponnesians at large, and was now (411 B.C.) a refugee with Tissaphernes; who, while pretending to favour the Spartans, was in reality playing off the two belligerent powers each against the other for his own advantage, and paralyzing the efficacy of the Lacedaemonian fleet by bribes. Hermocrates and Dorieus, themselves incorruptible, accused their confederates of venality. Astyochus was superseded by Mindarus; but

the new navarch, though active, was unsuccessful. He was defeated in the three successive engagements at Cynossema (411 B.C.), Abydos (410 B.C.), and at Cyzicus (409 B.C.). The last defeat cost him his life and annihilated his whole fleet. The Sicilian contingents shared in the disaster, not a vessel escaping, while their crews were left destitute on the eastern coast of the Hellespont. At the close of 409 B.C. the Syracusans at home, already disappointed of their confident expectations of vengeance, heard with dismay the gist of the famous despatch in which the surviving Spartan commander described his position. In a fit of most unreasonable exasperation they decreed the banishment of Hermocrates and his fellow-officers, despatching others to take under their command the survivors of the defeated squadron.

§ 2. Two causes combined to bring the Syracusans into this spiteful temper—the revival of party animosities at home and the renewal of hostilities with Carthage.

That unanimity of parties in Syracuse which had prevailed after the overthrow of the Athenian armament does not seem to have lasted long. Its early action was marked by the appointment of a Board of Ten, headed by Diocles, a Syracusan of wide influence throughout Sicily, to revise the laws and constitution of the state. The appointment of *Nomothetae*, or law-givers, is a sufficiently common occurrence in earlier Grecian history, but after the year 500 B.C. becomes anomalous, and the commission of Diocles is a proof of the lamentable condition to which years of revolution and reaction had reduced his state. Diocles seems to have justified his selection by the rigour of his legislation, particularly as regarded the administration of justice, although we have no particulars of his reforms*. Until the conquest of Sicily by the Romans the laws of Diocles remained the basis of all later Syracusan codes, and were even adopted by other states, such as Selinus; but there seems to have been no sufficient security against unconstitutional reaction, for within five years of their

* With the exception of the substitution of the lot for voting in the appointment of magistrates—a peculiarly democratic innovation. Still, it seems that the lots must have been worked in the interest of the oligarchs.

promulgation they were overthrown by the tyrant Dionysius, who posed as a demagogue. This fact points to a sudden revival of the old quarrel between the aristocracy and the masses; and the banishment of Hermocrates, himself an oligarch, could have been carried only by the popular party as a spiteful assertion of its powers for the moment. One additional proof of internal dissension may perhaps be found in the fact that Syracuse was unable during a war of three years to reduce the towns of Naxos and Catana—a fact scarcely conceivable unless her energies were crippled by faction at home.

The exasperation of the rival parties arising from the ill-success of their arms alike in the Aegean and Sicily was now accentuated by the danger of attack from Carthage. Since the year 480 B.C., when Hamilcar and his entire army were destroyed at the battle of Himera, the Carthaginians had remained passive spectators of Sicilian affairs, contenting themselves with maintaining their three trading stations on the west coast*. The original cause for this attitude—dread of Gelo of Syracuse—had given place to fear of Hiero, his successor, and that in turn to apprehension of the superb navy of Athens. They had welcomed with delight the overthrow of the bulk of that navy at Syracuse—an overthrow which seemed to have left even the conquerors in the extremity of weakness. Everything promised success when, in 410 B.C., Eggesta invited the protection of Carthage against Selinus.

Selinus, the westernmost and most Carthaginian of all the Hellenic cities of Sicily, had profited by the troubles of Syracuse to secure a wide influence in the island, leagued with Agrigentum and Gela. The vaunted and futile effort of Athens to champion Eggesta had on the other hand made that town the object of universal antipathy, so that when, about the year 411 B.C., a dispute arose concerning some border land, Selinus was able not only to settle the quarrel in her own way, but further to attack the recognized territories of Eggesta. The Eggestaeans, without Sicilian or Greek allies, were compelled to throw themselves on the mercy of Carthage at the moment when any inter-

* Solus, Motye, and Panormus.

ference by that state seemed likely to be most successful. It happened, too, that the chief Carthaginian magistrate, or Suffete, at the time was Hannibal, grandson of the general who fell at Himera. Having been compelled to spend many years of his life at Selinus as an exile in expiation for his grandfather's ill-success, he had recently returned to Carthage, where, with unbounded influence in the state, he retained a hatred of all that was Grecian and a truly Hannibalic thirst to revenge the defeat of his ancestor. He had no difficulty in persuading Carthage to take up the cause of Egesta; and by the close of 410 B.C. it was well known that he would invade Western Sicily with a Carthaginian force, typical in numbers and ferocity. Hannibal was, moreover, a diplomatist as well as a soldier. He despatched envoys to Selinus to remonstrate with that state for her aggressions against Egesta, and to suggest that the quarrel should be submitted to the arbitration of Syracuse. The Selinuntines, in the flush of success, declined; while the Syracusans, thus rejected as arbitrators, at once declared themselves neutral, exactly as Hannibal had wished and expected.

§ 3. In the summer of 409 B.C. the Carthaginian army landed at Motye, and advanced at once upon Selinus. That city was taken completely by surprise. The peace party, headed by Empedion, had been silenced, and every overture refused; but no defensive measures seem to have been taken to support so offensive an attitude, beyond an appeal to Agrigentum and Gela for reinforcements. Those reinforcements never arrived, for after ten days of continuous assault, Selinus was in the hands of the Carthaginians: its walls were rased, its temples desecrated, and all its inhabitants, save some 3000 who escaped to Agrigentum, were either slain or made prisoners.

The fall of Selinus roused the Sicilians to action. Syracuse threw off her neutrality, and 5000 men, with contingents from various other towns, commanded by Diocles, were at once thrown into Himera, whither the Carthaginian army moved direct from Selinus. Again the storming engines of Hannibal were brought up, and a ceaseless attack was maintained. For a few days the besieged held out, and

then in a sudden sally drove back the advanced posts of the enemy with heavy loss. But the appearance of the reserves under Hannibal completely changed the face of events. He drove the Greeks once more into the town with the loss of 3000 men, while at the same time came the news that his fleet was putting out from Motye to sail round to Syracuse, now nearly stripped of its military forces. Diocles at once hurried his whole force homewards, and ordered the Syracusan squadron which occupied the harbour of Himera to retreat likewise, carrying with it as many of the useless population as possible. On the next day Himera was carried and rased. Of the prisoners, Hannibal selected 3000 and sacrificed them on the scene of his grandfather's defeat to the spirit of that general. He then founded a new town, Thermae, in place of Himera, disbanded his whole force, and sailed home to Carthage.

At about the same time (end of 409 B.C.) Hermocrates landed at Messana. After the disastrous battle of Cyzicus, he had busied himself in providing for his destitute crews; and his personal influence with Pharnabazus, satrap of the northern parts of Asia Minor, had enabled him to obtain a large grant of money and permission to build vessels from the forests of Mount Ida. When the new commanders arrived from Syracuse with the despatch announcing the condemnation of Hermocrates, the latter was able to hand over to them a well-equipped squadron, albeit the crews murmured loudly against the injustice shown to their late admiral. Hermocrates silenced their murmurs, adjuring them to use nothing but peaceable means to secure his restoration, and betook himself again to Pharnabazus, who furnished him with fresh funds and ships with which he at once sailed for Sicily, resolved to effect his return by force. He found, however, that his own party was still in the minority, for the oligarchs, and particularly Diocles, were at the moment in bad odour, as having caused by their remissness the destruction of Selinus. An attempt to surprise Syracuse was frustrated, and Hermocrates drew off to the ruined site of Selinus, where he established himself as the leader of refugees from that town and from Himera, and harried the Carthaginian

reservation with impunity, there being now no army to oppose him. Thus proclaiming himself the avenger of the destroyed Greek towns, he gathered fresh adherents, while the influence of the rival party of Diocles sank proportionately. Accordingly, in 408 B.C., Hermocrates was able again to move upon Syracuse. On this occasion he trusted to a stratagem to secure his entry into the town, for he carried with him the bones of those Syracusans who had fallen before Himera, and professed to be desirous only of placing them in the sepulchres of their fathers. Any appeal to Greek sympathy on the score of reverence to the dead was politic and powerful, and the determination of Hermocrates to make himself despot must have been notorious indeed to counteract such an appeal. Party feeling ran high between the two factions, and ended, not in the recall of Hermocrates, but in the banishment of Diocles also. The bones of the victims of Himera were buried with ceremony, but Hermocrates was forced to content himself with earning an additional reputation for piety, and retired once more to Selinus. A few months later, summoned by his partisans within Syracuse, he surprised Achradina, but was immediately slain by the forces of the opposite faction (407 B.C.)*. Most of his followers were slain, the remainder banished, and many who escaped were declared by their friends to have fallen in the battle that they might thus be spared sentence of exile.

§ 4. Amongst this number was Dionysius, at once one of the keenest partisans of the democratic faction, and the most assiduous in exalting the prowess of the slain Hermocrates against Carthage at the expense of Diocles and the oligarchic party†. Of low birth, he had practised as a public scribe, and may possibly have been already of some reputation as an author, for in later life he wrote a number of odes and tragedies. Having been wounded in the final attempt of Hermocrates to enter Syracuse, he

* The dates of these various attempts of Hermocrates to effect his return are quite conjectural. Grote gives those which are here adopted. The difficulty of the subject is increased by there being at the time two persons named Hermocrates in Syracuse, the second of whom was the father of Dionysius.

† It would seem that the Hermocratean oligarchs, disappointed of their object, now coalesced with the democrats, hoping by these means to overthrow a rival clique of anti-Hermocratean oligarchs.

remained in the city in concealment, and shortly afterwards appeared publicly as the leader of the democratic party, though we are not told how he continued to avoid the punishment which fell upon most of the defeated Hermocrateans. Probably the expectation of the presence of the Carthaginians in Sicily in 406 B.C. diverted from party politics the attention of the oligarchic faction, who remained satisfied with their recent success.

It seems that Hannibal, having avenged the defeat of Himera and successfully supported Egesta, was desirous of no further aggressions. But the daring of Hermocrates in raiding the lands of Motye and Panormus, coupled with the confidence inspired by the easy capture of Selinus and Himera, roused the Carthaginians to fresh efforts, and in 406 B.C. a force of 150,000 men landed at Motye under the command of Hannibal and Himilco. The former had at first declined service on the plea of age, but was finally persuaded to sail on the appointment of Himilco as his colleague. The intentions of Carthage had been no secret in Sicily. The various towns had been actively engaged in preparing for resistance, more particularly Agrigentum, which now stood as the western fortress of Hellenism, and was consequently the primary object of attack. The town was built on a cluster of hills rising as high as 1100 feet from sea-level, at the southern margin of the most fertile plain of fertile Sicily. On one side alone was there an approach to the walls which encircled the town—a town which could not have numbered less than a quarter of a million of inhabitants. The slight records of its political history prove that it must have escaped in great measure from the troubles which continually exercised its rival Syracuse; while the purposed humiliation of the neighbouring town of Gela by Gelo had left Agrigentum without a peer on the southern shore of Sicily. Her wealth, her temples, her fortifications*, the luxuriance of her crops of grapes and olives, were famed throughout Sicily; while her name was proclaimed repeatedly before all Greece as the home of victors at

* *Arduus inde Aeragas ostentat maxuma longe Moenia, magnanimum quondam generator equorum.*—*Aeneid*, iii, 703. The Greek name Aeragas expresses the position of the town on cliffs.

the Olympic games. Three hundred of her citizens could furnish racing cars drawn by teams of white horses to welcome home one of their number, the victor at the games of 408 B.C. The walls of Selinus had been old and weak; but those of Agrigentum seemed impregnable when the Carthaginian army drew its lines about the city immediately after landing. Dexippus, a Spartan, had been summoned from Gela to conduct the defence, and the siege had already lasted for some time when the Sicilian contingents from Syracuse, Gela, Camarina, and other places, arrived under the command of Daphnaeus, the successor of Diocles as head of the oligarchic party at Syracuse. Routing a body of horse which endeavoured to bar his progress, Daphnaeus entered the city in safety. But unfortunately for himself he had withheld his men from following up their victory, wisely foreseeing that their disorder would put them at a disadvantage when Hannibal's reserves attacked them. For the same reason Dexippus had held his garrison in check; and now both generals were loudly accused of collusion with the enemy. They escaped for the moment, but four of their Agrigentine colleagues were at once indicted and stoned to death unheard, the sole command being vested in Daphnaeus.

§ 5. The Greek forces were now large enough to set at defiance any attempt to storm the town, and the Carthaginian generals settled down to reduce it by blockade. For many months little progress was made, while a violent sickness, breaking out in their crowded lines, carried off numbers of the besiegers, including Hannibal himself, and filled the rest with superstitious terrors. They had destroyed the magnificent tombs which filled the plain on the south side of the town, using the materials in their siege works. This impiety was now recoiling on them, they thought, and as an expiation the customary human sacrifices were offered. The siege dragged on into the eighth month, and was at one time almost abandoned through the mutiny of the mercenary troops, who clamoured for pay; while the whole army suffered from the difficulty of getting provisions. A squadron of Carthaginian vessels, however, contrived to surprise a large convoy of supplies off Agrigentum, and so

relieved Himilco's army, while scarcity began to be felt in the town. The mercenaries of Dexippus mutinied and marched away; the fidelity of the remaining troops was doubtful; and at length the order was given to evacuate the town by night. The majority of the garrison and inhabitants thus escaped; but some who preferred to share the fate of their homes were cut down or burnt in the ruins of the town when it was occupied by Himilco in the morning.

The return of Daphnaeus and his colleagues to Syracuse was the signal for an outburst of popular fury. It gave to the democratic party a new and powerful handle against the discredited oligarchs. When the generals appeared before the assembly to explain their conduct, they were met with nothing but insult and clamour, until finally Dionysius, now the recognized champion of the combined democrats and Hermocrateans, openly accused them of treachery and bade the populace stone them there and then, as the Agrigentines had done with their own treacherous citizens. Rebuked by the presiding officers, Dionysius only became more reckless and violent, and in the end the generals were dismissed in disgrace, and a new Board, including Dionysius, was elected in their place.

Who were the colleagues of Dionysius we do not know, except that amongst them were Philistus, the historian, and Hipparinus, a ruined aristocrat who threw in his fortunes with those of the rising demagogue. It may be regarded as certain that all the members of the Board were chosen from the ranks of the popular party, which was at that moment synonymous with the party of Hermocrates and Dionysius. But this apparent unanimity of political views did not improve matters. Dionysius began to obstruct his colleagues in every possible way, and by incessant accusations of treachery to poison against them the minds of the Syracusans. The fate of Agrigentum, and the ever-present menace of the advance of Himilco upon Syracuse, had thrown the city into a condition of panic and alarm in which the populace was ready to suspect every one, while Hipparinus and his fellow-generals doubtless played into the hands of Dionysius. The latter now declared that,

within the city, there was none to be trusted, and that the only true patriots were the exiled partisans of that Hermocrates who had so well proved his loyalty by avenging the ruin of Selinus. On their recall, he said, depended the safety of the state. He carried his point; and from all parts of Sicily there flocked back to Syracuse men who owed their late exile to the oligarchy, their restoration to Dionysius—men eager to do his bidding to any extent, so that it gave them revenge upon their enemies.

Meanwhile the Carthaginian general had remained encamped at Agrigentum collecting the plunder of that city, and had held his army together during the winter instead of dismissing it in the usual way. His next object of attack was Gela; and the Geloans, aware of their danger, urged the Syracusans to assist them in defending their city. The Lacedaemonian Dexippus had already brought into the town a detachment of his mercenaries, and the Syracusan generals now marched out to his support. At Gela had appeared the same panic and mistrust as at Syracuse, and the oligarchic party were regarded by the populace with detestation and mistrust. Again Dionysius stood forth as the champion of democracy. He provoked the Geloans to rise, massacre the oligarchs, and confiscate their belongings. The proceeds of the outrage he applied to paying his troops so lavishly as to secure their loyalty. Instead, however, of marching against Himilco, he suddenly withdrew and returned to Syracuse, taking with him also the troops of Dexippus, and so leaving Gela absolutely defenceless at the very moment when the approach of Himilco was most imminent. Arrived in Syracuse, he styled himself the "liberator" of the Geloan democracy, and stood higher than ever in popularity. In the burst of enthusiasm which greeted him, he secured the deposition of his colleagues in a body, and his own appointment as sole general with unlimited powers.

§ 6. The plea for such a course was solely the need of decisive action against the Carthaginians; and had Dionysius been the patriot he professed himself, he would at once have moved westward to prevent the investment of Gela. But patriotism did not trouble the new dictator.

He had obtained his advancement by the free and spontaneous act of the democracy; he determined to secure it before the inevitable reaction could occur. Tyranny had but one protection, its bodyguard; and to obtain this also by popular vote Dionysius had resort to another piece of double-dealing. He ordered the whole force of the city to march out to Leontini, which had remained, since the Sicilian expedition, a dependency of Syracuse, occupied on sufferance by a number of exiles and refugees. There was no excuse for an armed demonstration in that quarter, least of all by a general whose appointment was intended to check a Carthaginian attack. In consequence, such of the citizens as suspected the attitude of Dionysius failed to appear in arms in obedience to his summons, and he marched out accompanied only by his own adherents. Encamping at Leontini for the night, he suddenly caused an alarm to be raised, and declaring that an attempt had been made upon his life, he induced his army to allot to him a bodyguard of 600 men*. He at once proceeded to select twice that number of the most needy and reckless desperadoes obtainable, whom, with a standing army of mercenaries collected from all quarters, he secured to his service by the gift of magnificent armour and by the promise of high pay. He then marched without molestation through Syracuse to Ortygia, the citadel, where he permanently established himself, after procuring by popular vote the execution of Daphnaeus and other leading oligarchs, and the dismissal of Dexippus. At the same time (beginning of 405 B.C.) he married the daughter of Hermocrates. It now remained to secure himself from the attack of Himilco, who was already besieging Gela. Marching overland, Dionysius appeared before the Carthaginian lines with 30,000 men, while a fleet of fifty sail supported him by sea. The siege now assumed the same character as at Agrigentum, and for three weeks went on a desultory warfare without decisive results to either side. At the end of that period Dionysius made arrangements for a general attack. His fleet, assaulting the Carthaginian lines on the

* The regular word for a soldier of the bodyguard in Greek is *δορυφόρος*, a spearman, from the lance carried by the bodyguard of the Great King.

seaward side, where they were least securely defended, actually carried the works; and had the land forces come up, as arranged, to attack the position at other points, victory would probably have been with the Greeks. But there is every reason to believe that such a result was purposely avoided by Dionysius: to set the Sicilian Greeks free from Carthage would be to leave them at liberty to act with Syracuse against himself, while he had no scruples about using the aid of Carthage to confirm his own power. The land attack was made too late, while the particular regiment which formed the despot's strength was never brought into action at all, so retaining its vigour and numbers unimpaired. Himilco drove off the attack of the fleet, and the Geloans now learnt that their pretended defender had resolved to evacuate the town, albeit he had suffered little loss and the position remained as tenable as ever. Like Himera and Agrigentum, Gela was abandoned in the darkness; and Dionysius afforded a further proof of treachery by compelling the inhabitants of Camarina to join in his flight and abandon their city, thus surrendering that position also, the last outpost of Syracuse towards the south.

§ 7. An act of such palpable cowardice or treason, whichever it was, aroused to revolt the Syracusan soldiery, already regretful of the part which they had played in the aggrandizement of Dionysius. The cavalry, the finest troops in Sicily, mutinied in a body; and finding the usurper's person too securely guarded to admit of their reaching him, galloped off to Syracuse, announced the treason and flight of Dionysius, occupied his stronghold of Ortygia, and plundered the property of the despot and his adherents. They declared the city once more free, and gave themselves up to their feelings of delight and satisfaction. But Dionysius had already divined their purpose. He pushed on towards the city at full speed, and on arriving at the gates about midnight he found them virtually unguarded. To force an entry and fight his way to Ortygia was a small task in the confusion and disorder of his enemies. Those of the horsemen who could effect their escape retreated with their partisans to Aetna. The

refugees from Gela and Camarina established themselves at Leontini.

Syracuse apparently lay at the mercy of Himilco whenever he chose to attack it, but at this juncture he made peace with Dionysius. It appears that a pestilence, similar to that which had attacked his army before Agrigentum, had recurred and carried off upwards of half of his troops—a fact which sets the retreat of Dionysius from Gela in a still worse light as an act of collusion. It would, moreover, serve Himilco, on his return to Carthage, as an excuse for having stayed his hand when all Sicily seemed at his mercy; and doubtless it would appear an easier thing to leave Dionysius pledged as a vassal of Carthage to the maintenance of peace in the island, than to attempt the permanent occupation of Sicily. Accordingly, peace was signed on the following conditions: the Carthaginians retained all their earlier dependencies and possessions in the west of the island, together with Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum; Gela and Camarina were restored to their inhabitants as tributaries of Carthage, on condition that those towns should remain unfortified; Leontini, Messana, and the Sikel communities were to remain autonomous; and on the other hand, the Carthaginian government recognized, and undertook to support, the despotism of Dionysius over Syracuse.

Himilco thus secured a sort of over-lordship in Syracuse, while in Gela and Camarina he possessed frontier positions little less hostile to the despot than to Carthage. The independence of Leontini and of the Sikel tribes completed the chain of control to the west and north, depending as they did upon Carthaginian influence for their own autonomy. The fortress of Agrigentum, the key of the southern coast, passed, with its extensive trade, into the hands of Carthage, whose reservation was thus extended beyond the Halycus to the line connecting Agrigentum with Himera.

§ 8. Thus left to himself, Dionysius proceeded to render Ortygia an impregnable position. He surrounded with enormously strong walls not only the whole of the small island, but also the Lesser Harbour (*Laccius*), in such

a way as to admit of but one vessel sailing in or out at a time, while a fleet of sixty sail could lie secure within its basin. Here he collected his bodyguard and mercenaries in specially constructed barracks. At a later date he fortified also the city proper, enclosing the larger and eastward portion, Achradina, within one continuous wall, to which the walls of Tyche, the suburb on the north-west, and of Neapolis, the similar suburb on the south-west, formed appendages or loops each complete in itself. Between Ortygia and Achradina lay a narrow strip of low ground, averaging half-a-mile in width, which remained vacant and was used as a necropolis. The descent of Epipolæ was also fortified, though not all at once. For the present, Dionysius contented himself with carrying a wall along the northern and more accessible scarp from Tyche to Euryalus, thus barring the approach of any enemy from the side of Leontini and the Bay of Thapsus. The marshes of the Anapus and the more difficult character of the southern slope seemed, for the present, an adequate defence on that side.

The enormous cost of these works was met by heavy exactions from the citizens, whose murmurs broke out into open mutiny in 403 B.C. At that time the whole citizen army was encamped before Erbessus, a Sicel town which had sided with Carthage in the recent war. They killed their deputy-commander, Dorieus, and, marching upon Syracuse, occupied Epipolæ, where they were joined by auxiliaries from Rhegium and Messana, and by the exiled horsemen from Aetna. They even sent envoys to Corinth to ask for assistance; but that state, their metropolis, was in no position to spare an armed force, and could do no more than send one Nicoteles to support the insurgents by his advice. The latter were now strong enough to occupy the necropolis and lay siege to Ortygia, while a Rhegine and Messenian fleet blockaded it by sea, and cut off all supplies. Starved out, Dionysius was on the point of surrender, when the over-confidence of his foes saved him. Feeling their success assured, the besiegers relaxed their vigilance, and the despot was able to purchase the services of a body of Campanian mercenaries, whose sudden arrival

raised the siege. Dionysius used his victory with moderation. He allowed the remnant of the insurgents to withdraw to Aetna, and took no sanguinary measures against the citizens at large. He seized, however, an early opportunity, during the ensuing harvest-time, to search the houses of the townsmen then absent in the fields, and to appropriate all their arms. He built also additional vessels and fortifications. But his power was above all strengthened by the active countenance of Sparta. That state, fresh from her victory over Athens, was now busied in overthrowing democracy everywhere, and substituting for it oligarchies and harmosts, whose government was little else than despotism under another name. With this access of moral support in addition to his extensive material resources, Dionysius successively attacked and reduced Catana, Naxos, and Leontini; and when the Italiot Greeks of Locri and Rhegium, aided by Messana, menaced him with attack, he avoided a conflict, and was able by skilful diplomacy to put himself on good terms with all three states. He even asked a wife from Rhegium, and though the request was refused with contumely, he was more successful in a similar application to the Locrians. He married Doris, daughter of a distinguished citizen of that place, taking at the same time a second Syracusan wife*, Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus. From his marriage with Doris dates the beginning of the long alliance between Locri and the Dionysian dynasty—an alliance fatal to the welfare and liberties of much of Magna Græcia.

His mild policy towards Rhegium and its allies was due to a desire to conciliate all parties, and so be free to carry out his designs against Carthage. The idea of driving the Carthaginians out of Sicily was as popular now as ever; and when the despot declared himself about to champion the cause of Hellenism against the Barbarians, desisting at the same time from the violence and cruelties which had marked his first tenure of power, he found ready support throughout the majority of the Greek towns in the island. For three years he busied

* His first wife, daughter of Hermocrates, had been put to death by the insurgent horsemen, 405 B.C.

himself with ceaseless preparations for war. His arsenals were stocked with many thousand stand of arms of the finest workmanship. New siege engines, notably catapults, were invented, and vast trains of artillery got together. His fleet was augmented to 300 sail, and amongst them were vessels larger than any as yet seen in Grecian warfare—ships of four and even of five banks of oars*.

§ 9. It was in the beginning of 397 B.C. that Dionysius, now fully prepared for war, commenced his aggressions by surrendering the lives and properties of all Carthaginian residents in Syracuse or the dependent cities to the mercy of the Sicilians. Their mercantile proclivities prompted many Carthaginians to reside in the Sicilian coast towns, so that they offered an easy and lucrative plunder to their enemies. A herald was then despatched to Carthage, bidding that power withdraw from all the great cities of Sicily on pain of war. The moment was well chosen, for the same pestilence which had thinned the armies of Himilco before Agrigentum and Gela, eight years before, had crossed to Africa, and had for three years or more been devastating the territories of Carthage. So paralyzed were the government that no measures seem to have been taken to counteract the declared aims of Dionysius, for he was allowed to subjugate the Sicels and the Greek towns at his pleasure, despite the special clauses in the recent treaty guaranteeing their independence, as well as to manufacture arms without hindrance. Even the garrisons of the newly-conquered towns of the south coast had not been augmented beyond their ordinary peace-footing; so that when Dionysius appeared in succession before the gates of Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus, with a land force of 80,000 foot and 3000 horse, and supported by a fleet of nearly 500 sail, these towns at once welcomed him as a deliverer. The Carthaginian garrisons were massacred or sold as slaves, and in the spring of the same year Dionysius laid

* *I. e.* Quadriremes and Quinqueremes. The triremes, or ordinary vessel of three banks, carried on each side three tiers of thirty oars each, and about twenty marines or fighting seamen, a total of 200 men.

siege to the oldest and most important of the native Carthaginian settlements, the town of Motye. The intense hatred of the Hellenes for the Carthaginians is well illustrated by their thus deliberately transferring themselves to the power of a notorious despot like Dionysius.

The siege of Motye was no slight matter. The Carthaginian element was almost unmixed in the western corner of Sicily, and the isolated fortresses of the Elymi—Egesta and Eryx—were more Carthaginian than Greek. Entella was occupied by a body of mercenary troops, recently in the service of Carthage, and not inclined to transfer their support to Dionysius; while the actual coast-line was entirely commanded by the great fortresses of Motye, Panormus, and Solus. Nevertheless, the Syracusan force was sufficiently large to lay siege to Motye while detaching various divisions for action against the other positions of the interior. Of the latter, Eryx fell into the hands of Dionysius; but the remainder, closing their gates, defied him, though unable to prevent his troops from ravaging the whole country at will. The town of Motye itself was built on an islet in the small bay on the northern side of the promontory of Lilybaeum, and was connected by a bridge with the coast. On the approach of the enemy the bridge had been destroyed, so that Dionysius was compelled to construct a mole from shore to shore—a distance of 1200 yards—before he could bring his engines within reach of the walls. But the mole was at length completed and the siege commenced in earnest. The Carthaginians, alarmed, as they well might be, at the rapid progress of their enemies, were only able to despatch Himilco with a fleet to act as he best could in defence of their countrymen. That general, not venturing to face the magnificent fleet of Syracuse in the open sea, endeavoured first to raise the siege by a descent upon Syracuse itself; but, though his squadron sailed into the harbour there and destroyed some merchant vessels, the recently-erected fortifications prevented its doing any further damage, and it returned without creating the intended diversion. Himilco now attempted to surprise Dionysius' fleet while it lay beached

in the Bay of Motye, and it was only rescued from destruction by the vigorous action of the despot. He caused eighty of his vessels to be transported bodily across the promontory of Lilybaeum to the sea on the other side, and Himilco, thus threatened with a flank attack, was compelled to retire to Carthage. Soon afterwards the town fell by a nocturnal surprise, and Dionysius, leaving his Admiral Leptines in command, with orders to continue the operations against Entella, Egesta, and other towns, retired to winter at Syracuse.

§ 10. In the following year (396 B.C.) Dionysius rejoined Leptines, and personally conducted the siege of Egesta, which still defied his efforts. While thus engaged he received news that Himilco had effected a landing at Cape Pelorus with a force of 100,000 men and more than 2000 ships, including transports. The landing had been effected by night, and Himilco had taken successful precautions to prevent Dionysius learning the destination of the force which he knew to be gathering. An attack by Leptines failed to prevent his advance, and moving upon Motye, the Carthaginian army re-occupied that place without any serious resistance. Dionysius, thus robbed in a moment of the toil of so many months, and finding himself short of supplies, retreated to Syracuse without hazarding an engagement*.

Having thus relieved the besieged towns, Himilco determined to take vengeance on the Greeks for the sack of Motye. The Hellenic towns of the south coast, so recently pillaged by his troops, offered little hope of booty, nor were there any noteworthy cities on the north coast. He resolved to transfer his forces at once to the eastern coast and to attack Messana, the key of the straits, a town whose position in the most remote corner of the island had protected it as yet from the assaults of Carthage. Accordingly he marched along the northern coast, receiving as he went the allegiance of the Sicel tribes, who hated Dionysius as the destroyer of that independence which Carthage had by treaty secured for them. Feigning

* Lilybaeum was founded now, to take the place of Motye as chief fortress and mart of Carthage in Sicily.

a land attack, he induced the full force of Messana to quit the town and advance to meet him; whereupon his fleet sailed unhindered into the harbour and took the place at once. The plunder, if less rich than that of Agrigentum, was sufficient to repay the trouble of the attack; the town was rased to the ground and left a wilderness. The whole Carthaginian force now moved southward upon Syracuse, skirting the coast, and so acting in conjunction with the fleet under Mago.

It is difficult to understand what could have kept the Syracusan army inactive during this time, for some months must have now elapsed since the retreat from Egesta. That retreat had been viewed as an act of cowardice by the army, and the old murmurs were again heard accusing the despot of collusion with the enemy. Such a charge was on this occasion ridiculous; but certainly little had been effected to justify the immense preparations and the great force—the largest ever under the command of a single Greek—which had been collected in the previous year. So widely had the discontent spread that when Dionysius at length marched northward to meet Himilco he had with him but 30,000 men. Off Catana his fleet gave battle to the flotilla under Mago. The battle was stubbornly contested, but ended in the complete defeat of the Syracusans, with the loss of 100 vessels and 20,000 men. Dionysius at once retreated without venturing to engage with his land force, and shut himself up in Syracuse, sending urgent requests for assistance to Sparta and Corinth. The whole Carthaginian fleet at once sailed into the great harbour; Himilco, with his army, fortified a camp at the Olympieum and outposts at Plemmyrium and Dascon; and twenty years after the Athenian expedition the Syracusans saw themselves once more threatened with ruin by an enemy occupying the same ground as Nicias.

§ 11. This second retreat of Dionysius lent new energy to the discontent. Mutiny spread among his mercenaries, and was with difficulty checked. He now exerted himself to recover some of his lost prestige, and personally conducted flying squadrons to protect the convoys which still reached the Syracusan harbour, despite the vigilance of

Mago. At the same time he declined to hazard a general engagement either by land or sea. He was absent on such an expedition, when a citizen named Theodorus gave expression to the general discontent. A chance engagement in the harbour, brought on by the endeavour to seize a Carthaginian transport, had left the Syracusans triumphant. Theodorus thereupon bade them for the future cease to trust Dionysius, whose generalship brought nothing but disgrace and whose despotism was misery: let them disown him, and fight for themselves; for the recent fight had shown that they were more favoured of heaven than were the arms of the murderer and temple-plunderer who was their despot. Dionysius reappeared while the assembly was still undecided, and with him came Pharacidas, the leader of the succours from Sparta. The question depended on his decision, for to offend Sparta was to provoke the greatest power in the Greek world—a power fresh from the overthrow of her enemies, and triumphant throughout Greece. But it was no part of Spartan policy to favour democracy. She was already seeking the alliance of Persia and of Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly. She now allied herself with an equally infamous enemy of Hellenic liberty, and through the mouth of Pharacidas declared for Dionysius and tyranny. The Syracusans, deprived of their one hope of support, were cowed into acquiescence, and Dionysius was once more free to continue his despotism.

This stroke of good fortune was followed by another which had still more important results. The plague, which had so often decimated the armaments of Carthage, again broke out in the camp of Himilco with appalling virulence. His men died by thousands, while the Syracusans were untouched. The marsh fevers which had wasted the troops of Nicias were as nothing to the pestilence which now converted the whole camp of the Carthaginians into a mortuary. The wall which Dionysius had constructed on the northern slope of Epipolae had nullified all attempts at blockade by leaving open the road into Syracuse on the northern side, and Himilco seems never to have attempted to carry Euryalus, the key to the

whole position. Pestilence completed what stupidity had begun. Dionysius could watch the host of his enemies melting away, and could choose his own time for striking. Repeating the manœuvre of Gylippus, he marched round the enemy's line and took them in the flank, while his fleet attacked and burned the whole Carthaginian flotilla and the camp at Dascon. Only dread of contagion prevented his occupying Himilco's lines at once. He drew off and awaited the approaching end. It soon arrived. Himilco endeavoured to negotiate for the safe retreat of his whole force. On this being refused, he made a secret treaty by which his own escape and that of the other native Carthaginians in his army was assured, and putting to sea by night, sailed away to Africa. His deserted army, left without a general, fled in all directions, pursued by the Syracusans. The Hiberians alone were spared, being taken into the pay of the despot (autumn, 395 B.C.). Himilco, publicly declaring his defeat to be the just reward of his sacrilege in destroying the tombs on the Helorine Way before Syracuse, starved himself to death. But the prostration of Carthage was completed by the revolt of her Libyan subjects, who, to the number of 120,000 men, occupied Tunis and shut up the Carthaginians within their walls. It was only at the last extremity that the Queen of Africa was able to crush the revolt by means of an opportune quarrel among the insurgents. She was long incapacitated from fresh interference with the power of Dionysius, though her admiral Mago maintained a vigilant attitude at the western corner of Sicily, and there by his conciliatory conduct won over many of the neighbouring towns to the Carthaginian side.

§ 12. The first care of Dionysius was to re-establish Messana, which he peopled with adherents of his own, intending it as a *point d'appui* in his meditated attacks upon Southern Italy. At the same time he reconstituted Leontini as an independent town, giving it to some 10,000 mercenaries whose mutinous clamours for pay had put him in a dangerous position. Then marching westward, he recovered all the ascendancy which Himilco had wrested from him in the two preceding years, seizing in addition Enna,

Cephaloedium, and Solus in the extreme west, and making alliances with the various Sicel chiefs.

In the year 393 B.C. he laid siege to Tauromenium, which, though the strongest position in North-east Sicily, had been captured by Himilco in 396 B.C., and by him handed over to a body of Sicels. These new colonists offered so successful a resistance that Dionysius was unable to effect their reduction despite all his efforts, and only narrowly escaped with his life in a fruitless night attack. His ill-success led to the defection of Agrigentum, which seems to have remained dependent on Syracuse since its recovery from the Carthaginians in 397 B.C. It now declared itself autonomous, and expelled the party of Dionysius, while its example found imitators among many of the recently conquered Sicels. Even Mago was encouraged to take the field anew. He ravaged the newly-organized territories of Messana, but was compelled to retire with loss on the appearance of the despot.

In the following spring Dionysius undertook his first expedition against the Italiot Greeks. He had never forgiven the insulting reply of the Rhegines on his demanding a wife from their number: the only fit wife for him, they had answered, was the daughter of the common hangman. He resolved to take a terrible vengeance on Rhegium, and suddenly appeared before the walls with a powerful force. It was only the courage of Heloris—once a personal friend of Dionysius, but now an exile—which saved the town; and the Syracusan forces were drawn off before anything further could be done in order to meet Mago, who was again advancing. The armies met at Agyrium, the capital of the Sicel prince Agyris, and Dionysius was able to prevent the capture of the town. Mutiny in his own army prevented his further progress, and he availed himself of Mago's offers to conclude a peace by which the Sicels of Tauromenium were surrendered to him. Attacking that fortress again in the following year, he at length reduced it, and repeopled it, like Leontini and Messana, with mercenaries of his own. He was thus firmly in command of the narrow strait which divided him from the scene of his next conquest.

§ 13. The cities of Magna Græcia were not unaware of the danger which menaced them from Syracuse, but unhappily they were harassed at the same moment by an even nearer danger. The Samnites, the hardest mountain race of Central Italy, descending from their fastnesses in the Apennines, had spread over Campania, ousting the Etruscans from Capua, the Greeks from Cumæ and Neapolis, and forcing the Lucanians to move southward also, in search of new lands.

The origin of these Lucanians is doubtful, as is also their relationship to the Bruttians, the prior occupants of the "toe" of Italy. Probably both were branches of the same Samnite stock; but the Bruttians were now becoming the serfs of the Lucanian invaders, whose power had already overthrown one or two Greek cities on the coast, such as Laüs and Paestum, and now threatened the independence of the others.

To meet these aggressions there had been formed a defensive league of all the Greek cities from Thurii to Rhegium, Locri alone standing aloof. That state was already connected with Dionysius by his marriage with Doris; it now became his active ally to satisfy its private jealousy of the neighbouring city of Rhegium. Its secession was sufficient to paralyze the action of the Italian league, by furnishing to Dionysius a secure basis of operation at the moment when fresh attacks of the Lucanians threatened the independence of Thurii. He was now in alliance with the Lucanians, and his landing at Locri and instant march upon Rhegium was the signal for a simultaneous descent of the Lucanians on Thurii (390 B.C.). The latter enterprise was so successfully repulsed that the Thuriens, grown over-confident, followed up their foes into the heart of the mountains, and were there entrapped, losing 10,000 men out of a force of 14,000. The 4000 who escaped did so by swimming to the Syracusan fleet, which was coasting off the scene of their defeat, under the impression that it was the allied squadron of Crotona. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral, despite their hostility, suffered them all to depart safely at a small ransom; for which act of humanity he was dismissed by Dionysius, who handed over the com-

mand to his own brother Thearides. He was at the moment smarting under the complete failure of his attempt on Rhegium, where a storm had destroyed the second division of his fleet, while he himself had escaped to Messina with the greatest difficulty.

In the following year he redoubled his efforts, aiming in this campaign at the reduction of the cities generally. With 20,000 men and a large fleet he laid siege to Caulonia, on the northern borders of the Locrian territory. Heloris, now elected commander-general of the entire Italiot force of 25,000 men, marched to the relief of the place, but was himself surprised and slain with his leading division; while the remainder of his army was defeated, surrounded, and at length forced to capitulate, to the number of 10,000 men, under pressure of thirst. Dionysius—by a stroke of humane policy strangely at variance with his usual conduct—set them all free, thus disarming much of the opposition to his aggression. Then a third time attacking Rhegium, he forced that town, now isolated, to surrender on promise of clemency—a promise which he seemed to fulfil in exacting only the surrender of the entire Rhegine fleet and 100 hostages. Soon afterwards he took both Caulonia and Hipponium, a town on the western coast, north of Rhegium, and handed over the territory of both to Locri. In the following year, determined still to wreak full vengeance on Rhegium, he picked a new quarrel with that town, now virtually disarmed, and laid siege to it for the fourth and last time. It made a desperate resistance, but fell at length; and when Dionysius marched through its gates, there remained alive but 6000 inhabitants, whom he sold into slavery. Their commander, Phyton, he put to death with a cruelty borrowed from the Carthaginians, and the town he utterly destroyed. He then returned to Syracuse, where, as signs of his wide-felt power, he found waiting him envoys from those Gauls who in 390 B.C. sacked Rome, and who now begged his alliance (387 B.C.). A few months later he extended his Italian power by the capture of Croton, the strongest position in the South Italian peninsula; and prompted perhaps by his Gaulish allies, made a piratical descent upon Pyrgi, the port of the ancient Etruscan town

of Caere, where he plundered the immense treasures of the temple of Leucothea. His excuse was the suppression of Etruscan piracy; but the real reason was doubtless the wish to recruit his exhausted treasury, in which he amply succeeded.

§ 14. It was in that year, the ninety-ninth Olympiad, Dionysius despatched a magnificent *Theory** to Olympia, to compete in the chariot-races and dramatic contests, and to parade before the eyes of assembled Greece the wealth and power of his dominion. At that festival was present the famous orator Lysias, once a citizen of Thurii, but now domiciled at Athens. Amid the general decay of patriotism, Lysias retained some of that feeling which had animated the Greeks a century before; and he now saw with disgust the purple magnificence of the Syracusan commissioners, the representatives of a tyranny which had lately overthrown the free Greek state of Rhegium, and reduced many others to dependence. He addressed the assembled crowd in a violent harangue, in which he spoke of Dionysius as the firebrand that was scorching the western, just as Artaxerxes was consuming the eastern part of Hellas. The multitude took up his text with such ardour that they attacked the tents of the Syracusan *Theory*, tore them to pieces, and assaulted the persons of the sacred commissioners themselves. At the same time a poem, which Dionysius caused to be recited at the games, was received with hissing and hooting. So infuriated was Dionysius on hearing of these events—the symbol of the universal hatred of Greece—that he is said for a time to have gone out of his mind.

The matter seems to have prompted him to actions which might render his position less invidious, and he now prepared for a fresh war with Carthage. After erecting an additional wall along the southern slope of Epipolae, and including the suburb of Neapolis within the city walls, he advanced, in 383 B.C., to meet Mago. At a battle near Cabala, the position of which is unknown, he defeated and slew that commander with the loss of 10,000 men, suffering the

* *Θεωρία*, a sacred embassy, representing its particular state at any religious event.

remainder to depart on condition that the Carthaginians would at once evacuate Sicily. The son of Mago, succeeding to his father's position, made excuses for some days' delay until he had restored the confidence of his army. Then, attacking the Greek army at Cronium when unprepared for any renewal of hostilities, he utterly destroyed it. Night alone saved the remnant. Fourteen thousand dead were left on the field. Dionysius was forced to make peace by ceding Selinus and much of the territory of Agrigentum, thus constituting the river Halycus the boundary between his own dominions and those of Carthage, and by paying so heavy an indemnity as to make Syracuse for the time the tributary of Carthage (382 B.C.). Some Carthaginian efforts in Italy were less successful, and he was able there to maintain his ascendancy; and he even contemplated the construction of a wall across the peninsula of Bruttium from sea to sea, to protect the Locrian territories from incursions on the northern side.

§ 15. For the remaining years of his life we have only incidental information of the actions of Dionysius. We know that, as an ally of Sparta, he sent a squadron of ten vessels to act with her against Athens and Boeotia, 373 B.C.—a squadron which was captured in its entirety by Iphicrates—while he also supplied some small bodies of mercenaries to the Spartan army, notably the Gauls who brought on the Tearless Battle at Midea, 368 B.C. He seems to have been husbanding his strength in order to revenge his recent humiliation by Carthage, and in 368 B.C. he took the field once more with 33,000 horse and foot, and 300 ships of war. His efforts were at first successful, and he mastered Eryx, Entella, and Selinus. He next laid siege to Lilybaeum—the new fortress constructed by the Carthaginians after the sack of Motye—but, being surprised here by the unexpected appearance of a Carthaginian fleet of 200 sail which he believed to have been destroyed in dock by fire, he lost 130 ships which were lying in the harbour of Eryx to blockade Lilybaeum by sea, and withdrew to Syracuse. The Carthaginians contented themselves with his repulse and with the recovery of the towns which he had lately occupied.

In the early months of 367 B.C. the news reached Syracuse that the despot poet had been at last successful in his efforts to win the prize of Tragedy, though only at the Lenaea, a second-rate Attic festival. On this occasion only had he obtained the first place, and in the excitement of his delight he indulged too freely in a banquet celebrating his triumph. His excesses brought on a fever of which he shortly died, leaving behind him in the tragedy of his own life the example *par excellence* to Grecian moralists of the misery of the tyrant's position. His reign of thirty-eight years is said to have cost the lives of 10,000 victims to his personal cruelty, exclusive of the thousands who fell in his endless wars; and in the height of his power he went in such dread of assassination that he would suffer no barber to dress his hair, but singed it with his own hands, and searched the persons of even his wives and brothers for the dagger which he believed them to conceal. Yet his courage and boldness are indisputable, and the great Scipio, who in later days conquered Carthage, pronounced him one of the two Greeks who excelled in military ability. The other was Agathocles, his successor fifty years later as despot of Syracuse. Nevertheless, when he died he had done little to beat back the enemy of Sicily, and at his death the Sicilian domain of Carthage was inferior to that which she had held on his accession only by the strip of territory which lies between the Halycus and the Himera. With all his oppressions he seems to have been decidedly a man of culture, and the success of his literary activity proves him to have had no mean taste for refined pursuits. In this he resembled Hiero, as also in his liberal patronage of men of letters; and his court presented the singular spectacle of a group of men each distinguished for his excellence in philosophy or literature, yet all supporting a *régime* repugnant alike to their convictions as thinkers and as Greeks with a loyalty which endured when Dionysius himself was gone. His chief ministers were Philistus the historian, whose attachment to the despot dynasty even exile could not shake, and Dion, an ardent disciple of Plato. That great philosopher himself visited Syracuse in 387 B.C., and if he found his theories of government distasteful to the despot, such a

result probably surprised no one but himself and his fellow-enthusiasts*. The failure of his endeavours to regenerate Dionysius did not damp the ardour of his disciples, and Dion still retained his influence, checking for the present the violence of his master, and looking forward in the future to greater influence with that master's successor.

* He was seized by Dionysius, and sold into slavery.

CHAPTER VII.

SPARTA AFTER THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.

§ 1. Deterioration of the Greek character.—§ 2. The restoration of Plataea, destruction of Mantinea, and reconstitution of Phlius.—§ 3. The Olynthian Confederacy, its growth and extent.—§ 4. The Acanthians appeal to Sparta: Sparta's reasons for attacking Olynthus.—§ 5. Contumacious attitude of Thebes: Phoebeidas seizes the Cadmea.—§ 6. Criticism of this event.—§ 7. The war in Chalcidice and break-up of the Olynthian Confederacy: Its results.

§ 1. THE Peace of Antalcidas marks a new phase in the history of Greek life: it was the first definite acknowledgment of the break-up of Hellas. It betrayed the utter want, not of pan-Hellenic patriotism only, but of the narrower patriotism which holds together even single communities for freedom's sake; and when once the nation had bent itself to the dictation of the barbarian, there was no hope for its recovering the feelings of honour and patriotism thereby lost. It was to this that the ceaseless feuds of one community with another, of one party against another, had brought the whole Greek people; they were exhausted with struggling for a prize which they now saw fall into the hands of an onlooker. Not that the ceaseless party feuds came to an end: on the contrary, they grew with each generation more incessant, more aimless, and more vindictive. This age saw introduced into Hellas something of the barbarism of manners which had heretofore been deemed Oriental only: Agesilaus harried and slew mercilessly and sold his fellow Greeks into slavery: the Thebans made profit of the truce accorded to Pausanias in contempt of the best and most humane sentiment of Hellenic religion: the Corinthians butchered their own nobles at a

public festival: Agesipolis, with more excuse, defied omens and warnings in his invasion of Argolis. Such was the inevitable outcome of ceaseless war—war which had involved all Greece since the day when the Spartans first marched against Athens in 431 B.C. From the same cause sprang the beggary which now spread over the country. Lands ravaged and plundered year by year, exchequers exhausted in petty wars, only added to other evils those of high-handed violence and robbery. The fighting still went on, but it became a prime object with each commander to make the war support itself, and right and left his requisitions fell upon all alike, whether foes or friends, who came in his path. It was now the rule for Athens—and doubtless other states also—to equip fleets on the understanding that these should find their pay as best they could. War became no better than piracy by sea and raiding by land. Whence arose this yet further evil that thousands of the free Greeks came to regard warfare as a profession. The nation became a recruiting ground for all who could afford to pay for mercenaries: there was no liberty for them to fight for at home, nor money to pay them if they fought there; they flocked to the courts of such men as Cyrus and Seuthes and Evagoras, bearing with them a redoubtable name for valour, but draining their homeland of all that was still vigorous and manly within it. Or if they remained within the borders of Greece, it was only under the flag of such men as Iphicrates, owning no ties of patriotism, bound only by the bond of a leader's success, and ready to turn their hands against any man so long as in so doing they could find fighting and spoils. A hundred and fifty years were to elapse ere Greece became a Roman province; but even now had commenced the ruin, impoverishment, and depopulation, the utter moral degradation and civic incapacity, of which the removal made the Roman conquest a blessing in disguise.

§ 2. These results were, however, as yet unforeseen. For the present all Greece was once more subordinated to Sparta, as to the servant of the Great King charged with the maintenance of the terms of the recent peace by him dictated. And backed up by Persia, Sparta was now

stronger than ever, and free to put upon the terms of the treaty whatever interpretation she chose, so long as she avoided any collision with Persian wishes. It has been said that Spartan statesmanship knew nothing of so lofty an ideal as pan-Hellenism. The young Agesipolis indeed had some appreciation of its calls and value, but he was also very jealous for the honour of his own state; and Agesilaus, by far the more influential of the two kings, as he was the older and the more experienced, had ceased to entertain anything in the way of a policy more ennobling than a passion for his own personal advancement and the humiliation of all who ventured to thwart him. We have seen how he dealt with Thebes in the matter of the Peace of Antalcidas: he was equally violent in his method of compelling Argos and Corinth to dissolve their alliance and revert each to its own previous condition of isolation. The events of the next few years are merely the record of his unscrupulous ambition and revenge, wherein the leading motive is the recollection of what he had suffered at the hands of Thebes. In 386 B.C., not content to have compelled Thebes to resign her headship of the Boeotian Confederacy, and to have made Spartan influence paramount in Orchomenus and Thespiæ, he carried out the restoration of Plataea. That town had been captured and rased by the Spartans in 427 B.C. after a costly siege, on account of its hostility to Thebes; but for this very reason it was now restored by the same state which had destroyed it, its scattered inhabitants or their representatives were collected again from their asylum in Attica, and it was established as a guard-house of Sparta and a thorn in the flesh of the Thebans upon the south, as was Heraclea in the north. In the following year occurred a yet more outrageous piece of statecraft. Ever since the Peace of Nicias the Arcadian town of Mantinea had been more or less averse to the Spartan alliance, although forced to accept that alliance for a term of thirty years immediately after the disastrous battle of Mantinea, 418 B.C. The old treaty had now expired, and although in the present condition of Grecian affairs it would have been madness for the town to attempt any defiance of the power of Sparta,

yet the latter state determined to put any such attempt beyond the reach of possibility. Excuses for aggression were easily found: the Mantineans had failed to furnish their proper contingents to the Spartan armies, and had openly rejoiced in the discomfiture of Agesilaus when he fled from the attack of Iphicrates. They were requested therefore to pull down their walls, and restore to their original independent condition the inhabitants of the five several unwall'd villages by whose coalition the existing town of Mantinea had been brought into existence. Such coalition, said the Ephors, was an infraction of the right of autonomy which belonged to the terms of the late peace even to the smallest village. The Mantineans of course declined to obey; whereupon, as Agesilaus did not care for the task, Agesipolis was constrained against his better feelings to coerce the stubborn state whose known disaffection, and close contiguity with the no less disaffected states of Argos, Tegea, and Corinth, made it a standing menace to the peace of the Peloponnesus. Agesipolis easily accomplished his mission: he dammed up the stream which flowed through the town, thereby causing it to flood and undermine the walls. The more extreme Spartans would have put to death several hundreds of the leading Mantineans, but this Agesipolis would not allow. He dismantled the town indeed, and once more relegated its people to their former village communities, but his victory was, as far as he could make it so, a bloodless one. Finally, in the year 383 B.C., Sparta made yet more secure her control of the Isthmus by enforcing at Phlius the recall of all who had been exiled for too violent attachment to Spartan interests, albeit the Phliasians had maintained a guarded neutrality throughout and had lifted no finger against Sparta. Such were amongst the examples of Sparta's justice and of her peculiar view of the meaning of that clause in the Peace of Antalcidas which demanded the autonomy of all Greek communities. There were yet more striking examples to come.

§ 3. For thirty years past the Greeks of Chalcidice had figured but little in the history of Greece; and albeit one of their towns, Potidaea, was a direct agent in bringing

about the Peloponnesian War, yet that war as a whole had but slight effect upon them, and they thrived quietly and unnoticed amongst the general impoverishment and decadence of the less remote allies of Athens and Sparta. Their trifurcate peninsula, equally well posted for access to Mædon, to Thrace, and to Thessaly, was pre-eminently fitted for the growth of mercantile communities, while not less secure from the coming and going of belligerents upon the mainland. The timber of Macedonian forests, the vines and corn of Thrace and Thessaly, the varied mineral wealth of Mt. Pangæus and its neighbourhood, and the fisheries of the surrounding seas, furnished the staple articles of Chalcidian commerce and its chief sources of wealth. Athens had spent men and treasure freely in the effort to make this favoured land her own, and now, after thirty years of quiet, it offered a far more tempting spoil to any power strong enough to grasp it. For the Chalcidians, led by Olynthus, at the head of the Gulf of Torone, had in due course risen to a position of political importance, seemingly by the aid which they had lent to the Macedonian King Amyntas (393—369 B.C.) against the ceaseless inroads of the barbarous Thracian and Illyrian peoples along his frontiers. Those inroads proved too much for the strength of Macedonia, for that kingdom, which had but lately been consolidated and developed by Archelaus (*obit* 399 B.C.) with an energy and skill foreshadowing that of Philip, was now passing through a period of revolution and decline: Amyntas was driven out of all his possessions along the coast and towards Chalcidice, and withdrew to the interior to await better times. He made over his titular possessions in that quarter to his Chalcidian allies, who seem to have been as successful as Amyntas was unfortunate in retaining their power. Thus Chalcidice became as it were the central fortress to which the distressed Macedonians turned voluntarily for succour, so that around the whole coast of the Thermaic Gulf and as far inland as Pella the native communities made alliance with Olynthus, and so originated a Confederacy for the mutual protection of Greeks and natives against the Illyrians and other invading tribes. The terms of the alliance were honourable to all

parties: each member had freest intercourse of trade and marriage with all others, and the law of Olynthus was adopted as that of all. Amongst the native confederates were Pella, Pydna, Methone, Therma, and Anthemus. Very naturally the other Greek communities in the peninsula followed the example of Olynthus, and hastened to become partners in an alliance of which the advantages were so obvious and the burden so light. Within a brief space the Confederacy included the whole of them, with the exception of Apollonia and Acanthus. These also were invited to become members, but upon their declining to do so they received notice that the Olynthians would attempt to compel them. Unable to cope with Olynthus alone, and therefore helpless before the forces of the whole Olynthian alliance, the two recalcitrant communities looked for external aid.

§ 4. It was for this purpose that the Acanthian Cleigenes presented himself at Sparta in 383 B.C. To Agesipolis indeed and his party it seemed unwise to entertain the invitation of the Acanthians, partly because the quarrel in Chalcidice could in nowise be shown to concern Sparta herself, partly because such distant expeditions were not to the liking of the conservatives, partly because any interference on the part of Sparta would but be a further act of injustice, and likely to lead to the repression of this latest and most honourable development of the Greek nationality. But Agesilaus, and the Ephorality also, were eager for the war: they represented the liberal party to whom the old stay-at-home policy was distasteful, and who saw in the constant activity of Spartan arms the surest way to the maintenance of her power. Accordingly they welcomed Cleigenes and his arguments cordially, they pretended—as indeed they very consistently could—that the Olynthian Confederacy was a violation of the Peace of Antalcidas, and they at once called out a force of 10,000 men. Their real motive doubtless was the desire to repress the growth in Northern Greece of any power which might prove antagonistic to themselves, and the assertion of Cleigenes that the Olynthians were already negotiating for an alliance with both Athens and Thebes rendered this

motive the most prominent amongst several. But further, the war party was eager to make a demonstration beyond the Peloponnesus, Agesilaus himself was always athirst for fresh wars, and his party had now initiated a new policy which he was anxious to put into execution. This was nothing less than a plan for the disarming of all other states save Sparta, by permitting her allies to avoid personal service by means of equivalent payments in money. The policy was exactly parallel to that of Athens in regard to the members of the Delian Confederacy, and had it had time to become firmly established it would have led to the transfer of the entire military resources of Greece to the direct control of the Spartan officers, with consequent increase of efficiency in the Spartan ranks and diminution at once of the wealth and the fighting capacity of her allies.

§ 5. The news of the resolution of the Ephorality to attack Olynthus was neither a surprise nor a pleasure to the majority of the Greeks: especially did the Greeks beyond the Isthmus resent any such action, foreseeing that it would destroy a power which one day promised to them a valuable ally, would replace it by an accession of Spartan influence in their rear, and would still further accustom the Greek world to the idea of Sparta's paramount authority and autocratic interference in every quarter. The Thebans indeed, although they foresaw that any Spartan force must pass by their very gates upon its northward march, made public proclamation that none of their number should join the expedition. In fact Thebes was now emerging from her prolonged lethargy: she was exchanging her old philo-Spartan subserviency and intellectual apathy for a new and vigorous period of independent activity both of body and brain. Philosophy had found its way into the land of the "Boeotian swine," and had stirred here, as elsewhere, the latent energies of the popular and patriotic party. The city was in a ferment, the old and effete aristocracy daily growing weaker, the spirit of democracy daily gaining strength under its leader Ismenias. It needed no very keen insight to foresee that, unless very speedily and very effectually checked, Thebes would ere long take the lead in a national crusade against Spartan

military despotism. At the moment, however, the rival parties within the city were evenly balanced, that of the philo-Spartans and aristocrats being led by Leontiades, that of the democracy by Ismenias; and both these men were members of the Board of Generals for the year 383 B.C.

Of the Spartan army destined for service in Chalcidice a force of 2000 men was at once raised and despatched northwards by forced marches in two divisions, respectively captained by Eudamidas and Phoebidas, both of them ardent partisans of the extremists in Sparta. Eudamidas made his way at once to Acanthus and Apollonia, in time to forestall the attack of Olynthus upon those towns; Phoebidas followed in more leisurely fashion, and in the course of his march pitched his camp before the walls of Thebes. Here he was visited by Leontiades and others of the Laconizing Thebans. The purport of this visit was understood when, a few days later, the Thebans awoke to the fact that Phoebidas and his thousand men were in possession of the Cadmea, the citadel of their city. The *coup* was cleverly arranged, the Spartans being admitted by a gate near the Cadmea at high noon, when the heat drove every one from the streets, and on the day of the festival of the Thesmophoria, when all males were withdrawn from the citadel and the fortress given up to the women-folk for ritual purposes. The democratic party were taken entirely by surprise; they could not offer any resistance, and were constrained to look on quietly even at the arrest of Ismenias. The city passed again under the absolute control of the Laconizing party, and the Cadmea remained in the hands of Sparta. Ismenias was soon afterwards put to death at Sparta's suggestion, on charges of malignancy in one form or other, but really as being the leader of the anti-Spartan movement, the abettor of Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles, and the man who had restored Heraclea to its inhabitants after Lysander's fall.

§ 6. It is impossible to say how far the government at Sparta was answerable for the conduct of Phoebidas, but it is at least possible that Agesilaus was the prime instigator of his *coup*, and that the Ephoralty, if not actually ordering Phoebidas to do as he did, yet led him to expect some

unusual event and to act upon it. It is highly probable that the party of Leontiades had been for some time in communication with Agesilaus and the Ephors, and they may well have represented that the presence of Phoebidas near the city would be helpful towards effecting a revolution to which they did not as yet clearly see their way. At any rate Phoebidas could feel himself sure of the secret approval of the government when he thus ventured to violate the peace, and he could not unreasonably hope that the influence of Agesilaus would avail to protect him from any after results of his conduct. The Ephors, however, while carefully retaining all the advantages which he had gained for them, had not the courage to brave the universal outcry against his treachery; they summoned Phoebidas home and condemned him to a heavy fine, which seems not to have been enforced; but they sent three other Spartans to act as harmosts to the garrison which still occupied Cadmea. Whatever the secret history of the event, its importance to Sparta was incalculable. It disarmed her only remaining enemy who possessed either means or courage to resist her; it gave her an impregnable *point d'appui* in the very heart of Central Greece, whence she could threaten even Athens; it gave to her entire control of the roads leading from the Isthmus to the north, and so secured her line of communications with the forces destined for service in Chalcidice; and finally it was the crowning event of a series of high-handed proceedings which, so it seemed, must utterly extinguish the last sparks of resistance to her dominion. So thought Agesilaus: but in point of fact this apparent triumph was the beginning of the end of her power, and from it Xenophon dates the period of her decline. Three years later there was found vent for the indignation which the injustice of the despot-city had aroused at Thebes, and nine years later still (371 B.C.) the Thebans humbled Sparta more signally than now they were themselves humbled by Agesilaus and his fellows. For the present the Ephors easily justified their conduct to themselves: Thebes had been put in their power voluntarily by the leaders of the only party which Spartan diplomacy recognized as such; and this was but a fit and proper

method of punishing her for her past sins of omission and commission, for compelling her to a more loyal path for the future, and for once more vindicating the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas by putting beyond fear of molestation from Thebes the autonomy of the communities of the Boeotian Confederacy so-called.

§ 7. In Chalcidice, meantime, Eudamidas had found an ally in Amyntas of Macedonia, now anxious to recover the territories which he had a little while previously added to Olynthus; but the resources of the latter town were sufficient to deal easily with the small contingents brought against them, especially as the Olynthians were excellently equipped with cavalry. Accordingly, the full force of 10,000 men was now mustered in the Peloponnesus and sent out under the lead of Teleutias, the most popular of the Spartan officers. He took with him a considerable number of Theban horse and foot, and was able to confine the Olynthians almost to their own walls, while he attacked the petty dependent towns in detail. His weakness in point of cavalry he made good by securing the aid of Derdas, Prince of Elimeia in Upper Macedonia. Nevertheless, the spring of 382 B.C. found the Olynthians as strong and determined as ever, albeit thrown solely upon their own resources. Whenever they ventured to oppose the Spartans in the field they were worsted indeed, but their defeats were not serious, and they retaliated by constant skirmishes and forays, which exasperated their enemy as those of Iphicrates had done in the Corinthian War. The consequence was that Teleutias lost his coolness, made a rash assault upon Olynthus, and was slain before its walls (381 B.C.). His army, of course, dispersed at once, and was only rallied by the arrival of Agesipolis. Sparta, being at the moment free-handed, could afford to concentrate all her efforts upon this war. Agesipolis was at first as successful as Teleutias had been, again confined his enemy to their walls, and stormed Torone; but his exertions proved too much for his strength, and he died of a fever in the summer (380 B.C.). To him succeeded Polybiades, who at length brought the Olynthians to terms. The recently-formed Confederacy was dissolved,

each of its members taking a separate oath of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Sparta, while the Macedonian communities reverted once more to the rule of Amyntas. Such was the final example of Spartan autocracy and of the insolence which led her to tolerate no state save in dependence upon herself. Within a generation she saw the folly of her course in Chalcidice, for it was by her fault that Amyntas recovered his power in Macedonia, raised that kingdom to the front rank amongst Hellenic states, and handed on to his son Philip a power which was to reduce all Greece to one and the same condition of subjection. All this resulted from the destruction of the Olynthian Confederacy—a Confederacy which had offered no offence to Sparta, and which would in all likelihood, if left alone, have staved off for many years the subjugation of Greece. Its overthrow was completed in the year 379 B.C.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PROGRESS OF THEBES.

§ 1. The exiled Thebans conspire against the philo-Spartan government in Thebes.—§ 2. Epameinondas.—§ 3. The liberation of Thebes.—§ 4. Isolation of Thebes: Measures of Epameinondas for her defence.—§ 5. Sphodrias makes a descent upon Attica: Athens declares war on Sparta.—§ 6. Criticism of Sphodrias' conduct: Difficulties of Sparta: Abortive invasion of Boeotia by Cleombrotus.—§ 7. Revival of the power of Athens: Chabrias, Callistratus, and Timotheus: Reconstitution of the Athenian Confederacy.—§ 8. Battle of Naxos: Athens recovers the mastery of the seas: Timotheus ravages the coasts of Peloponnese.—§ 9. Progress of Thebes: Revival of jealousy between Thebes and Athens.—§ 10. Abortive peace between Athens and Sparta.—§ 11. The belligerents appeal to Persia: Epameinondas refuses to accept the terms of the Rescript.—§ 12. Cleombrotus invades Boeotia: Military reforms of Epameinondas.—§ 13. Leuctra.

§ 1. THE occupation of the Cadmea in 383 B.C. had put in power throughout Boeotia the Laconizing party, the old oligarchy whose method of government was purely selfish. They had secured themselves by conduct not unlike that of Critias and the Thirty at Athens, arresting, executing, or banishing all whom they suspected of democratic tendencies. As before with the exiles from Athens, so with those from Thebes, Sparta made proclamation that they should not be entertained elsewhere; and just as Thebes had refused to obey so iniquitous a behest in the case of Thrasybulus and his fellows, so now Athens disregarded the demands and threats of Sparta, and lent a warm welcome to the three or four hundred refugees who fled to her walls. Her contumacy passed unpunished, for it may be supposed that the Theban tyrants, seeing the most notable of their adversaries either slain or imprisoned, and

backed by the support of the garrison in the Cadmea, viewed without apprehension the movements of the exiles in Athens and elsewhere, of which they were kept—as it was believed—fully informed by their spies. And even to Athens they could reach if they desired it, as when they procured the assassination of the exiled Androcleides. The surrounding Boeotian towns were as entirely under Spartan influence as Thebes herself. Excitability and astuteness were not prominent traits in the Boeotian character, and the possibility of the organization and accomplishment of a revolution without previous token of its existence never occurred to the ruling oligarchs. Yet so it came about.

The leader of the tyrants, and the ablest of them, was Leontiades, the betrayer of the Cadmea. By comparison with his fellow oligarchs he was a man of lofty character, holding aloof from the baser pleasures which his comrades used their power to subserve. While Archias and Phillipus were but leading figures amongst the mass of those who were Laconizers only because they could not preserve their power otherwise, and while they regarded power as but the necessary means to the indulgence of every base passion, Leontiades represented the better side of the Boeotian character, the side now tardily coming into prominence under the guidance of philosophy and culture. He was therefore in a sense the parallel of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, but his merits were stunted by the belief that Spartan domination was desirable in itself.

§ 2. Epameinondas was the highest outcome of the new development of the Theban character. He had benefited by the personal training of Lysis and Philolaus to acquire a thorough grasp of all that was worth knowing in the later Pythagorean philosophy, while an intimate friendship with Simmias and Cebes, disciples of Socrates, gave him the advantage of the Socratic teaching. But he was no mere eccentric or pedant; he could hold his own upon the orator's platform, in the general's tent, amongst the athletic exercises of the palaestra, with any of his countrymen. Above all, he was an ardent patriot: his text was Thebes for the Thebans, and with this end in view he lived

on quietly and unnoticed during the despotism of the oligarchs, making what preparations he could against the day of liberation by encouraging others to hope for better things, and by stealthily organizing the rising Theban chivalry to train themselves assiduously for the coming struggle with Sparta. Pelopidas was the bosom friend of Epameinondas, but with him the relative excellence of brain and body were reversed. No mean thinker, and well cultured in all finer training, he was yet more a man of action than of intellect. His high spirit would not suffer him to remain at Thebes as Epameinondas did: he went into exile with four hundred other Thebans, and found asylum at Athens. A third leader of the patriots, and also an exile at Athens, was Mellon (or Melon), a man with all the ardour and courage of Pelopidas, but lacking his ability or the opportunity to show it.

§ 3. It was now three years from the capture of the Cadmea. Olynthus had fallen, Phlius had been humbled, Sparta was seemingly stronger than ever. If three years could bring no occasion for patriotism to assert itself, then further waiting was useless. The patriots must make their own opportunity. They were in constant communication with Epameinondas, who could tell them that Thebes was filled with young warriors ready and eager to strike for freedom; that the oligarchs were indulging a sense of perfect security; that their secretary Phyllidas, and Charon another official, were loyal at heart, and anxious to abet the exiles in any likely plan. It was close upon mid-winter, 379 B.C.

Seven (or twelve) of the exiles, amongst them Pelopidas and Mellon, left Athens in the guise of hunters one snowy day and hurried to Parnes. At the same time a hundred others, all picked men, mustered unnoticed in the Thriasian Plain, and moved towards the frontier. A messenger brought word from Charon and Phyllidas to the seven that all was well, and in the evening of the next day they made their way one by one to Charon's house, where they found awaiting them six-and-thirty Theban conspirators. There was a great banquet that evening at the house of the secretary Phyllidas, to which were summoned all the

tyrants save Leontiades: none declined, for good living was dear to the Boeotian lords, and moreover Phyllidas had promised them the company of the most fascinating ladies of the city. As the guests took their places, Archias desired Charon to be summoned to his presence, and informed him that he had information of a conspiracy on foot against the government: Charon would do well, he said, to be on his guard and to hold aloof from it. Charon played his part admirably, and returned to relieve the anxiety of the conspirators concealed in his house. A little later, when the company were already flushed with drinking, a hurried messenger brought to Archias a letter from one of his spies in Athens, wherein was set forth the whole plan of the conspiracy. "Business-to-morrow!" said the guest, and thrust the letter aside unopened. Late in the evening the servants were dismissed, the doors of the saloon opened, and there entered the expected figures robed and garlanded and heavily veiled. They took their places, each by the side of one of the guests. They were Pelopidas and his fellows, three of them disguised as ladies of rank, while the other four seemed to be their attendants. Within a few moments they had stabbed the entire number of the revellers. Thence they hurried to Leontiades' house, posing as messengers on urgent business from Athens. Leontiades took alarm as they entered, and slew one of the three assassins, but fell himself before the sword of Pelopidas. Thence to the gaol, where Phyllidas showed a forged writ from the Polemarchs authorizing his entry. A hundred and fifty prisoners were freed and armed; and mustering now two hundred well-equipped men, the conspirators proclaimed by trumpet in the dead of night along the streets of Thebes, that at last the day of vengeance was come. Forthwith Epameinondas assembled the young warriors whom he had trained in secret, the populace poured into the Agora, the remnant of the oligarchs and their adherents fled to the Cadmea. There was no time to lose, for already the message was flying by Thespiæ and Plataea to Sparta that the Spartan garrison was imperilled. A division blocked the roads from the south and west, and drove back the aid sent from Plataea and

Thespieae, while the mass of the populace with the determination born of three years of oppression beset the citadel without flagging, cut off all supplies, and wearied out its defenders. Within a few days the three harmosts agreed to a capitulation, and led out the garrison towards Megara. There they were met by a Spartan army under Cleombrotus, successor of Agesipolis, hurrying to the rescue. It was too late. Thebes was free, and with her went all Boeotia. The Confederacy was restored and united in one cordial spirit of resistance to Spartan dominion. Amongst the newly-elected Boeotarchs were Epameinondas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon. The Athenian generals Chabrias and Demophon were hovering about the slopes of Cithaeron in readiness to lend aid if needful. All Greece exulted in the blow thus dealt to the Spartans. Cleombrotus could but retreat to gather larger forces for a later vengeance, and the Ephorality betrayed the smart of their chagrin by executing two out of the three harmosts and fining the third. Had they but held their ground for four or five days longer, Cleombrotus would have arrived to raise the siege. At a later date when the Macedonians in the Cadmea were assaulted by the revolted Thebans, they held out for more than a fortnight before they were relieved by Alexander.

§ 4. Thebes had but a few weeks of respite, for so incensed were the Spartans that they would not wait for the usual campaigning season, but sent out a fresh army under Cleombrotus in the earliest days of the next year (Jan. 378 B.C.). Thebes stood absolutely alone amongst the states of Greece, for albeit many sympathized with her, none dared to lend her any aid, and even the Athenians had been so eager to disclaim all share in the recent revolution that they indicted two of their Board of Generals for actively abetting it. Still worse, Thebes stood almost alone in Boeotia, for though in many of the Boeotian towns there were strong parties in favour of liberty, yet in each there was also a very strong Laconizing party, while Orchomenus, Thespieae, and Plataea were as good as Spartan fortresses; and even where the party of freedom might have outnumbered the rival Spartan faction,

its energy of action was crippled by the inherent passion for autonomy, which effectively prevented that united action of one town with another whereby alone the power of Sparta could be withstood. Even within Thebes itself the population was by no means unanimous, and it required all the tact and energy of the new Boeotarchs to overcome the difficulties of their position. So serious indeed was their case that they reconstituted the famous Sacred Band, an institution of ancient origin which had lately fallen into disuse. It was a picked company of three hundred youths of tried courage, strength, and loyalty, irrespective of birth, so drawn up when in battle order that each man stood by the side of one for whom he would fight to the death. Charged primarily with the defence of the Cadmea, the Sacred Band now became the kernel of the new patriotism, setting an example to the whole body politic. Aware that Thebes would have to depend mainly upon herself in the coming struggle, the Boeotarchs strained every nerve to render the army efficient. The Boeotian cavalry in particular, always formidable, now became far superior to anything which the Peloponnesians could send against it. More than this, Epameinondas made a scientific study of the whole art of war. He saw how far Iphicrates and his peltasts had surpassed the unwieldy heavy infantry of Sparta, and what disadvantages there were in his system. From these data he developed a new theory of war—a theory which was not to receive full trial until after seven years of constant preparation, and a theory of which the trial was the triumph.

§ 5. Yet all these measures required time for their effect, and fortunately for Thebes the new king, Cleombrotus, brother of Agesipolis, was heartily opposed to the policy of terrorism advocated by Agesilaus: he had no sympathy with the party of Phoebeidas and the Boeotian oligarchy, and no desire to waste Grecian blood in intestinal warfare in which the only right of Sparta was her might. Accordingly his second expedition (Jan. 378 B.C.) was little more than a demonstration. The Thebans had secured their more immediate territories by a fosse and rampart, and

this Cleombrotus did not attempt to pass. The whole march was a fiasco. There was but one act of importance in its course—Sphodrias was left behind as harmost of Thespieae.

Now it was just at this time that Spartan envoys were at Athens endeavouring to make out a case for their state against the Athenians, on the score of aid lent by the latter to the Theban revolutionists; while the Athenians themselves, albeit at bottom heartily in accord with the Thebans, were yet all anxiety to disclaim any public support of the conspiracy, and eager to make any reasonable concessions as proof of their good faith. In the very middle of these negotiations, at a time when it was of paramount importance to Sparta that Athens should not make common cause with Thebes, and of equal moment to Thebes that she should find an ally in Athens, Sphodrias and his garrison was found to have entered Attica, marched as far as the Thriasian plain near Eleusis, and then retreated after burning and looting the adjacent villages. A genuine Spartan, regretting the loss of the Cadmea, he had recollected how Teleutias had surprised the Peiraeus (388 B.C.), and he had let his imagination be fired with the idea of repeating that exploit: it would be a glorious thing to establish a Spartan harmost in Peiraeus in lieu of those expelled from Thebes. But Sphodrias was not a Brasidas: his projected night march was badly timed, and dawn broke to find him still many miles from his goal. In sheer vexation, and conscious that he had even now and to no purpose violated the peace with Athens, he revenged his disappointment by looting whatever came to hand, and so withdrew. Great was the wrath at Athens: the Spartan envoys speedily came down from their lofty position, disclaimed all knowledge of Sphodrias' movements both on their own part and on that of their state, and hurried back to Sparta with loud and vehement assurances that the peace-breaker should be punished as he deserved. The Athenians put Peiraeus in such a state of defence as might frustrate any further attempt, and Sphodrias was summoned to take his trial before the Ephors. Incredible as it would seem, he was acquitted, thanks to the interest of Agesilaus: to that tactless politician such a thing as apology was unknown, and he

argued that Sparta could ill afford to lose a man who had given such excellent proof of truly Spartan genius. Cleombrotus did not protest, because Sphodrias was one of his adherents, and the remonstrances of the envoys from Athens were futile. The inevitable result was that Athens, finding satisfaction refused, declared war upon Sparta and threw herself heartily into the Theban cause.

Such are the facts of this episode. The ancient authorities, however, assert that the action of Sphodrias was prompted by certain of the patriotic party in Thebes: pretending to be earnest Laconizers, they induced the hot-headed harmost thus to attack Athens in return for the covert aid lent by her to the recent revolution. If the attempted surprise of Peiraeus failed, as they intended that it should, they foresaw that the Athenians would be none the less estranged from Sparta; if it succeeded, Athens must in self-defence ally herself with Thebes. Grote discredits the story, Curtius accepts it; but whatever the initial cause, the result is the important point, and of that there is no doubt. A strong force of Athenian troops was at once put into the field under Chabrias, with instructions to block the passes of Cithaeron against any Peloponnesian army moving northwards by way of the Isthmus.

§ 6. The position of Sparta was now worse than ever. Her authority had been violently defied in Thebes, and the two recent demonstrations under Cleombrotus had led to nothing but derision; the unrighteous violence of the war party had driven Athens with all her forces over to the Theban side, and thus imperilled the security of the Isthmus and even the existence of the Spartan garrisons at Orchomenus, Thespieae, and Plataea; the Peloponnesian allies, for long only half-hearted in their allegiance to Sparta and avowedly sympathizing with Thebes, demanded loudly that, if called out for service at all, they should be led by a general who knew his own mind, and not by one so irresolute as Cleombrotus. The war party of Sparta demanded that Agesilaus, the sworn foe of Thebes, should be commissioned to punish the revolted city. It seems that that king had of late kept in the background from the conviction that his ante-Theban bias had led him too far in the matter of the

capture of the Cadmea and the acquittal of Phoebeidas : he felt that his personal rancour against Thebes was more distasteful than pleasing to the allies, and possibly also it gave him a malicious pleasure to force upon Cleombrotus the conduct of a war so little to that king's taste. But there was now manifest need of action both energetic and drastic, if the spirit of discontent against Spartan rule was to be stayed. Accordingly, in the summer of 378 B.C. Agesilaus in person marched upon Boeotia with the entire muster of the allied forces. Contriving to force the passes of Cithaeron, he was for a long time checked by the vigorous activity of the Thebans and Athenians along the whole line of their recently-erected fosse ; but having at last forced an entry within this, he ravaged the enclosed country in the most thorough and barbarous fashion. It was long before his enemy ventured to offer a pitched battle, and when at length they did so Agesilaus betrayed the insincerity of his attitude, and his mistrust of his allies, by calling off his troops when in mid-charge, before they could come to blows. The immovable courage of his enemy reminded him too vividly of Coronea. Retreating soon afterwards he left Phoebeidas behind as harmost of Thespiæ ; whereupon the Thebans repaired their defences, ravaged the Thespian lands, and slew Phoebeidas. The war party had gained nothing by the appointment of Agesilaus, who nevertheless took the field again in the next year (377 B.C.). Again he broke through the fosse and ravaged the country, but he showed even more clearly than before that he did not care to engage in a pitched battle. On his homeward march he contrived to injure his sound leg so seriously that he was for several years incapacitated from active service. For this reason therefore Cleombrotus once more took the field in 376 B.C. ; but his own unwillingness, not less than that of his allies, now heartily weary of the war, combined with the activity of Athens and the daily growing confidence and efficiency of Thebes, prevented his even passing Cithaeron. It was very evident that Sparta was no longer what she had been by land ; equally evident that she must now strike once more for the mastery of the seas, if she was to prevent the restoration of the Empire of Athens.

§ 7. For the Athenians had thrown themselves into the war with a vigour worthy of their earlier days. The whole body of Sparta's subjects and enemies had now every grievance which had prompted their action in 395 B.C. ; and since that date there had been added to the score of such grievances all that had been done by Sparta in reference to Mantinea, Phlius, Argos, Thebes, and Olynthus. The events of the last three years were clear proof of the failing strength of Sparta. It was patent that the discontented states only needed a leader to declare themselves, if not enemies of Sparta, at any rate autonomous in the proper sense of that term, and not merely in the sense in which their autonomy had been interpreted by Sparta on the basis of the Peace of Antalcidas. The only states which could claim such leadership were Athens, Argos, and Thebes ; but Argos was too weak, and Thebes was but an upstart amongst the states of Greece, so that it devolved upon Athens, in virtue of her by-gone maritime power, to assert herself as champion of the freedom of Greece. She was fortunate, moreover, in her statesmen at the moment. True she had lost Thrasybulus and Conon ; but the place of the latter was ably taken by his son Timotheus, while in Chabrias and Iphicrates she had generals of proven value, and in Callistratus and Callias she had persuasive orators and skilled diplomatists. After acquitting himself notably in Cyprus for Evagoras, Chabrias had acted as a captain of mercenaries for the revolted Acoris in Egypt, and, as has been seen, had done service on the Attic frontiers and about Thebes since the expulsion of Phoebeidas ; indeed it was mainly his attitude which had forced Agesilaus to his confession of inferiority in the field. Iphicrates, the organizer of the peltasts, was no friend of Chabrias. Since the Peace of Antalcidas he had taken service with Cotys in Thrace, where his brilliant services had won him the hand of the daughter of that prince, had given him the seaport of Drys as a patrimony, and had so worked upon Amyntas of Macedonia that the latter adopted him as a son. When the remonstrance of Pharnabazus compelled the Athenians to recall Chabrias from Egypt, Iphicrates was commissioned to take service on their behalf in the

great invasion of Egypt by Artaxerxes, nor do we find him again in Athens until 376 B.C. Timotheus, the son of Conon, had yet to make his name as a captain, but even now he was famed, like Aristides before him, for rigid honesty and inexpugnable integrity. With Chabrias as his man of deeds, and Callistratus as his man of words, Timotheus sailed from Athens immediately upon the declaration of war which followed the attempt of Sphodrias (378 B.C.); and passing from island to island of the Aegean, he speedily effected a Confederacy of not less than seventy maritime communities. Thus, one hundred years after the first, there arose a second Confederacy of Delos. But every means was adopted to prevent the recurrence of those abuses and grievances which had led to the overthrow of the older Confederacy. There was to be a general convention (*συνέδριον*) of all the allies at Athens, and each member, whether great or small, was to have one vote. In particular, the money payments of the members were no longer "tribute" (*φóρος*) but "contributions" (*συντάξεις*), and the Athenians made it an article of the new Confederacy that none of their number should have power to possess landed property in any of the Confederate states, thus publicly disowning any intention of re-introducing the old system of cleruchies or colonization abroad; and such of their citizens as had been expelled from their cleruchies on the end of the Peloponnesian War were expressly debarred from claiming back their property. In the first enthusiasm born of the new League, it was resolved to equip 20,000 infantry and 500 horse for service on the Boeotian side, and a fleet of 200 sail to keep the Spartans out of the Aegean*. Needless to say, such ardour did not last long: at Athens there was made a new assessment of the population, and the taxes were levied upon a plan different from that of the old Solonian Constitution. It is this change which makes memorable the year of the Archonship of

* From an inscription discovered in 1851 we learn that the first to join the alliance were Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, Mitylene; then Euboea with the exception of the town Histiaea; then Scythos and Pezarethos. Among the other names found in the inscription may be mentioned Perinthos, Maronea, Paros, Andros, Tenos, Antissa, Ceos, Amorgos, Selymbria, Siphnos, Zacynthos. Thebes also joined this league.

Nausinicus (378 B.C.), and the principle was so equitable that it was subsequently extended to the trierarchy. Athens found her new position very onerous, and was very soon eager to make peace; and we may conclude therefore that her less wealthy and populous maritime allies were neither more able nor more willing to maintain the burdens of the new Confederation in a manner proportionate to its inaugural proceedings. Little is known of the working of the new League. There was a conference of deputies, presumably meeting at Athens, by whose voice the amount of the several "contributions" was probably determined, but who collected it, or when, or what means were provided for enforcing payment, we are not told. We may notice also that whereas the older Confederacy had been organized to protect Greece against Persia, and had passed into Athenian control solely by reason of Sparta's lack of initiative, the later Confederacy was aimed expressly against Sparta. The question of the relations of Greece with Persia had been settled, it seemed, by the Peace of Antalcidas, and there was now no general Hellenic revulsion against the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King; while Athens, not to mention that her best general, Iphicrates, was even now acting by her authority in the service of Artaxerxes, was in no position to quarrel with Persia had she wished it. And she did not wish it, for it was of the highest moment to her that Persia should not lend aid to Sparta, but should rather be on good terms with Athens.

§ 8. It has been said that Chabrias and the land forces of the Confederacy did good service for Thebes against Agesilaus. What the fleet did in the meantime we do not know; but since, after the repulse of Cleombrotus from Cithaeron in 376 B.C., the Spartans determined to try for better issues by sea, we must suppose that the Confederate fleets were active and successful in the Aegean and upon the adjoining coasts. It was to prevent any further extension of Athenian influence that in the summer of the same year the navarch Pollis put out with sixty triremes and presented himself between Paros and Naxos, and commenced to intercept the merchantmen and corn-ships making

for the Peiræus. Off Naxos he encountered Chabrias with eighty sail, and left forty-nine of his vessels in the hands of the victorious Athenians, who now cruised unmolested from one end of the Aegean to the other, and added seventeen new communities to their Confederacy, including Abdera in Thrace, which was protected by Chabrias against the native tribe of the Triballi. Their success in winning new allies was largely due to the address and honesty of Phocion, a man who first comes into notice now, and one destined to figure largely in the history of the next fifty years. In the next year the Athenians adopted a bolder course: they determined to attempt once more one of the objects of Pericles' statecraft, and to surround the whole of the Peloponnese with a continuous chain of allies. The Spartans were equally resolved to prevent the design, but Timotheus ravaged the coasts of Laconia, defeated the navarch Nicolochus between Alyzia and Leucas, and won over to the Confederacy the islands of Cephallenia and Corcyra, as well as the Acarnanians, the Epeirote Molossians and Chaones, and other tribes of the mainland. It was only want of money to pay his crews which prevented him from still further improving his position, but Athens was sorely pressed for funds, and the victories of her fleet in the West did not arrest the constant annoyance caused nearer home by Peloponnesian privateers from Aegina. Moreover, the Athenians began to feel resentment at the growing power of Thebes: all their efforts, it seemed, were destined rather to improve the position of Thebes than their own. They demanded that Thebes should contribute her share towards the expenses of the fleet, but that state had enough to do on its own account, without finding funds for Athens.

§ 9. The latter part of 376 B.C. and the whole of 375 B.C. were months of ceaseless activity for Thebes, albeit there was no further Spartan invasion. The method of conciliation having failed to expel the Spartan garrisons from the Boeotian towns and to unite the whole country in one state, Epameinondas and Pelopidas set themselves to secure this end by force of arms. A brilliant success gained over the Lacedæmonian garrison of Orchomenus by Pelopidas and

the Sacred Band at Tegyra, and the defeat and death of the harmost of Tanagra, went far towards breaking down the last relics of Spartan ascendancy within Boeotia. Thespieæ and Plataea were recovered, as well as Chaeronea and Haliartus, and by the year 374 B.C. Boeotia was united, with the single exception of Orchomenus. That fortress lay upon the borders of Phocis, and the Phocians had long been staunch allies of Sparta from fear of Thebes. Against them accordingly Pelopidas turned his arms in 374 B.C., at a time when they were also attacked by the encroaching power of Jason, despot of Pheræ in Thessaly. Taken between two fires, the Phocians appealed to Sparta, as they had done in 395 B.C.; whereupon Cleombrotus came to their aid with forces sufficient to defeat the aims of Thebes. Had Phocis been reduced, Orchomenus must have fallen, all Boeotia been united, the treasures and influence of Delphi placed at the disposal of Theban politicians, and the forces of Thebes and Pheræ would have joined hands. But though on this occasion the designs of Thebes were frustrated, the mere attempt upon Phocis indicated a degree of confidence and strength at which Athens took immediate alarm. The two states had for centuries been traditional rivals, as much as Phocis and Athens were traditionally allies. Apart from the contempt with which Athens regarded the upstart claims of Thebes, and the inherent antagonism between the Ionic blood of Attica and the Aeolic Boeotians, it was most undesirable for Athens to have her north-western borders threatened by a warlike state of first-class rank. Thebes had declined in any way to contribute to the maintenance of the war undertaken by Athens (so said the Athenians) mainly for Thebes' sake. On the other hand, Sparta was sorely in need of allies, and would make very considerable concessions to secure the secession of Thebes from the Theban alliance, while the Athenians as a body found the war wearisome, costly, and indecisive.

§ 10. The upshot was that negotiations were opened and a peace patched up between Athens and Sparta (374 B.C.) on the basis of the Peace of Antalcidas. Each state was to evacuate all possessions other than those within its own

limits, Sparta was to be the accepted hegemon by land and Athens by sea. To these conditions all the Peloponnesian allies and the whole Delian Confederacy excepting Thebes readily swore allegiance: they were well pleased to see Sparta thus easily thrust from her position of autocracy, and to revert once more to peaceful life. Not so Thebes: the longer the war continued, the more would Sparta be embarrassed, and the more freely would the power of Thebes expand. But there was no means of withstanding the general voice of Greece, and unless she was to be isolated from all alike, Thebes must also swear to the peace. Even then however she claimed, in the person of Epameinondas, to do so for united Boeotia, nor was it until the last moment that she conceded this point. She could afford to wait yet a little while, for her strength was growing yearly just as certainly as that of Sparta was declining. The longer she postponed her ultimatum, the more favourably would she be able at length to make it public.

It would seem that the party of Cleombrotus was now in the ascendant at Sparta; certainly the party of Agesilaus saw the need of recuperating its forces before demanding the settlement of the long outstanding account against Thebes. For the fortunes of Sparta were sunk very low, so low that she was fain to decline the duty when the important town of Pharsalus, one of the keys of Thessaly and an invaluable ally in view of impending struggles with Thebes and Pherae, appealed to her for help against the aggressions of Jason (374 B.C.), who had made himself master of the latter town and much of the rest of Thessaly. It was all she could do to defend Phocis: Polydamas, the despot of Pharsalus, must fend for himself. As a result, Jason reduced the town at his leisure, and so completed his subjugation of Thessaly.

It was thoroughly Greek that the peace so recently concluded and so much desired should be broken almost as soon as made. After swearing the oath, Athens sent orders to Timotheus to bring home the fleet which he still commanded in the Ionian Sea. As he was sailing by Zacynthos, he was invited by a party of exiles to restore them to their island, and accordingly made a landing for

that purpose. This was a breach of the peace which the Spartans resented even more hotly than the Athenians had resented the action of Sphodrias: they forthwith declared war anew, and despatched a fleet under Mnasippus into the Ionian Sea (373 B.C.). Mnasippus laid immediate siege to Corcyra, recently enrolled a member of the Athenian Confederacy, and of particular value to Sparta as being the most advantageous port for communications with the Syracusan Dionysius, her ally. In reply the Athenians equipped a fresh fleet and again appointed Timotheus to the command; but when the latter spent some time in the Aegean trying to raise funds, without showing the needful expedition in the relief of Corcyra, they superseded him in favour of Iphicrates.

Timotheus was put upon his trial for remissness: he came off with unblemished character, but felt that his popularity was gone, and took service, as his father Conon had done before him, with Artaxerxes. Iphicrates, on arriving at Corcyra, found that Mnasippus had been already defeated and killed. He easily swept the Spartan fleet from the western seas, and also captured a squadron of ten vessels sent to their support by Dionysius. But such proceedings as these only revived the late desire for a general pacification, a desire accentuated by the news that Thebes had once more rased Plataea, the old ally of Athens, and dismantled the fortifications of Thespieae (372 B.C.). Those two positions lay too near her walls, and their new populations were too inherently hostile, to make them tolerable neighbours. Both Athens and Sparta recognized more clearly than ever the need of husbanding their resources against the growing Theban power, and both saw in the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas a means of preventing the forcible unification of Boeotia, upon which alone depended the strength of Thebes. Accordingly Antalcidas was once more sent up to Susa—so natural had it now become for the Greeks to lay their fortunes at the feet of Persia—to request Persian aid in ending the war.

§ 11. Artaxerxes made no objections: each such appeal was a fresh rivet in the chain of his ascendancy. Early in 371 B.C. the deputies of the Grecian states were convened at

Sparta to hear the Great King's reply. It was in the main what it had been in 387 B.C., with this important alteration, that Athens and Sparta were now declared equal powers, and Sparta was no longer to be the sole instrument for enforcing the provisions of the peace. The Greek communities were to be autonomous, but Sparta was no longer to read this article of the peace in the light of her own interests. Advocated by the eloquence of the Athenian orators Callistratus and Callias, from the latter of whom it took its name, the peace was readily accepted by the Peloponnesian allies and by the Delian Confederacy, whose members swore to it, as did Athens and Sparta, severally. But Epameinondas claimed once more to swear to it in the name of all Boeotia; to have done otherwise, to have sworn only in the name of Thebes and to have left the various other Boeotian communities to do the same each for itself, would have been to undo at a blow the entire results of the past seven years of struggling; and this the Thebans had resolved not to do. They had fought to unify Boeotia, and they would maintain their right even in the face of all Greece; for even if it led to war with Sparta, as they foresaw it would, the worst result could only be that which would also come from their immediate renunciation of their hegemony in Boeotia. The remaining deputies looked on in wonder and expectation; Agesilaus, burning with his unsatiated hatred of Thebes, grew menacing. Thebes must swear for herself alone, he declared, or be excluded from the peace and be left the scapegoat of all Greece. "We will swear for ourselves alone," replied Epameinondas, "if you Spartans will also swear each for the five townships which make up your so-called city of Sparta!" Agesilaus struck out the name of Thebes from the signatories. Thebes alone prevented the peaceful settlement of Hellas, and against it was directed at once the full levy of the Spartans and their allies, now encamped under Cleombrotus in Phocis.

§ 12. The whole Theban army, not more than 6000 hoplites in addition to cavalry, took up a position at Coronea, near the frontiers of Phocis, on the direct road by which it was expected that Cleombrotus would at once advance upon Thebes. That general, however, chose another

course: he moved to the south-east, so as to enter the Boeotian territories by way of Creusis, there picking up reinforcements sent from the Peloponnese, and placing pickets at the various passes of Cithaeron. His army now raised to the number of about 11,000 men—nearly twice as large as that of his enemies—he moved upon Thespieae. He encamped and entrenched himself upon the extreme north-western spur of Mount Cithaeron, immediately above Leuctra, a small township south-east of Thespieae and some ten miles west of Plataea. Upon the slope on the further side of the valley lay the Thebans. There was much doubting in their ranks: of the seven Boeotarchs, three were in favour of retreating at once and submitting to a siege within Thebes, but the dogged resolution of Epameinondas at last secured for him a majority of votes, and it was decided to accept battle upon the spot. As for Cleombrotus, the Spartans in his ranks—there were seven hundred of them—urged him to strike at once and for ever to crush the arrogance of Thebes. Epameinondas set in motion every means to encourage his men. Favourable presages were brought to the camp from the national oracles of Lebadea and Thebes; and seeing close by the tomb of one Scedasus and his two maiden daughters, who had been done to death by the brutal violence of Spartans in by-gone days, Epameinondas welcomed it as an omen of victory, quoting an ancient oracle that the power of Sparta should fall upon the spot where fell the outraged maidens. But he had more reliable resources than those of superstition: he was now to put into practice those new tactics in which he had for so long been training his troops. Heretofore a Grecian battle had been a mere question of weight: the opposing forces joined issue simultaneously all along the line, and the heavier and more valourous at any point there carried the day. Manœuvring there was none to speak of. The reforms of Epameinondas mark a new era in the art of war: he converted his forces into a mobile and easily-handled machine, replacing mere weight by skill.


§ 13. The army of Cleombrotus fell in about noon, facing eastward, in the usual order: the hoplites stretched away eight deep along the slope, while the cavalry were posted in

front. Opposite lay the Thebans, seemingly in just such another line, likewise covered by their small squadrons of cavalry. It was impossible for Cleombrotus to know that Epameinondas had drawn away troops from his right and centre, and had massed them upon his left, to the unheard-of depth of fifty, and that behind this tremendous phalanx lay the Sacred Band, ready for use wherever required. Cleombrotus' design was to utilize his superior numbers by surrounding the smaller Theban force: that of Epameinondas was to concentrate his whole force upon the enemy's right, where as usual were posted the Spartans. If those were once shattered he knew that the rest of the opposing army would give him little trouble.

The battle began with a cavalry charge by the horse of Cleombrotus; but inefficient as they were numerous, these were driven back by the squadrons of Boeotian horse, and recoiled upon their own infantry, thereby creating some confusion in the line. Before they could recover and re-form their ranks, the Peloponnesian hoplites found themselves in action: the Theban phalanx was already at close quarters with the Spartans on the right, but to the bewilderment of the allies, they found themselves out of action. The right of the Theban army remained stationary, while the centre only advanced so far as to maintain the continuity between the right and left. While the Spartans were struggling desperately against the full force of the Theban charge, their flanks assailed by the Sacred Band so as to render it impossible for them to deploy to the right, the Peloponnesian allies stood idle and useless, held in check by the victorious Theban cavalry. It was not for long: Cleombrotus fell fighting, and with him Sphodrias and a dozen other captains; and the whole of the right wing broke and fled in fragments to the camp. Thither also the centre and left retreated and re-formed.

This was the first battle of Thebes with her enemy, and it was brilliantly successful. On the field lay not less than 1000 Lacedaemonians, of whom full four hundred were pure Spartiates—more than one-half of the whole number engaged; while amongst the slain there were to be found scarce any of the allies. So manifest was it that

the quarrel of Thebes was with Sparta alone. Never very enthusiastic in support of Sparta's anti-Theban bias, the allies were now less so than ever; and although the broken army even now outnumbered its conquerors, yet the surviv-



BATTLE OF LEUCTRA.

JULY 6, 371 B.C.

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| <p>A. Army of Cleombrotus:</p> <p>a. Right wing, Spartans.</p> <p>b. Centre and left, Allies.</p> <p>c. Horse.</p> | <p>B. Theban Army before the action.</p> <p>C. " " " in action.</p> <p>d. Phalanx of Epameinondas.</p> <p>e. Centre.</p> <p>f. Horse.</p> <p>g. Sacred Band under Pelopidas.</p> <p>h. Right.</p> |
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ing Spartiates dared not risk another engagement. They confessed themselves defeated, and begged the usual truce of burial. A messenger was sent to bear the evil news to Sparta, while the victorious Thebans beset the camp on all sides and challenged their foe to further combat. It was July 6, 371 B.C.

CHAPTER IX.

THE THEBAN SUPREMACY.

§ 1. Prefatory.—§ 2. Moral results of the Battle of Leuctra: Its effect upon Sparta.—§ 3. Unification of Boeotia and formation of the Theban League.—§ 4. Political results of Leuctra: Disruption of the Peloponnesian Confederacy: Renewed pretensions of Athens.—§ 5.—Designs of Epameinondas.—§ 6. First invasion of Peloponnesus: Confederation of Arcadia.—§ 7. The Thebans invade Laconia: Restoration of Messenia.—§ 8. Alliance of Athens and Sparta: Second invasion of Peloponnesus.

§ 1. THE battle of Leuctra destroyed at a blow the supremacy which Sparta had won by the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. During the three-and-thirty years which had since elapsed, she had more than once been hard pressed by the allies whom her selfishness had driven to revolt. She had lost her naval supremacy in the battle of Cnidus (395 B.C.), and after that had suffered severely in the eight years' desultory fighting of the Corinthian War. But the Peace of Antalcidas, forced on the Greeks mainly by Persian authority, had restored her again (387 B.C.), and she maintained her position until the unprincipled seizure of the Cadmea brought upon her that conflict with Thebes which culminated in her utter ruin at Leuctra.

§ 2. It is difficult to realize the feelings with which the Greek world heard of the result of this fight. The power of Sparta was broken, broken in fair field by an adversary numerically little more than half as strong, and broken for ever. That supremacy which had been slowly built up through the centuries since the first coming of the Dorians, which by long use had grown to be part and parcel of all political life in the Peloponnese, and which had recently made itself a burdensome reality over the whole of central and northern

and maritime Greece from Olynthus to Rhodes; the supremacy which had not scrupled to find allies in the barbarians of Persia and the tyrants of Syracuse; was fallen so utterly that the same army which but twenty days previously had descended upon Boeotia in the confident expectation of vengeance, was now decimated, and cooped up within its camp by the heretofore condemned soldiery of Thebes. Throughout the length and breadth of Greece the message stirred up aspirations for liberty even amongst communities that had for years obeyed the behests of Sparta as some irresistible mandate of the gods.

But the battle of Leuctra, if it threw down Sparta, involved all Greece in her ruin. The Spartan hegemony had been oppressive, bigoted, and utterly selfish, yet it was better than none at all. And now it fell indeed, but too late, for ere it fell it had wrought this mischief, that there was left no single state able to take up the position which Sparta's fall left vacant. Epameinondas dreamed of uniting all Hellas under the liberal leadership of Thebes, but Hellas was now divided beyond all unification other than that brought about by compulsion, and Thebes was not strong enough to compel it either in point of military force or in moral weight. Unity was to return only in the train of an alien conqueror. Sparta had been a reckless and unskilled pilot, yet she had contrived by fair means or foul to keep the helm under her control; after her fall the vessel of Hellenic political life drifted ever more aimlessly to ruin.

On the last day of the great festival of the Gymnopaedia the news reached Sparta: a king was slain, a whole army routed and besieged, more than a thousand Lacedaemonians lay dead side by side with four hundred of Sparta's nobility. Agesilaus might bethink him with vexation and sorrow how at length his "lame reign" had undone his people. Never in the course of history had a king of Sparta been so powerful for good or evil; none had so blindly, yet strongly, misused his power; and now he was left, the butt of a people's murmurings and superstition, to see proud Sparta thrown back within the borders of Laconia, more enfeebled than she had been since the semi-mythical age

of Lycurgus. He was to see yet worse ills than this: the "wasps" were soon to be attacked even in their nest and forced to fight for bare existence.

The Ephors suffered the festival to run its course before they proclaimed the evil news. They forbade excessive mourning for the dead; all the living of serviceable age were at once called to arms. Not the old men or the magistrates were excepted from the army with which Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, hurried to rescue the survivors of Leuctra. There joined him a sorry remnant of the Peloponnesian allies, but he dared not march by way of the Isthmus. He crossed by sea to Creusis, a Boeotian seaport on the Corinthian Gulf, and Cleombrotus' last acquisition, where he learnt that the defeated army was already retiring under treaty. He overtook it at Aegosthena in Megaris, and hurried back to Sparta. By Lycurgean law he who survived a defeat was a disgraced man, one whom the passer-by might strike if he but wore a smile, and for whom public life had henceforth no honours or rewards: what was to be done with the three hundred survivors of Leuctra, many of them born of the chief families of the state, and all of them of tenfold value to her after the loss of so many of her best warriors? To visit upon them the full penalty of Lycurgus' law would be to foment yet a new trouble and to drive them over, like so many Cinadons, to the side of the perioeas and helots, to whom Leuctra came as an omen of revenge long deferred, and a summons to strike for freedom while their masters' arms were nerveless. For once the laws must be disregarded, and by special decree the fugitives from Leuctra were spared all public recognition of their defeat.

§ 3. In the flush of their victory the Thebans thought of nothing less than destroying or taking prisoners the whole remaining Spartan force which they kept besieged in their camp beneath Cithaeron; and to this end they sent instant summons to their ally, Jason of Pherae, to bring to their aid troops sufficient to enable them to effect their purpose. In the first terror which had fallen upon all the allies of Sparta, Jason marched without hindrance across Phocis into Boeotia, and united his forces with those

of Epameinondas. But Jason was a statesman not less shrewd, if less liberal, than Epameinondas: he was rejoiced to see Sparta humbled, but he had no wish to see her place taken at once by Thebes. Thebes was to him a useful ally, but he was by no means inclined to make her too powerful to continue such. Therefore he urged that it would be better for the Thebans to dismiss their humbled foes under treaty: by so doing they would make friends amongst the Peloponnesian allies who formed the larger part of the number, would inflict upon Sparta a humiliation more lasting than any mere defeat, and would avoid heaven's wrath for an abuse of good fortune. These arguments were seconded by Epameinondas, who was too large minded a Greek to cherish the wish for petty vengeance over his fellow Greeks. Their conjoint counsels prevailed: the remnant of the Spartan army marched away by night, greatly to the satisfaction of the half-hearted allies, and the Thebans turned their wrath against those of the Boeotians who still clung to the Spartans' side. On the eve of Leuctra the Thespian contingent in the Theban ranks had taken advantage of the offer of Epameinondas to quit the field, so sure were they of Sparta's victory. Now Thespieae was rased, and its population dismissed to join the fugitive Plataeans at Athens. Only the earnest representations of Epameinondas prevented the same punishment overtaking Orchomenus: Thebes, he said, must use her new-born power well, and set an example of moderation which, by its contrast with that of Sparta, would win over the hearts of all Greeks. Orchomenus was spared. Thereafter the envoys of Thebes passed through all the states of Central Greece, proclaiming the overthrow of Spartan rule and offering in its place the more generous alliance of their own city. Acarnania, the Epicnemidian and Opuntian Locrians, Euboea, the town of Heraclea by the pass of Thermopylae, and even the Phocians, joined this league; and in token of the new era now dawning Epameinondas caused to be summoned the ancient Amphictyony of Central Greece. It met at Delphi, and its first act was to pass upon Sparta a formal condemnation for seizing the Cadmea (382 B.C.) in time of peace, and even during the celebration of a holy

festival. For this she was adjudged to pay a fine of five hundred talents. Of course Sparta took no notice of this judgment, whereupon the fine was doubled, but still remained unpaid. None the less Epameinondas had gained his object. He had proclaimed Thebes the champion of Central Greece and of the rights of the Delphian god; he had made the oracle, despite the bonds of blood and policy which united the Delphians to their fellow Dorians, subservient to his political aims, and had rid it of its old dependence upon Sparta; and he had obtained a public proclamation upon religious grounds of Sparta's wrongdoing and of the legality of Thebes' revolt against her. But this revival of the Amphictyonic assembly, and its abuse as a political agent, were destined within a generation to work havoc with the liberties of Greece, although none saw it as yet, and although Epameinondas would have scouted the charge of any such intention.

§ 4. The consolidation of the power of Thebes in Central Greece, the formation of her new alliances, and beyond all else the uncertainty of Jason's intentions, kept Epameinondas engaged until late in 370 B.C., more than a year after the battle of Leuctra. Meantime the Peloponnese was shaken from one end to the other by the party-feuds consequent upon the overthrow of Sparta, the subversion of the oligarchical governments which leaned upon her for support, and the lack of any fitting and acceptable head about whom her late allies could gather. Just as the decarchies and harmonies had disappeared from the islands and further shores of the Aegean after the battle of Cnidus and the fall of Sparta's naval supremacy, so now after Leuctra and the overthrow of her territorial power they vanished from the communities of the Peloponnesus. Only amongst the ancient Dorian settlements along the northern frontier of Argolis and about the Isthmus—at Phlius, Sicyon, Troezen, Epidaurus, Hermione, and Corinth—did Spartan influence maintain itself. The Achaeans remained impassive, while the Eleans and Arcadians became openly hostile. Even in the Dorian towns of Phlius, Corinth, and Sicyon, the philo-Spartan oligarchies had to struggle desperately for their ascendancy, and if in the Arcadian Orchomenus and

Heraclea the oligarchs were successful they remained isolated exceptions amid the general revolution in Arcadian sentiment. The leaders in the revolt against Sparta were the Mantineans, who took instant advantage of their enemies' weakness to rebuild the town which Agesipolis had destroyed (385 B.C.). Their example infected their kinsmen far and wide. For years the Arcadians had lived in their mountain country without any pretence of political unity, their petty jealousies and rooted love of independence being fostered by Spartan diplomacy as the surest guarantee of their national weakness and their subservience to her purposes. Even now Sparta's case was not wholly desperate, if but Tegea, her ancient ally in the south of Arcadia, would remain loyal. But here too the spirit of liberty asserted itself: there was a brief collision between the supporters of Sparta under Stasippus and the revolutionists, which was decided in favour of the latter by the aid of the Mantineans. Thereupon, with the exception of Orchomenus and Heraclea, the whole of Arcadia, as far as the very borders of Laconia, stood united in its new-found freedom. At Argos there occurred a sedition which, with the possible exception of the "Terror" in Corcyra during the Peloponnesian war, surpassed any heretofore known in the annals of Grecian states. From the earliest times a sworn enemy of Sparta, the city was governed at this date by an oligarchy. Alarmed for its safety by the general spread of anti-oligarchic feeling in Greece, the government was meditating repressive measures when the democratic party became suspicious. In a popular rising there were slain no less than twelve hundred of the governing class, nor did the ferocity of the revolution spend itself until it had also made victims of the very leaders who had excited it. This sedition was spoken of as the "Scytalism," from the club used as a weapon by the rioters; and it affords a notable illustration of the growing savagery of political feeling and the deterioration of Greek *morale*. At Athens the episode created so intense a disgust that the assembly, on hearing of the news, was at once ordered to be purified.

Sparta lay helpless and passive; the Thebans were still busied in Central Greece; and in the confusion which over-

whelmed smaller states Athens once more asserted herself. Already jealous of the growth of the power of Thebes before the day of Leuctra, she was doubly so when the herald brought the tidings of that great triumph. She would have nothing to do with any Theban alliance, concerning herself rather with efforts to countervail the rise of the new power upon her borders. To very few of the Greeks could the supremacy of Thebes be welcome, and Sparta was now too weak to hold her own: Athens had a splendid opportunity to win the headship over the Peloponnese, and her envoys were forthwith despatched to offer her alliance to such of the southern states as felt the need of union and the lack of a guiding power. Thus was formed early in 370 B.C. an alliance of Athens, Elis, and Argos.

§ 5. Scarcely had this alliance been concluded when Epameinondas found himself free at last to turn his attention to the Peloponnese. With his large and liberal views, he saw that he must seek to replace by another that unity which he had shattered; but whereas the union under Spartan rule had been constrained and abused, the union under Thebes was to be generous and voluntary. And to secure it, Epameinondas had to follow up the work only half completed on the field of Leuctra: he must show himself able to deal with Sparta in her own stronghold, must champion the cause of her revolted subjects even at her very gates, and must so organise the Peloponnese that she should never again be able to pose as a mistress there. He it was, doubtless, who by his assurances of support had encouraged the Arcadians to their revolt: now he set himself to unify Arcadia, and place it as one nation in the path of any further Spartan aggressions. This was one of his purposes in his southward march. Another was to penetrate even into the heart of Laconia, to Sparta the inviolate itself, and to hold up to the gaze of all her emancipated subjects the utter impotence of the state to which they had bowed down. And he had yet a third design—a design more noble, more statesmanlike, and more far-reaching than either of the others: he purposed to restore the Messenians to their homes and to their place amongst the peoples of Greece, and in so doing to rob Sparta beyond

recovery of the best portion of her soil, planting upon it men who cherished against her the hatred accumulated in two centuries of exile and servitude.

§ 6. It was time that he should show himself in the Peloponnese, for the Spartans had at length ventured to lift their heads anew. Agesilaus had taken the field against the Arcadians, more especially against the Mantineans. Too weak to prevent by force the reconstruction of the town of Mantinea, the Ephorality had in vain endeavoured to get it viewed as a voluntary concession on the part of Sparta; but when they saw the Mantineans straining every nerve to unite Arcadia in arms, when they saw their last and most loyal ally Tegea torn from them by Mantinean help, it seemed imperative to make some prohibitive demonstration. Accordingly, before the Theban army could appear, Agesilaus led his weak column into the territories of Mantinea, and for three days ravaged the country. The new town was built in such fashion that it was no longer possible to take it speedily, as Agesipolis had done, by damming up a stream, and, in any case, Agesilaus had not the time for any attempt upon it. At the first news of the advance of Epameinondas he withdrew to Sparta. So far had the glories of his people fallen that he found material for self-praise in thus having for three days wrought his will upon the crops and orchards of the handful of men of Mantinea.

When, a few days later, Epameinondas marched into Arcadia at the head of a picked army from Thebes and her new allies of Central and Northern Greece—Thessalians, Euboeans, Acarnanians, Locrians, and others—the entire levy of Arcadia, now busied with attacks upon the recalcitrant towns of Heraea and Orchomenus, flocked to his standard, and raised his whole force to a total of more than 40,000 men. The new aspirations of the Arcadians, inflamed and directed by Lycomedes of Mantinea, a wealthy and capable man, but lacking in the selflessness of a true leader, had already taken shape in the foundation of a city which was to be the capital of united Arcadia. Under the name of Megalopolis this newest of Greek cities occupied the largest plain of the central Peloponnesus, the valley

watered by the Helisson, a tributary of the Alpheus; and, lying twenty miles westward of Tegea, it blocked the outlet from Laconia by way of the Eurotas valley, as Tegea blocked that along the western slopes of Mount Parmon. To this day its ruins attest the excellence of its architects and the magnificent scale upon which it was planned. Here was the Parliament House of the new state, where was to meet the representative assembly, known as the Ten Thousand. No fewer than forty Arcadian communities sent settlers and representatives to the new city; but the unwieldy size of the assembly, while intended to emphasise the republican equality of all, soon proved fatal to any conjoint action. We cannot say how far Epameinondas was directly responsible for the creation of Megalopolis and the organisation of Arcadia: certainly the position of the city shows the judgment of a thorough statesman.

§ 7. The arrival of the army of Thebes served to stamp with the approval of that power the revolt of Arcadia. But Epameinondas had seen in the recent march of Agesilaus upon Mantinea a sign of that renewal of Spartan aggressions which it was his first object to render impossible. Seconded by the eager enthusiasm of his Arcadian allies, he now threw down the gauntlet as no leader had ever thrown it before: he crossed the northern frontier of Laconia by four different passes, and concentrated his army at Sellasia, near the eastern bank of the Eurotas, eight miles north of Sparta. Having burnt that town he moved southwards, and crossed the bridge which formed the means of communication between the eastern bank and Sparta. The Spartans were now at bay indeed. Never before had an invader violated their homeland; never had the women of Sparta seen the camp-fires of an enemy; never had the perioecæ and helots received so secure a summons to one unanimous rising against their oppressors; never had the Spartiates—the carnage of Leuctra had reduced them to less than two thousand men—been so feeble and so few. But at this crisis Agesilaus stood up to redeem the ruin which his policy had brought upon his country. His untiring energy was a match for treasons within and generalship without. The promise of manumission brought into

his ranks six thousand perioecæ and helots, and despite the numerous desertions to Epameinondas he was able to hold every approach to the unwalled city. Perhaps the Theban general had no great desire to blot out the name of Sparta for ever: he felt that he had now degraded her beyond hope of immediate recovery, and he knew that to rase her would be to bring upon himself the speedy loathing of all Greece. Nevertheless, he had made her humiliation complete, when, after crossing to the western bank of the river at Amyclæ, he suddenly turned about, not without sceing his cavalry severely handled by an ambuscade of the desperate "wasps," and marched down the whole length of the Eurotas valley, ravaging and destroying on every side. Gythium, the arsenal and port of Laconia, he took and occupied with a Theban garrison. Thence he passed westward into Messenia to carry out the third and greatest of his designs. Already he had summoned to his standard all the dispersed remnant of the Messenian nation. From Rhegium and Messene, from Hesperides in Libya, they came back burning with long-repressed patriotism and revenge; and on the slopes of Mount Ithome—the scene of their most heroic struggles in the past—he built for them anew a city to which he gave the name of Messene (370 B.C.). Under its rule passed the whole of Messenia, and with it the whole population which had remained in serfdom or subjection upon the soil of their fathers. Sparta looked on while the most fertile and largest portion of her territories was thus sundered from her, and while the genius of Epameinondas planted here a whole people sworn to resist her further aggressions for all time. Then Epameinondas withdrew towards the Isthmus, leaving the tyrant-city disarmed and beset by a cordon of united foes, whose chief fortresses were Messene, Megalopolis, Tegea, Mantinea, and Argos.

§ 8. In the interim the jealousy of the Athenians towards Thebes had given place to declared hostility. The Ephors, aware of the state of feeling in Athens, had made urgent appeals for a defensive alliance against the new power which threatened to oust both Sparta and Athens from their traditional positions. Sparta indeed had little to

offer, for her allies were now reduced to few save Corinth, Phlius, Sicyon, and the remaining Dorian towns about the Isthmus; but on the other hand she no longer made any claims to supremacy, or rather spoke of making Athens partner with her in a conjoint supremacy of Greece by land and sea. Such a prospect was agreeable enough to the Athenian ecclesia, the more as the recent attempt to organise a Peloponnesian league in the interests of Athens as against Sparta had borne no good fruit. It was decided to make common cause with Sparta; Iphicrates was ordered to take the field at once with 12,000 volunteers, at the time when Epameinondas was already ravaging Laconia. Iphicrates, however, advanced no further than Corinth, fearing to be outnumbered by the Argives and Arcadians if he pressed on towards Sparta. He did not even make any serious attempt to bar the retreat of Epameinondas by way of the Isthmus (spring of 369 B.C.): there occurred only a slight collision in which the Theban cavalry were victorious. Thence Epameinondas and his fellow Boeotarchs returned home, four months after the legal expiry of their term of office. As Epameinondas must have foreseen, they were at once threatened with impeachment for having thus illegally retained office; but the bold front with which he forestalled attack, frankly owning the illegality and eloquently showing how well he had used his opportunities, disarmed the malice of his enemies. It seems that himself and Pelopidas were again named Boeotarchs for 369 B.C.

Within a few months he invaded the Peloponnesus a second time. Athens and Sparta had by this time settled the terms of their alliance: they were to assist each other in offence and defence, and each was to have priority for alternating periods of five days both by land and by sea. The joint forces, supported by Phlius, Corinth, and other towns, had occupied the Isthmus with a view to preventing any further inroads of the Thebans by land; while the neutrality of the Achaeans, who inclined if anything to favour Sparta, rendered it no easy matter for the Thebans to reach the Peloponnesus across the Corinthian Gulf. Epameinondas was compelled therefore to show himself able to force the Isthmus, and further his presence was

needed to guarantee the unmolested completion of his work at Megalopolis and Messene. After lying for a brief while face to face with the opposing lines along Mount Oneum between Corinth and Cenchreae, he continued to surprise the Spartan and Pellenian division at daybreak, forcing them to retreat, and so rendering it no longer feasible to prevent his advance. Soon afterwards the "trimming" of the leader of the Laconising party in Sicyon put him in possession of that town—a valuable outpost for the command of the Isthmus, and a useful port for providing access, in case of need, to the Corinthian Gulf. The Spartans lay quiet, albeit reinforced by some thousands of Celtic mercenaries sent by Dionysius I. of Syracuse, and nothing occurred to interrupt the steady consolidation of the last year's work in Arcadia and Messenia. Nevertheless, the Thebans were dissatisfied with their leader's achievements, especially as, when upon the homeward march, he suffered a sharp reverse in the attempt to surprise Corinth, where Chabrias and his mercenaries again did good service for Athens. Popular favour was not more constant at Thebes than at Athens, and Epameinondas found himself passed over in the election of Boeotarchs for 368 B.C.

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CHAPTER X.

END OF THE THEBAN SUPREMACY.

§ 1. Rise of the Powers of the North: Thessaly: Jason of Pherae.—§ 2. Campaigns of Pelopidas in Thessaly.—§ 3. Arcadia disowns the Hegemony of Thebes: The Tearless Battle: Third Invasion of Peloponnesus and Secession of Achaea.—§ 4. The Greek States appeal to Persian Arbitration: Philiscus: Rejection of the Persian Rescript.—§ 5. New Combinations in Peloponnesus: Alliance of Athens and Arcadia: Elis at war with Arcadia.—§ 6. Renewed Activity of Athens at Sea: Death of Pelopidas and Reduction of Thessaly by Epameinondas.—§ 7. Dissensions in Arcadia: Fourth and last Invasion of Peloponnesus by Epameinondas: Battle of Mantinea and Death of Epameinondas.—§ 8. Pacification of 362 B.C.: Condition of the Persian Empire: Agesilaus in Egypt.—§ 9. Result of the struggle between Thebes and Sparta: Condition of Greece in 362 B.C.

§ 1. WHILE Central and Southern Greece were thus distributed, there had arisen and fallen again a new power in Northern Greece, where, for the first and last time in history, Thessaly had become a united and formidable state. Peopled by many tribes, and from of old accustomed to the government of oligarchies almost as numerous as the towns of the land, Thessaly had heretofore been famous only for the excellence and abundance of its mercenaries whether infantry or cavalry, the fertility of its corn-lands, and the sanguinary and ceaseless struggles of one oligarchy against another and of the oppressed lower classes or Penestæ against their rulers. It was with such quarrels that Aristippus and Meno, the Cyrean officers, and Critias the Athenian, had concerned themselves. Inevitably the land became exhausted, the nobles—in particular, the Aleuadae and Scopadae of Larissa and Crannon—became fewer and less powerful; until at length, about 404 B.C., one Lycophron, himself a noble, professed himself the advocate of the

popular side, made himself master of Pherae in south-western Thessaly, near the Gulf of Pagasæ (*Gulf of Volo*), and gradually extended his power over most of the land. Sparta, anxious to obtain a footing in Northern Greece and thereby to threaten the flank of Thebes as well as to break the old-time connection between Athens and the Thessalian oligarchs, aided Lycophron in his aggressions, and herself acquired considerable influence in the neighbourhood of Heraclea and Pharsalus (*Fersala*). This influence was entirely lost upon the fall of Lysander at Haliartus, and Agesilaus, when returning from Asia (395 B.C.), had some difficulty in fighting his way across Thessaly to Boeotia. The whole country was united under Lycophron, and by him bequeathed (about 390 B.C.) to his son-in-law Jason. This despot was no mean statesman, and withal a man of energy and resolution, culture and justice. He set himself steadily to weaken the old prestige of the oligarchs, to elevate the masses, and to create and foster the spirit of national union. The year 374 B.C. found him at last lord or Tagus of all Thessaly by the consent of its people. It was in this year that Sparta was compelled to decline the task of rescuing from his grasp the one remaining free city of Pharsalus. Jason next allied himself with Alcetas, prince of the Molossi, and extended his influence in Euboea. He contemplated wider plans: he intended to make himself leader of all Hellas, and to justify his claims to hegemony by leading the Greeks against Persia. The overthrow of Sparta at Leuctra seemed to offer him opportunity to assert his claim, and it was with the design of preventing the dangerous aggrandisement of Thebes by yet preserving a few of the Spartans to resist her, that he induced the Thebans to dismiss the routed army from its camp at Leuctra. At the same date he seized Heraclea and Thermopylae, so securing to himself the means of ingress into Central Greece whenever he desired it. So powerful was he now, and so thoroughly furnished with men and means, that Epameinondas awaited his next movement with great concern. Jason gave out that he would in person present himself at the Pythian games of 370 B.C.: his design was doubtless to ingratiate himself with the oracle-mongers of

Delphi, and to reassert the due preponderance of Thessaly's seven votes in the councils of the twelve Amphictyonic states. It was partly in consequence of his menacing attitude that the Thebans were so slow in taking action after the battle of Leuctra. Their apprehension was calmed by the sudden assassination of Jason in the summer of 370 B.C., when on the eve of starting for Delphi. His death left Thebes free to deal with Delphi and the Amphictyons in her own interests, and thereafter to turn her attention to Southern Greece: it for ever ruined the promise of Thessalian ascendancy.

§ 2. To Jason succeeded his brothers Polyphron and Polydorus. Polyphron murdered Polydorus and reigned a year, when he was likewise murdered by a third brother Alexander. The new despot (369 B.C.) was but a savage, and an incapable one. The oligarchs took advantage of the troubles at Pherae to renew their agitations in the various towns, turning for help to Macedonia, where another Alexander had succeeded to the throne of his father Amyntas in 370 B.C. This Macedonian Alexander was a cordial ally of Athens, which power was just now at open war with Thebes and busy with designs to extend her power in Chalcidice, and to recover her old colony of Amphipolis (*Jeni-Kevi*). The Macedonian king made himself master of Larissa and Crannon and kept them for himself. If Thebes had been glad of the fall of Jason and the ruin of the power of Pherae, she could not be content to see his place taken by the still more extensive power of Macedonia. Accordingly, in 368 B.C. Pelopidas led a Theban army into Thessaly and expelled Alexander the Macedonian, but emphatically asserted the independence of the towns which had revolted from Pherae. The union of Thessaly, the life's work of Jason, was undone, and in most cases the oligarchic families accepted the suzerainty of Thebes. Alexander of Macedonia became her ally, abandoning his Athenian allies. It was partly owing to this change of attitude in Macedonia and the menace of a wider Theban ascendancy in that quarter, partly owing to the troubles which ensued upon the assassination of Alexander in the same year (368 B.C.) and the civil war

between the rival claimants Pausanias and Ptolemaeus of Alorus, that the Athenians kept Iphicrates—whom Amyntas had adopted as his son—in commission in the northern Aegean with a considerable fleet (369—365 B.C.). Iphicrates took into his pay a certain Charidemus, an Euboean of Oreus, a captain of mercenaries; and warmly espousing the cause of Amyntas' sons, Perdicas and Philip, his own brothers by adoption, he drove out Pausanias and established Ptolemaeus as regent on behalf of Perdicas. As for the direct interests of Athens, Iphicrates seemingly advanced them but little; he failed to take Amphipolis, and was superseded in 365 B.C. by Timotheus.

The successful expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (369 B.C.) left no lasting results. In the following year Alexander of Pherae by his tyrannical conduct again necessitated Theban interference. Pelopidas was reckless enough to allow himself to be captured and imprisoned, having thought it needless to take any military force with him on this second occasion.

The Thebans at once took the field to punish Alexander and to liberate Pelopidas, but having no capable leaders—for in this year (368 B.C.) Epameinondas was no longer a Boeotarch—they found themselves in very evil case; and it was fortunate for them that Epameinondas was serving as a private soldier in their ranks. He was called to the command under pressure of this emergency, and not only rescued the embarrassed army, but being once again elected as Boeotarch (367 B.C.), he returned to Thessaly and speedily compelled Alexander to restore Pelopidas and to make unconditional submission to Thebes.

§ 3. In Peloponnesus, meanwhile, things were as far as ever from any peaceable settlement. A new element of discord was found in the attitude of the Arcadians, whose sudden rise to power bred an insolence and over-confidence which Lycomedes diligently fostered for his own ends. His ambition would not suffer him to act only as the dependent of Thebes; he reminded his countrymen of their ancient origin, their acknowledged bravery, their recent access of strength and the corresponding decrepitude of Sparta, and urged them to be subject to the will of none, but to form a

policy of their own. The success attending a foray into the territory of Epidaurus, and the capture of Asine, on the western shore of the Messenian Gulf, from its Spartan garrison, increased the national pride and made the attitude of the Ten Thousand towards Sparta still more intolerable. At length, in the year when Epameinondas was no longer Boeotarch (368 B.C.), Archidamus, one of the Spartan kings, struck a blow for his country's honour: he entered Arcadia, ravaged the lands of the Parrhasians, and took Caryae. Amongst his forces were again some thousands of Celtic mercenaries, furnished by Dionysius II., who had succeeded to the despotism of Syracuse in this year. These troops presently told Archidamus that their time of service had expired, and betook themselves back to Sparta. While on the march they were beset by the Arcadians, and compelled to summon Archidamus to the rescue. The latter at once presented himself, and at Midea inflicted a bloody defeat upon his insolent enemies without the loss—so it was said—of a single Lacedaemonian. This was the celebrated "Tearless Battle." Rebuffed in this quarter the Arcadians next picked a quarrel with a less formidable enemy, Elis. The Eleans had not forgotten the losses inflicted upon them by Agis in 400 B.C., and they had taken occasion in Sparta's abasement to reassert their claim to dominion over Lepreum, a town of Triphylia near the river Neda. That town, in reply, declared itself a member of the Arcadian League, and the forces of Arcadia were placed at its service. Thus was destroyed the unity of the anti-Spartan coalition which Epameinondas had laboured to establish. With a view to checking the evil while there was yet time, he presented himself for the third time in the Peloponnesus in 357 B.C., the year in which he had rescued Pelopidas in Thessaly. He effected little, however, for the Arcadians declined to subserve his views at all, while Lycomedes loudly declared that Thebes' sole aim was to set up in the Arcadian towns a military tyranny such as had been that of Sparta, finding to support his assertions an instance in the fact that a Theban garrison was now in occupation of Tegea. But Epameinondas controlled his chagrin, and turned his attention to another matter which might be arranged without

recourse to arms: he entered into negotiations with the neutral Achaeans, and by dint of diplomacy alone induced the whole country to enroll itself on the side of Thebes. With this he was content, even guaranteeing to each township its traditional oligarchic government. But his moderation was anything but pleasing to his enemies at home, and furnished a fresh plea for intrigues against him. He was accused, by a leading orator named Meneleidas, of connivance with oligarchism, that is, with Spartan methods of policy, and paid the penalty of his honourable tolerance by being again ousted from the board of Boeotarchs (366 B.C.). Events proved that Epameinondas was in the right, for after the Achaean oligarchs were expelled by the forward party in Thebes, they seized the government again, and in retaliation entered warmly into the views of Sparta.

§ 4. At this date the Satrap of Phrygia was one Ariobarzanes, a man whose doubtful loyalty to his sovereign, and a personal friendship for Antalcidas, made him both willing and anxious to "Laconise": he knew how the Spartans had fought under Agesilaus, and he hoped to purchase their aid in his meditated revolt from Persia. The humiliation of Sparta after the battle of Leuctra and the restoration of Messenia were acceptable to him only as affording occasion for his intervention. Accordingly, in the year 368 B.C., he despatched his agent, a Greek of Abydus named Philiscus, to lay his views before the assembled Greeks at Delphi. We do not know whether Ariobarzanes had any authority for so doing from the Great King; but the European Greeks, now accustomed to look upon Persia as arbiter of their destinies, readily assembled at Delphi to discuss the terms of a general pacification. Now as the Satrap's purpose was only to buy Spartan support for himself, and as such support was useless unless Sparta were raised again from her present condition of helplessness, Philiscus was instructed to make it a prime article in the peace that Messenia should be restored to Sparta. Needless to say, the Thebans would not hear of such a course: they could not voluntarily throw away the chief gain of their past struggles. The negotiations came to nothing. Philiscus, who was accompanied by two thousand well-paid mer-

cenaries, handed them over to Sparta and returned home, while the Greeks again betook themselves to their unending feuds. The only solid result of Philiscus' efforts was that Thebes was now looked upon by many of the Grecian states as selfishly disturbing and preventing the peace.

Nevertheless, the matter had awaked anew the old spirit of lip-service towards Persia. Sparta diligently made the most of the preference still supposed to be hers in virtue of the Peaces of Antalcidas and of Callias; so that, to counteract her intrigues, there was sent up to Susa (367 B.C.) a joint embassy from all the leading states now at war. From Athens went Timagoras and Leon, from Arcadia Antiochus, from Elis Archidamus, and from Thebes Pelopidas. The result of the mission was not long in doubt: Pelopidas, as much by his personal qualities as from Artaxerxes' secret dislike of Sparta, easily prevailed upon the Great King to take the Theban view of the situation; especially as it was now manifest that Sparta was a ruined state, that Thebes was the strongest power in Greece, and that in aiding her Persia might seem only to be requiting past services rendered in the days of the Persian wars. For each and all of these reasons the Great King sent down the rescript: Messenia was to be recognised as a free and independent state, and on this understanding the Greeks were to come to terms. Further, lest the reviving naval power of Athens should stand in the way of Thebes—or of Persia, it would seem—the Athenians were ordered to dismantle their fleet of war, and to recognise Amphipolis as under the protection of the Great King.

But of this rescript also there came no good. The Arcadians would have none of Theban supremacy; the Athenians vented their indignation by putting to death Timagoras; the only parties pleased were the Messenians, Eleans, and Thebans. A new congress was forthwith called at Thebes; the rescript was laid before the envoys, and all refused to swear to it. In particular, the violence of Lycomedes, and his obstinate anti-Theban feeling, led to the open secession of the Arcadians. Nor was Thebes more successful in inducing each state to swear to the peace

severally. Corinth led the way in declining this proposal, and the whole scheme of pacification fell through (366 B.C.).

§ 5. In Peloponnesus the good understanding between the allies was rapidly disappearing. The Arcadians took particular offence at Epameinondas' tolerant treatment of the Achaeans: they demanded that the oligarchic families should be expelled and the various townships placed under trustworthy popular governments. To satisfy their demands, the arrangements of Epameinondas were reversed and violent revolutions were carried out in Achaea, with the result that the expelled nobles banded together and avenged themselves by ravaging Arcadia. Similarly at Sicyon, where also the statesmanship of Epameinondas had made no change in the existing order of things, a popular revolution was carried out at the suggestion of one Euphron. This man had been the leader of the Laconising party in Sicyon: he now professed ardent Theban sympathies, and thereby made himself despot. Having now, he thought, no further need of Thebes, he so far disregarded his interests as to bring himself into trouble: he was expelled and surrendered the port of Sicyon to Sparta, then appealed to Athens, failed in an attempt to surprise the town by Athenian aid, and finally presented himself at Thebes with a view to ingratiating himself with that state once more. He was assassinated by some Sicyonians in the Cadmea. The assassins were acquitted by the Theban courts and honoured as tyrannicides.

Athens had of late been intent upon the recovery of her maritime ascendancy only, Iphicrates being still on service about the Chersonese, though she showed but little energy in her efforts. There now occurred an event which once again involved her actively in the politics of the Peloponnesus. The town of Oropus on the northern border of Attica, near the mouth of the Asopus, albeit nominally belonging to Athens, had for long been a bone of contention between herself and Thebes. Now Epameinondas had not failed to observe the renewed pretensions of Athens by sea, and he had become convinced that Thebes, if she would ever come to a definite arrangement with Athens, must herself take to the seas. For such a purpose the possession

of Oropus was highly important. He prevailed upon certain Eretrians—Euboea as a whole was friendly to Thebes—to seize Oropus, and forthwith occupied it with a Theban garrison. The immediate result was that Athens was again roused to active hostility. The fact was welcome to Lycomedes, whose conduct at the recent congress had laid him open to attack from Thebes: he represented that it would be well for Athens and Arcadia to combine against the common enemy, and speedily concluded an alliance. So little had the unification of Arcadia been of profit to Thebes. But the alliance of Athens and Arcadia turned indirectly to the advantage of Thebes in the following way: in order to secure her communications with Arcadia, Athens resolved to surprise Corinth. The plot miscarried, and Corinth at once opened negotiations with Thebes for an independent peace. Of course the alliance of Athens with Arcadia had practically abrogated her pre-existing alliance with Sparta, and there was hope that Sparta also would do as Corinth did. The Messenian question, however, stood in the way again: Sparta held aloof, while Corinth and Phlius concluded peace with Thebes upon the *status quo*. Phlius indeed had no alternative; she had for years suffered heavily from the enmity of the Arcadians, and as Sparta could no longer protect her, she was compelled to seek protection from Thebes.

Lycomedes was slain by some Arcadian exiles as he was returning from Athens, and thereupon the Elcans resumed their pretensions to the possession of the places taken from them by Sparta in 400 B.C. But they made no progress: they failed to take Lasium, which was a member of the Arcadian League, and found themselves beaten back to Olympia, while even here their position was menaced by internal feuds. The warfare went on throughout the year 365 B.C. In the next year recurred the Olympic festival, and the Eleans strained every nerve to secure their authority as presidents of the festival. The Arcadians, however, were too strong for them: the festival was duly celebrated under Arcadian protection by the Pisatans, whose prerogative the presidency had been in ancient times; and all the efforts of the Eleans to drive out the usurpers were futile.

§ 6. Further and further spread the warfare. Ariobarzanes revolted from Persia in 366 B.C., whereupon Athens, seeing her way to new acquisitions on the Asiatic coast, despatched to his aid Timotheus, who annexed Samos, and also obtained, by grant of the satrap, possession of Sestus and Crithote in the Thracian Chersonese, and command of the Hellespont. With similar objects Sparta despatched Agesilaus to Asia, albeit without any army; and his success in staving off from the revolted Ariobarzanes the hostility of Mausolus, prince of Caria, and of Autophradates, Satrap of Lydia, was rewarded by the welcome grant of a considerable sum of money with which he returned home. From the Chersonese Timotheus sailed onward to Chalcidice, where he superseded Iphicrates, entered into alliance with Perdiccas, who in this year succeeded to the throne of Macedonia (365 B.C.), and with his aid captured Potidaea, Pydna, Methone, and other Chalcidic towns. It was directly in consequence of his successes here that at length, in 363 B.C., the Thebans equipped and sent out a fleet of one hundred sail under Epameinondas. As might have been foreseen it effected little, nor did circumstances allow it again to take the sea.

Alexander of Pherae had used the past few years (367—364 B.C.) in steadily extending his power in Thessaly; so that by this time he was lord of all the southern portion of the country, and especially of Phthiotis and Magnesia. His tyranny was of the worst description, and while by land he spared no force or outrage to extend yet further his possessions as against the Aleuadae and Scopadae and their kin, he was enabled, by means of his port of Pagasae and his command of the Maliac Gulf, to obtain no inconsiderable power at sea. Moreover he was in alliance with Athens, and the union of the two navies was doubtless felt heavily by the Boeotian coast towns. Policy demanded that Alexander should be repressed, and the excuse was readily found in the prayers of those whom he had expelled from Thessaly, and who appealed to Thebes for redress. In 364 B.C. Pelopidas took the field with but a small force, relying on the support of the malcontent Thessalians. At Pharsalus he collected a considerable number of these, and

at Cynoscephalae, near Scotussa, he gave battle to Alexander who was in command of an army far more numerous. A stubborn conflict ended in the rout of Alexander, but Pelopidas fell in the moment of victory. He had caught sight of his enemy in the battle, and rushing forward almost alone to take revenge upon the man who had once imprisoned him, he was cut down by the king's guards. So fell one of the two men who built up and maintained the power of Thebes, and bitter was the mourning for him. Though not of so lofty a character as Epameinondas, he was yet a hero, and he had been more successful than Epameinondas in retaining unaltered the affections of his people. From 378 B.C., when he led the liberation of Thebes from the Spartans, to the date of his death he had been annually, and without canvass, re-elected to the office of Boeotarch. His death was speedily and fully avenged: a Theban force of 7000 men overran the whole of Alexander's domains, shut up the king within Pherae, compelled him to free the subject towns, to renounce his alliance with Athens, and to swear unconditional allegiance to Thebes. All Thessaly was likewise enrolled amongst the allies of Thebes (364 B.C.). In the year 359 B.C. Alexander was murdered by his wife.

§ 7. The violence by which the Arcadians had maintained themselves at Olympia brought them no good. Finding the immense treasures of the sacred precincts now at their mercy, at a time when they were hard pressed to procure funds for their troops, the more headstrong leaders of the Arcadians laid hands upon the spoils. This proceeding smote the conscience of many of the Arcadians, and even the Ten Thousand condemned it; while the Mantineans, long since jealous of their old enemies the Tegeatans, formally seceded from the league. The dispute was fomented by the aristocratic party whom the formation of the league had thrust from power, and by the close of 363 B.C. the whole of Arcadia was divided into two hostile camps: on the one side the Mantineans conjointly with the oligarchs, denouncing the sacrilege, proclaimed themselves the peace party, and made terms with Elis; on the other the national or war party, centred at Tegea and Megalopolis, strove to

reduce the others by force. The peace party made overtures to Sparta; the war party to Thebes. If the union of Arcadia was to be maintained, and if Sparta was to be prevented from recovering her power in the Peloponnese, it was imperative that Thebes should interfere. Accordingly in 362 B.C. Epameinondas invaded the Peloponnese for the fourth and last time, at the head of a splendid army of Thebans, Euboeans, and Thessalians. He made his headquarters at Tegea, where he was joined by contingents from Argos and Messene, and from such of the Arcadians as represented the war party—the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, and others.

As leaders in the Arcadian schism the Mantineans were the primary object of attack, and into their territories accordingly mustered the forces of the Arcadian peace-party, the exiles from Achaea, the Eleans, and the Spartans. It was expected that Epameinondas would at once march thither, and the consternation amongst the Spartan contingent was great when the news reached them that the whole Theban army had marched across their rear into Laconia, and was in full movement upon Sparta. By dint of forced marches, however, Sparta was warned in time: when Epameinondas for the second time came in sight of the city he found its streets barricaded, and every preparation made for a desperate resistance. Disappointed in his design of surprising the city, and so compelling the Spartans to accept terms, he drew off his army as if to return to Tegea. But this again was only a feint. He despatched his horsemen direct to Mantinea, now partially denuded of defenders, hoping at any rate to surprise that town. Again chance disappointed him: a body of Athenian cavalry had happened to arrive at Mantinea just at the moment when the Thebans rode up, and in the skirmish which ensued the Thebans were worsted. The *contretemps* gave time for the allies of the Mantineans again to concentrate upon that town, and there Epameinondas found them when he at length advanced from Tegea.

Although both sides expected the battle which ensued, the manoeuvres of Epameinondas, who seemed anxious to avoid a collision, enabled him suddenly to take his enemies

off their guard. Thinking that he intended to wait until the morrow, the Lacedaemonians and their allies fell out of line and proceeded to make preparations for a bivouac. They lay in the order of battle: on the right the Mantineans, next them the Spartans and Eleans, then the Achaeans, and on the left the Athenians. In all they numbered 20,000 foot and 2000 horse to the 30,000 foot and 2000 horse of the enemy. Suddenly they saw the Theban army, which they had momentarily expected to see fall out, take up their arms and advance. There was scarce time to reform the line when the enemy was upon them. The tactics of Epameinondas were identical with those which he had practised at Leuctra. The right and centre of his line, formed of his various allies, were drawn up in the usual phalanx of from four to eight deep; while his left wing, where stood the Thebans themselves, and which had but a moment before presented merely the same arrangement, was suddenly caused to wheel inward to the right and to face to the front, thereby presenting a narrow column of but few shields in width but of at least fifty in depth. At the same instant the Theban horse, likewise arranged in unusual depth, charged down upon the cavalry covering the enemy's right and drove them from the field. Hard in their track came the hoplites of Thebes, here as at Leuctra far in advance of the rest of their line, and like a wedge they drove by sheer weight through the disordered and slender line of the Mantineans and Lacedaemonians. The struggle was brief, if bloody: the entire right and right-centre of the line gave way in rout, while the opposing ranks in other parts of the field had as yet scarcely joined issue. But suddenly the victorious Thebans wavered and came to a halt, leaving their flying foes to escape at will and unharmed. No hand was lifted to complete the victory, for the army was without a leader. Pierced by a spear in the breast as he led the charge Epameinondas had been carried dying from the field. When he recovered consciousness he asked whether his shield was safe—to lose his shield was the crowning disgrace of a Greek soldier. "Yes," they told him. "And the victory?" "It is yours," he was told. His surgeon

examined the wound and told him that, once the spear-head was withdrawn, he must die. Then he asked to see the two most capable officers with whom he had gone into the fight, Iolaidas and Diophantus. Both were dead. "You must make peace," he said to those who surrounded him, and drawing the shaft from the wound he quietly died upon the field which had seen him a second time triumph over Sparta in fair fight. The date is June, 362 B.C.

And with Epameinondas passed away the might of Thebes. Rarely has one man made his state so great in so brief a space, and never did a great state so speedily fall away upon the loss of its leader. He it was whose force of will had nerved her citizens, whose humanity had moderated their passions for good in the height of their successes, whose insight had sought to raise them up as the new leaders of Greece in the place of the Spartans whom he alone had been able to conquer. After him there was no Theban like him, nor any Greek indeed—brave, chivalrous, humane, a soldier and a statesman and an orator, "truest friend and noblest foe," he was the embodiment of Theban glory as Pericles had embodied that of Athens. But his time had been too short to train up a state which might hold together even for a little while when he was gone. They buried him where he died, and only time was to show how real was their mourning for his loss.

§ 8. How helpless the Thebans felt without their late leader is shown by the fact that they forthwith agreed to a peace which included the whole of the belligerents—practically the whole of Greece. The terms were simple: it was a general recognition of the *status quo*, and therefore a recognition of the independence of both Megalopolis and Messene. Sparta alone resisted the pacification, but alone she could effect nothing. The peace was sworn, and the Thebans and their allies were disbanded.

If the battle of Leuctra had left Greece in confusion by reason of the lack of any leading state, doubly worse was the confusion after the battle of Mantinea. For Thebes soon fell from the position to which the individuality of Epameinondas and Pelopidas had raised her. True, in the following year (361 B.C.) a Theban force under Pammenes

entered the Peloponnese again to reaffirm the independence of Megalopolis and the union of Arcadia; but there was no cohesion even in Arcadia, and henceforth there was constant war between Sparta in her isolation on the one hand, and on the other Messene, Megalopolis, and Argos. The jealousy of these opposing factions was destined to work the ruin of Greece within thirty years.

Sparta struggled on, but she had few men and no money. To gain the latter King Agisilaus in 361 B.C. undertook to lead a Spartan force to act on behalf of Tachos, the rebel king of Egypt, who had for some years been in revolt against Persia, and was just then threatened by a formidable invading army. The whole Persian empire indeed was in a state of collapse. The satraps of the Hellespont, Pisidia, Caria, together with Phoenicia, Syria, and Egypt, were all in open revolt or on the way to it. As usual, however, there was no cohesion and little fidelity amongst the revolted. One satrap betrayed another, then revolted again only to be himself betrayed; and thanks to the final treachery of Orontes, satrap of Mysia, Artaxerxes was at last able to bring up his full force against Egypt. Tachos knew the value of Greek troops and was anxious to hire all he could, and to secure the services of the Spartan Agisilaus and the Athenian Chabrias, the two most redoubtable captains of the time on land and sea respectively, he might reasonably be prepared to pay highly. Chabrias went as a volunteer, and before long he was recalled by Athens lest his presence in Egypt should lead to trouble with the Great King. Agisilaus, on the other hand, went with the full sanction of Sparta, the Spartans being annoyed with Artaxerxes for his lately expressed approval of the autonomy of Messenia. But on arriving in Egypt Agisilaus found himself treated with such scant respect that he transferred his services to Nectanebis, a cousin of Tachos and a rival claimant to the Egyptian throne. He succeeded in overthrowing Tachos, and in reward for this Nectanebis gave him nearly three hundred talents. But Agisilaus did not live to carry the money home. He died on the coast of Libya while preparing to sail. He was eighty-four years of age. He had ascended

the throne when Sparta was at her greatest power; he died only when it was at its smallest.

§ 9. It had been the aim of Epameinondas to unify the states of Greece. When now, after a lengthy trial, it had been proved that such unification could never be effected by Sparta and Spartan methods, he determined to make the attempt by methods of his own, and in the name of Thebes. It was to clear the way that he found it needful to beat back the arms and the pretensions of Sparta within her own borders, that they might not stand in the path of this new policy. He crushed Sparta, but nevertheless he failed of his purpose: he could not unify the divergent elements of the empire which he had overthrown; nor even had he lived to prosecute his aims for a far longer space, is it likely that he would have succeeded. The reasons for his failure lay not in himself, but in the Greeks with whom he had to deal.

And not only did he not succeed in his dream of reorganizing the Greek states, and so giving to them a new lease of life and power: he actually hastened their downfall, little as he would have desired it; for in destroying for ever the power of Sparta he had removed the only influence which still worked for the cohesion of Greece. Sad as was the ruin of the Spartan Empire—of Greece, that is to say—after the shock of Leuctra, the ruin which followed Mantinea was far more pitiable. Three powers—Athens, Sparta, and Thebes—had in turn essayed in as many different ways to centralize and combine the Greek states, and to build up a national unity; and each had failed, by reason of either her own incompetency or the incompetency of others, or both. There was no longer left a state of such strength, traditional or real, as to command the respect of the rest: those which had once been strong were worn out by suicidal struggles, and there being none fit to lead, there was anarchy everywhere. Even the renewed Athenian Confederacy, the sorry copy of the once great Delian League, was doomed to fall to pieces within a few years, and within a generation all Greece was destined to submit to the arms of Macedonia. This, the force of an alien conqueror, was the only means to secure

Greek unity which was as yet untried, and it was the only means which succeeded; and if one must regret that Greece could no longer be free, one may find some small consolation in the thought that she did not surrender her freedom until there were no longer any for whose sake it was worth preserving. The greatness of Sparta, of Thebes, and of Athens were all things of the past when at last those cities ceased to be free.

After Mantinea, then, follows the last period of the History of Greece—the period of her fall. The series of events which led thereto commenced indeed upon the day when the young Philip came to Thebes as a hostage for the behaviour of those very Macedonians whom he was soon to lead thither as a conqueror; and by a bitter irony, it was to the patriot Epameinondas that the conqueror owed much of his means of conquest. But none the less the date of Mantinea marks an epoch in Greek History as clear as that signalized by the fall of Athens. The forty years preceding the battle of Mantinea tell the story of her decline: the forty years which follow it narrate that of her fall.

CHAPTER XI.

LITERATURE, 404—362 B.C.

§ 1. Xenophon. — § 2. The Sophists. — § 3. Socrates. — § 4. His philosophy: the Dialectic Method. — § 5. Plato: his life and work. — § 6. The Orators: Lysias, Isocrates, Isacus.

§ 1. OF literature in the more limited sense of the word there is little in this period. The great tragedians died at the close of the preceding period, leaving behind them no worthy successors. Aristophanes lived longer, but he too found no capable heirs. Other forms of poetry—lyric and epic verse—had long been extinct. The elder generation knew only one other form of composition, that of historical prose, and of this also the greatest master was gone when Thucydides died. He left in Xenophon a successor indeed, but a poor one. The new generation, however, found at length a new use for prose, and in producing his *Dialogues*, Plato gave to the world what may reasonably be called the most charming form of Greek prose existing, if not the most charming of all prose whatever. Xenophon and Plato are the two names of the literature properly so-called of this period; but it is impossible to speak of Plato without speaking also of his great master Socrates, and of Socrates' forerunners the Sophists, albeit he did not write, nor have they left, any written compositions.

Xenophon, son of Gryllus, was an Athenian citizen. The date of his birth is uncertain: according to one legend, Socrates saved his life at the battle of Delium, 424 B.C., in which case he must have been born before 440 B.C. It is more probable that the date lies between 435 B.C. and 431 B.C., which would make him about thirty at the time of

the Expedition of the Ten Thousand, and this is borne out by allusions in the *Anabasis* to his youth. His family seems to have been wealthy. As a boy he was remarkable for a personal beauty and a modest bearing which attracted the notice of Socrates, the philosopher. Xenophon became his pupil and friend, and probably derived from him his dislike for the Athenian form of government. He does not seem to have taken any active part in the politics of his city, and he readily accepted the invitation to join Cyrus' expedition in 401 B.C. With Cyrus he fought at Cunaxa, and being elected leader of the Greek troops in the army, he led them through the whole of their homeward march to Byzantium, and captained them later in the service of Seuthes, king of Thrace, who promised him his daughter in marriage, but broke his word. After the somewhat disastrous end of this service, Xenophon, almost poorer than before, enriched himself by plundering the extensive possessions of Ardates, a Persian noble. He then handed over his troops to Thibron, and according to some accounts returned to Greece. It was probably about this time that he suffered sentence of banishment from Athens, on a charge of Laconism, a charge brought against him as a notorious adherent of the hated Cyrus, who had been the steady friend of Sparta. He possibly served under Agesilaus in Asia, 396-394 B.C., as he certainly did against the allied Thebans and Athenians whom Agesilaus defeated at Coronea (394 B.C.). He had probably married a year or two before; he had two sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, the former of whom was killed at the battle of Mantinea, 362 B.C.

About 387 B.C. he settled at Scillus in Elis, where he lived for nearly twenty years, amusing himself with writing and hunting. There is no evidence that he ever returned to Athens, although the sentence of banishment was repealed. He seems to have gone to Corinth after leaving Scillus, and probably resided there till his death, which took place about 355 B.C.

The works of Xenophon deal with history, sport, politics, and economics. His historical works are the *Anabasis*, the *Hellenica*, the *Cyropaedia*, and the *Agesilaus*. The *Anabasis*

deals with the expedition and return of the Ten Thousand; the *Hellenica* is a continuation of the history of Thucydides, covering the period between 411 B.C. and 362 B.C.; the *Cyropaedia* is a sort of historical romance dealing with the history of the elder Cyrus, written rather with the intention of setting forth the character of a just prince of a perfect state and of the ideal education, than of producing a historical work; the *Agesilaus* is a biography of his friend and fellow-soldier Agesilaus, king of Sparta. The next important group of his works comprises the three that deal with the character of Socrates: the *Memorabilia*, the *Apology of Socrates*, and the *Symposium*. The *Memorabilia* is an attempt to defend Socrates from the charge of irreligion, by relating various conversations in which he inculcated moral truths, and by showing his general mode of life. The *Apology* (or Defence) of Socrates is probably not the work of Xenophon. The *Symposium* is a discussion on love and friendship. Of a similar style is the *Hiero*, a dialogue on the advantages and drawbacks of high position. His works on sport, etc., are the *Hipparchicus*, a treatise on the duties of a cavalry officer; the *Hippice*, or *De Re Equestri*, a comprehensive treatise on horsemanship and the horse; and the *Cynegeticus*, a treatise on hunting and the breeding and training of dogs. His political works are the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*, the *Polity of the Athenians*, and the *Prosodi*, or *De Vectigalibus*. The first two are often considered spurious: they contrast the institutions of Sparta and Athens to the disadvantage of the latter. The *Prosodi* is a treatise on the revenues of Athens, and a late work. Finally, the *Oeconomicus*, a dialogue on the administration of a household, is one of the most pleasing of Xenophon's works, and gives a picture of the relations of husband and wife in an ideal Greek household.

§ 2. To understand the position of Socrates it is needful to grasp the position and attitude of his precursors the Sophists so-called, Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias, and others. The term "Sophist" is one which originally expressed any sort of mental or artistic skill (e.g. Solon, Pythagoras, and the Seven Wise Men were all thus labelled), but which, somewhat after about 450 B.C., became

the special name for a class of migratory professional teachers who sprang up in Hellas. The Sophists popularized whatever positive results in the way of knowledge their predecessors had attained; or rather, perhaps, finding little agreement existing in regard of the *speculative* matters heretofore discussed, they put such things aside, and turned their attention to giving well-to-do young men a *practical* education such as would enable them to get on in life. They were Lecturers who gave instruction in the subjects of the day, and professed to teach men the art of expressing their thoughts with a view to convincing others—the most acceptable gift of the politicians of the time. What men thought did not so much matter, for there was no such thing as universal truth; but what each man thought to be true or right was right and true *for him*. This notion was the one common point in their teaching which enables us to speak of them collectively as Sophists. As a consequence of this theory they declined to accept the received ideas about God, morality, scientific truth, etc., not merely because there were no such common notions existing at the time, but also because there could not, as they thought, be any such common notions.

As professors of wisdom without the reality, as men who made the worse cause appear the better, and as, moreover, taking money for their teaching (the second point common to the Sophists), the Sophists were attacked by later and sounder philosophers, and thus acquired a bad name, in which respect the earlier Sophists, whom Plato himself speaks of with respect as original thinkers, were jumbled up with more or less unprincipled purveyors of second-hand knowledge who came after them. Yet it is amongst these earlier Sophists that Socrates must be ranged, so far as regards his contemporaries. He did *not* take money for instruction; he *did* hold that beneath men's conflicting opinions there lay a basis of truth, which it was the chief duty of man to discover: none the less, in so far as he made men think out the grounds of their traditional belief, and stimulated thought at Athens as his fellows did wherever they went, he was a Sophist. That he was a positive teacher, not a negative critic, did not strike Aristophanes

and the normal Athenian: to them he was not, as to us, the Inspirer of all Philosophy since his time.

§ 3. The philosopher Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, a statuary, and Phaenarete, a midwife, was born in the deme Alopecce, just outside Athens, somewhere between the years 471 and 469 B.C. Commencing life as a sculptor, he soon abandoned this profession, and betook himself to the task of educating others, a duty which he considered was imposed upon him by Heaven. He served with distinction in several campaigns, and was present at the siege of Potidaea (432—429 B.C.), at Delium (424 B.C.), and at Amphipolis (422 B.C.). His upright and fearless character was strikingly shown on two important occasions: as one of the Prytans during the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae (406 B.C.) he was the foremost opponent of the motion which proposed to try them in a body, and persevered in his resolution though deserted by all his colleagues. Again, when ordered by the Thirty (404 B.C.) to go to Salamis along with four others to bring back Leon, he obstinately refused to take part in this disgraceful act. Alcibiades, Critias, and many others of the eminent men of the day reckoned him as their friend.

In 399 B.C. he was accused by Meletus a poet, Anytus a wealthy tanner, and Lycon a rhetorician, of irreligion and immorality: "he did not worship the gods worshipped by the state, but had introduced other strange deities; and he corrupted the youth." The first charge was based upon the fact that Socrates refused to accept that portion of the Greek mythology which attributed immorality and base passions to the gods. The subsidiary charge as to religious innovation had reference to the special prophetic warning voice which bade him refrain from any wrong act he was about to commit. This, however—whatever it was—was no deity: Socrates himself speaks of it as *δαμόνιον* or *δαμόνιον σημεῖον*. The second count in the indictment rested upon several circumstances: Alcibiades and Critias were friends of his; the state institutions were brought into evil repute, it was said, by his doctrines; obedience to himself rather than to their parents was inculcated in the youthful circle that came to listen to him.

These charges served as a peg for his enemies to hang their hatred on; and these enemies were not few in number. His habit of interrogating others and reducing them to self-contradiction, his interference in the business of other people, combined with various political causes, had made him an object of dislike to many. We see an example of his unpopularity in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, where he is regarded as a Sophist. The trial resulted in his condemnation by 281 votes to 220. The high tone of his defence irritated his judges; for when he might have escaped with a slight penalty by making a moderate counter-proposition to the punishment of death demanded by his accusers, instead of doing so, he claimed a reward for the benefits he had conferred upon the state; and, though induced at last to offer to submit to the trifling penalty of thirty minae, plainly showed that he regarded the issue with indifference. He was accordingly condemned to drink the hemlock by a heavier majority of dicasts than had found him guilty, nor would he make any attempt to escape death.

§ 4. The philosophy of Socrates was the philosophy of criticism, and the peculiar method in which he pushed his investigations by question and answer in the fashion of ordinary conversation became in the hands of Plato a most formidable instrument for the discovery of truth—the Dialectic Method. It was in fact the first attempt at a scientific method, and it was Socrates' greatest achievement that he was the first to appreciate and point out its efficacy. His second great accomplishment was this: he drew men's attention away from the futile, because unscientific, speculations in physical philosophy which had engrossed the attention of all the so-called philosophers from Thales' day onwards, and turned their thoughts towards ethical philosophy. He was in fact the founder of the science of Ethics—the science of the foundations and principles of right conduct; and in that he invented a true method of dealing with this and all subjects, he was in another sense the founder of *all* philosophy. But it must be borne in mind that he taught no dogmas, unless indeed we accept as such his assumption—a mistaken assumption—that “all Virtue is Knowledge.” Neither Socrates nor the Sophists had any system to teach,

and thus far they were alike; but whereas the “sophistries” of the latter led only to universal scepticism and despair, the inquiries of Socrates stimulated men to the belief that there was attainable a measure of knowledge and truth and led them on to find it. The Sophists' criticism was destructive; that of Socrates was constructive. The teaching of Socrates bore speedy fruit. Half-a-dozen divergent schools sprang more or less directly from his personal influence, each centring itself upon one point only of his many-sided intellectual activity, and therefore for the most part incomplete or even false in its teaching. The School which adopted and developed the essential and vivifying elements of the Socratic mind was that of which Plato became the leader.

§ 5. Plato was born at Athens, or possibly Aegina, in the year 428 B.C. His parentage was noble: his father's family traced its line back to Codrus, whilst on his mother's side he claimed descent from Solon. It is said that his real name was Aristocles, and that it was either his fluency of speech or the breadth of his chest which won him the name of *Plato*. He was carefully educated, and was reputed a keen scholar. His life falls naturally into three divisions. In his twentieth year he came under the influence of Socrates, and, like his brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, sat at the feet of that teacher till the latter's execution in 399 B.C. There is little doubt that this act completed the disgust with which the unsettled state of politics at Athens since 415 B.C. had already inspired Plato, and contributed to turn his thoughts to the excogitation of an ideal state which should be free from the faults of the constitutions which he saw around him. On the death of his master he lived for some time at Megara. In the course of his wanderings thence he reached Cyrene and Magna Graecia, where he found flourishing two pre-Socratic schools of thought, both of which influenced his mind very considerably: to the Pythagoreans is due not only much of his mysticism, but also of his fondness for mathematics; to the Eleatics he was indebted for the conception of the *reality* underlying that ceaseless *flux* which was, in Heracleitus' view, the only form of existence. It was under these influences that

Plato conjoined to the ethical ideas he had drawn from Socrates the beginnings of a system of logic, physics, and metaphysics which he gradually blended together into an harmonious whole.

Returning to Athens in 387 B.C., he was at once recognized as the greatest of the thinkers of his time. For forty years he there resided, giving free public lectures, both in the garden of his own house at Colonus, and in the Academy, a gymnasium about a mile to the north-west of the city, whence his followers took the name of the *Academic* School, or the *Academy*. These were not exactly formal lectures, but rather conversations like those in which Socrates sought to "bring men's thoughts to the birth by means of question and answer." Probably his deeper teaching at home to his more intimate disciples, took more of the shape of that professorial discourse which his writings, at first pure dialogues, tended more and more to assume. Amongst this inner circle of his disciples was Aristotle, whom Plato called "the Intellect of his School," and who, after his master's death, founded the School which was called the *Peripatetic*. Plato's residence at Athens was interrupted by two visits to Sicily. On an earlier occasion, in 387 B.C., he is said to have been at first kindly received at Syracuse by its despot, Dionysius the Elder, but to have been afterwards sold into slavery, from which he was liberated by Anniceris of Cyrene. He, however, made a great impression on Dion, the brother-in-law of the despot, who, on the death of the Elder Dionysius in 367 B.C., invited Plato over in the hope that he would train up the despot's son and successor, the Younger Dionysius, upon the model of the philosopher-king of the *Republic*. The experiment was not successful. Dionysius grew impatient of control, banished Dion, and made it advisable that Plato should withdraw before the expiry of the year. Some years later, 361 B.C., he was induced to return, but was glad to make a hasty escape. Having thus proved to his sorrow the impracticability of his ideal state, at least in this world, he continued teaching at Athens till his death in 347 B.C.

There are extant, besides one book of *Letters* (almost certainly spurious), thirty-five *Dialogues* ascribed to Plato.

These have been classified in as many ways as the plays of Shakspeare. They may be arranged according to the subject-matter—ethics, physics, and metaphysics; they may be divided into dialogues of research and of exposition; or they may be arranged, not exactly in chronological order, but in order of development. Chief of them is the *Republic*, in which is expounded the Platonic Ideal of what a well-organized state should be. Others are concerned with the analysis and discussion of the various cardinal virtues, such as Courage, Friendship, Temperance, or Virtue generally. For beauty of form and expression they have no equal in their language, nor was it until the time of Aristotle that philosophy was divorced from literary style and condemned to find expression in the crabbed and artless form most calculated to discourage its readers.

§ 6. With this period begins that long series of masters who made the name of Athens famous in oratory, the fore-runners and exemplars of Demosthenes. Of three at least of them we must make brief mention, namely, Lysias, Isocrates, and Isaeus.

Lysias, by birth a Syracusan, and subsequently a resident of Athens and Thurii, returned to Athens at some time previous to the installation of the Thirty Tyrants. He was the friend of Socrates and the disciple of many of the more distinguished Sophists of his time; and he was the first notable example of a class which subsequently became numerous, the class of those who practised oratory more for its own sake than for its utility as a weapon in public life. He was a prolific author, credited with more than four hundred orations according to one account, and celebrated for the simplicity and pure idiom of his style. It has been mentioned that by a speech delivered at the Olympic Games of 484 B.C. he gave mortal offence to the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse, and caused the despot's Theory to be grossly maltreated. He died in 378 B.C. Thirty-three of his orations are still extant.

Isocrates the Athenian, born in 437 B.C., was also a disciple of Gorgias and Tisias, the Sicilian rhetors; for oratory was cultivated with success in the great democracies of Sicily for many years prior to its development in

Athens. Like Lysias, Isocrates took no part in public life, but practised solely as a teacher of rhetoric. His best work belongs to the period of Macedonian encroachments, when he used his influence with his pupils, and with King Philip his personal friend, to arrange an amicable settlement between Macedon and Greece. His failure is said to have driven him to suicide. He is mentioned here as one of those who helped to train the tongues of the subsequent generation of political orators. Twenty of his speeches survive.

Isaeus, an Euboean of Chalcis, the pupil of Lysias, was another link between this and the subsequent period, for he was the teacher of Demosthenes. He composed fewer orations than his fellows, but he cultivated a force and fire different both from the wordy rhetoric of Isocrates and the over-cultivated polish of Lysias. Little is known of his life, and there remain only ten of his compositions.

TEST QUESTIONS

ON

GRECIAN HISTORY, 404—362 B.C.

1. Describe the political condition of Greece in 404 B.C.
2. What were the terms of the Peace of Theramenes?
3. Draw a plan of Athens as it was in 404 B.C., showing its harbours, fortifications, and chief buildings. When were its Long Walls demolished and when restored?
4. Compare the condition of subject states under the rule of Athens and Sparta respectively.
5. Trace the various phases in the government of Athens between the surrender of 404 B.C. and the re-establishment of the Democracy.
6. Write a brief account of the rule of the Thirty.
7. Write the life and estimate the character of Theramenes, with special reference to his sobriquet of *ὁ κόθοπρος*.
8. What causes aided Thrasybulus in restoring the democracy?
9. Mention the chief measures passed in the archonship of Eucleides.
10. Write a short life of Critias. How did his unpopularity affect the position of Socrates?
11. Draw a map of Attica, and insert the following names: Phyle, Eleusis, Peiraeus, Munychia, Sunium, Laurium, Decalea, Acharnae.
12. Write a life of Cyrus the Younger, with especial reference to his relations with the Greeks.

13. What political and social reasons led to the expedition of Cyrus and to the enrolment of the Ten Thousand? What was its influence on the subsequent history of Greece?

14. Describe the battle of Cunaxa. Draw a map to illustrate your answer.

15. Draw a map showing the march of Cyrus and the retreat of the Ten Thousand, and insert the names of the principal towns on the route.

16. Write a short account of the condition of the Persian empire in 401 B.C.

17. What do you know of Parysatis, Clearchus, Ariaeus, Anaxibius, Seuthes?

18. Give a brief account of the condition of the different ranks of society in Laconia in 400 B.C.

19. Relate the conspiracy of Cinadon.

20. What were the causes of the outbreak of war between Sparta and Persia in 400 B.C.?

21. Describe the warfare in Asia Minor between Sparta and Persia from its outbreak until the arrival of Agesilaus.

22. Write a narrative of the campaigns of Agesilaus in Asia Minor. Why was he recalled?

23. How would you account for the dislike aroused by the Spartan supremacy in the various Grecian states by the year 395 B.C.?

24. Write an account of the later years of Lysander (404—395 B.C.), showing how he influenced the political attitude of Sparta.

25. Describe the policy of Lysander with regard to the smaller states of Greece. How far was he followed by Agesilaus?

26. Describe the causes of the Corinthian War.

27. Write brief lives of Conon and Thrasybulus. What is known about the end of the former?

28. Give some account of the history of Cyprus during this period, with especial reference to the struggle between Greeks and Persians.

29. Mention the circumstances under which the following battles were fought, and define the position of each: Cnidus, Coronea, Haliartus.

30. Write an account of Iphicrates and his exploits during the Corinthian War.

31. Give the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, and explain the reasons which induced the various Grecian states to accept it. What were its effects on Greek history?

32. Briefly describe the relations of Sparta with Olynthus, and show that Spartan interference in that quarter tended to damage the Greeks at large.

33. Describe the circumstances under which the Cadmea was taken by the Spartans. How and at what period was it regained by the Thebans?

34. State the causes which led to the alliance between Athens and Thebes under Pelopidas and Epameinondas, and briefly give a history of the events by which it was marked.

35. Write a short history of Mantinea during this period, carefully tracing its attitude to Sparta at various dates.

36. Describe the circumstances under which the battle of Naxos was fought.

37. Give an account of the Second Confederacy of Delos, showing in what respects it differed from the First.

38. Write down the conditions of the Peace of Callias, and show how far it was due to Persian interference.

39. What was the precise point which led to the quarrel between Thebes and Sparta in 371 B.C.? Discuss the motives which actuated Agesilaus at this point.

40. Describe the battle of Leuctra, and draw a plan to explain your answer. What were the causes of the victory of the Thebans?

41. Describe the results of the battle of Leuctra upon the history of Greece.

42. Relate the story of the rise of Jason of Pherae, and discuss the possible effect which his assassination had on Grecian history.

43. Give some account of the chief generals whom Athens possessed during the Theban supremacy.

44. Describe the settlement of the Peloponnesus effected by Epameinondas after the battle of Leuctra.

45. How often and in what years did Epameinondas

invade the Peloponnesus? What were the particular political objects at which he aimed there?

46. Give some account of the proceedings of the Arcadians between the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea. What is the date of the Tearless Battle?

47. How far was the history of Arcadia and Boeotia affected by their physical configuration? To what states of modern Europe may they be compared in this respect?

48. Describe the causes which rendered necessary the fourth campaign of Epameinondas in the Peloponnesus.

49. Describe the events of the campaign of 362 B.C.

50. Relate the battle of Mantinea, and add a plan to elucidate your answer.

51. Write a life and character of Pelopidas.

52. Describe briefly the events that occurred in Thessaly during the youth of Philip of Macedon.

53. Write a life of Agesilaus, with special reference to his relations with (a) Persia, and (b) Thebes.

54. Discuss the question whether the reign of Agesilaus was really beneficial to his country.

55. Describe the policy of Agesilaus with regard to the states of Greece other than Thebes.

56. Describe the foreign and domestic policy of Epameinondas.

57. Enumerate the principal occasions on which the Persians came into contact with the Greeks during the period 404—362 B.C.

58. What do you know of the history of Egypt during this period?

59. Explain the meaning of the following:—Scytalism, Decarchy, Harmost, the Sacred Band, the Ten Thousand of Arcadia, the Peers, the Inferiors.

60. Describe the extent of the league over which Athens presided in 362 B.C., and state when each of the allies gave their adherence to it.

61. Compare the political condition of Greece in 404 B.C. and 362 B.C. respectively.

62. Describe the rise to power of Dionysius of Syracuse.

63. Give a brief account of the relations of Dionysius of

Syracuse to (a) the Greek cities of Italy, (b) the states of Hellas proper.

64. Mark on a map the position of the chief cities in ancient Sicily, distinguishing those of Ionian and Dorian origin, and, where cities still exist on the same sites, giving the modern names.

65. Give a short account of the wars waged by Dionysius I. against Carthage, and describe the results of each.

66. Draw a plan of Syracuse, showing its quarters and fortifications in the time of Dionysius I. Mark the position of Ortygia, Tyche, Neapolis, Achradina, Epipolis, the Great Harbour, Plemmyrium, the Olympieum.

67. How was Plato connected with affairs in Sicily, and what mark did his experiences there leave on his writings?

68. Give an account of the principal changes in the Triarchy at Athens.

69. Describe the financial measures brought forward in the archonship of Nausinicus. By whom were they subsequently extended?

70. Give some account of the Athenian corn laws. Whence did Athens chiefly derive its supplies?

71. Date the chief events in the life of Socrates, and indicate the causes to which his unpopularity with his fellow-citizens may be ascribed.

72. Estimate the character and position of the class known as the Sophists, and give the names of some of the more prominent.

73. Name and give some account of the orators who flourished at Athens during this period.

74. Write a life of Xenophon and mention his chief works. Which of those deal with the history of this period?

75. What is meant by the Middle Comedy? Give the names of some of the dramatists who wrote works of this class.

76. Mention our principal original authorities for this period.

77. To what causes is the decline of the Old Comedy to be ascribed?

Show how each of the following was connected with the history of this period :—

78. Conon, Thrasybulus, Evagoras.
79. Antalcidas, Dercylidas, Callistratus.
80. Pharnabazus, Tissaphernes, Seuthes.
81. Thibron, Clearchus, Anaxibius.
82. Dion, Dionysius the Younger, Philistus.
83. Critias, Lysias, Pausanias.
84. Agesipolis, Peisander, Teleutias.
85. Chabrias, Timotheus, Iphicrates.
86. Lycomedes, Alexander of Pherae, Callias.
87. Isocrates, Isaeus, Ctesias.

Name and date any events connected with the following places; and give the position and (where possible) the modern name of each place :—

88. Abydus, Aspendus, Cunaxa.
89. Byzantium, Dascylium, Cyzicus.
90. Eleusis, Pherae, Haliartus.
91. Cnidus, Coronea, Orchomenus.
92. Mantinea, Tegea, Leuctra.
93. Trapezus, Sestus, Sardis.
94. Tegyra, Pharsalus, Sicyon.
95. Thespiae, Phyle, Lechaeum.
96. Rhegium, Himera, Leontini.

97. Draw an outline map of Greece, and insert the names of as many as possible of the places which figure prominently in the history of this period.

98. Translate and explain, adding dates :—

(a) Λακεδαιμόνιοι τε γὰρ οἱ ὁμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις τῇ ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνον τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐκολάσθησαν.

(b) κατέλνε τὰς πολιτείας καὶ καθίστη δεκαδρχίας, πολλῶν μὲν ἐν ἐκάστη σφαττομένων, πολλῶν δὲ φευγόντων.

(c) ἐφ' ᾧ τε εἰρήνην μὲν ἔχειν ὥς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀπιέναι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐκάστους πλην τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τῶν ἑνδεκα καὶ τῶν ἐν Πειραιεὶ ἀρξάντων δέκα.

99. Translate and explain, adding dates :—

(a) Δερκυλίδας — ἀνὴρ δοκῶν εἶναι μάλα μηχανικός, καὶ ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Σίσυφος.

(b) Κόνων δὲ νικήσας τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ἐξέβαλεν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, τοὺς δὲ Ἑλληνας ἡλευθέρωσεν.

(c) Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενῶν καὶ Κύπρον.

100. Translate and explain, adding dates :—

(a) οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι αὐξανόμενοι μὲν ὀρῶντες τοῦς Θηβαίους, χρήματά τε οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικόν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς καὶ ληστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις εἰς Λακεδαίμονα εἰρήνην ἐποιήσαντο.

(b) τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν καπνὸν ὀρῶσαι ἠνείχοντο, ἅτε οὐδέποτε ἰδοῦσαι πολέμιους.

(c) ἡ ἀδακρὺς μάχη.

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